Dial v. Robeson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 29 September 2021
• Docket Number: 1:20CV1135
• Parties: ANTHONY DIAL, Plaintiff, v. ROBESON COUNTY and ROBESON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina

ANTHONY DIAL, Plaintiff,
v.
ROBESON COUNTY and ROBESON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendants.

No. 1:20CV1135

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina

September 29, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the court on the Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by Defendants Robeson County and Robeson County Department of Social Services (“Robeson DSS”). (Doc. 7.) This motion is brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b) (6) .

For the reasons stated herein, this court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint . . . .” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016)).

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Although a motion to dismiss “tests the sufficiency of a complaint, ” Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013), and this court's evaluation is “thus generally limited to a review of the allegations of the complaint itself, ” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016), this court may consider documents that are incorporated into the complaint by reference where the document is integral to the complaint, see Id. at 166, and the plaintiff does not challenge the documents' authenticity, see Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Norman v. Tradewinds Airlines, Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 575, 580 (M.D. N.C. 2003) (“The underlying concern in cases applying this rule is to protect a plaintiff who might not have notice of (and an opportunity to fully respond to) facts newly introduced by the defendant in conjunction with motion of dismissal.”) . Other courts within the Fourth Circuit have considered Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charges attached to motions to dismiss, where plaintiffs relied on those documents in their complaints and did not contest the exhibits' authenticity. See, e.g., Alexander v. City of Greensboro, No. 1:09-CV-934, 2011 WL 13857, at *6-8 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 4, 2011); Cohen v. Sheehy Honda of Alexandria, Inc., No. 1:06cv441 (JCC), 2006 WL 1720679, at *2 (E.D. Va. June. 19, 2006) (finding

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the EEOC charge was integral to complaint because plaintiff “would have been unable to file a civil action without first filing such a charge”).

This court finds that the Complaint incorporates by reference Plaintiff's Charges of Discrimination to the EEOC, which Defendants attached as exhibits to their Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss. (Ex. 1 - 2017 EEOC Charge (Doc. 8-1); Ex. 2 - 2019 EEOC Charge (Doc. 8-2).)

First, the 2017 and the 2019 EEOC Charges are integral to the Complaint. The same incidents form the basis for the allegations in the Complaint and the 2017 and 2019 EEOC Charges, (compare Complaint (“Compl.”) (Doc. 3) ¶¶ 4-13, 15-23, with 2017 EEOC Charge (Doc. 8-1); 2019 EEOC Charge (Doc. 8-2), and this court's jurisdiction is predicated on Plaintiff having filed the Charges of Discrimination and received Right to Sue Letters, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(f) et seq. The Complaint establishes that Plaintiff timely submitted charges to the EEOC, and the EEOC issued Plaintiff right to sue letters for both charges. (Compl. (Doc. 3) ¶¶ 12, 18, 22.)

Second, Plaintiff does not challenge the authenticity of the Charges of Discrimination. Plaintiff refers to the charges in his Complaint, (see Id. ¶¶ 12, 18), and in support of his arguments in his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion

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to Dismiss, (see Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.'s Br.”) (Doc. 10) at 2) .

Defendants cite allegations in the Charges of Discrimination in their Brief in Support of their Motion to Dismiss. (See Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Br.”) (Doc. 8) at 4-5.)

In the absence of any objection, this court will consider the allegations in the Complaint to incorporate those in the Charges of Discrimination, and the facts contained therein will be considered as part of Plaintiff's Complaint. The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.

Plaintiff is a Native American male who has worked for Defendants since 2000 “in a variety of capacities.” (Compl. (Doc. 3) ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleges that in 2014 he filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regarding discrimination concerns. (Id. ¶ 7.)

A. Director of DSS Position

On October 10, 2016, Plaintiff applied for a position as the Director of DSS. (Id. ¶ 8.) He interviewed and “scored the highest of all the candidates.” (Id.) After Plaintiff's initial interview, “Defendants re-opened the interview phase of the search, upon information and belief, to obtain a director of a

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different race than Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff re-interviewed for the position, but this time “the new questions were specifically focused on areas in which Plaintiff ha[d] limited experience and that the other candidate, Velvet Nixon, had extensive experience.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges these questions were changed because Defendants wanted to hire a black candidate. (Id.) The three finalists for the Director of DSS position were black. (Id.) Ms. Nixon, a black female, was offered and accepted the position. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff trained Ms. Nixon in her new position. (Id. ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination within 180 days of these actions and incorporated concerns of retaliation because of his prior EEOC activity in 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.)

B. Assistant County Manager Position

On May 1, 2019, Plaintiff applied and was interviewed for the position of Assistant County Manager. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was told he was not offered the position because “he was not the most qualified candidate.” (Id. ¶ 16.) He was also told “that his prior EEOC activity was a negative factor in his scoring for the position.” (Id.) Shelton Hill, a white male, “with less education and experience and fewer qualifications than Plaintiff” was offered and accepted the position. (Id.)

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In July 2019, Plaintiff filed another EEOC Charge of Discrimination and amended the 2017 EEOC Charge to include “this new retaliatory information.” (Id. ¶ 18.)

On August 14, 2020 and September 9, 2020, Plaintiff received right to sue letters on the Charges of Discrimination from the office of the EEOC. (Id. ¶ 22.)

C. Other Allegations of Retaliation

Plaintiff makes several additional allegations of retaliatory conduct by Defendants. First, Plaintiff alleges that during the interview phase for the Director of DSS position, the decisionmakers were told Plaintiff was under investigation for Medicaid fraud. (Id. ¶ 25.) Second, in spring 2019, Plaintiff was disqualified from consideration for the Deputy Director of DSS position because of a potential lawsuit related to the investigation. (Id. ¶ 27.) Third, Plaintiff alleges that because he voiced concerns regarding racial disparity in promotions and work environment for Native Americans, he “suffered excessive scrutiny of his performance, was subjected to factually unsubstantiated investigations, undermining of his authority with staff, and deprived of promotions and a professionally satisfying work environment as compared to his non-Native American coworkers.” (Id. ¶ 29.)

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D. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a charge of employment discrimination alleging race and sex discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC on May 16, 2017. (2017 EEOC Charge (Doc. 8-1).) Plaintiff filed another charge of employment discrimination alleging race discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC on December 10, 2019. (2019 EEOC Charge (Doc. 8-2).)

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Guilford County Superior Court on November 12, 2020. (Compl. (Doc. 3).) Defendants filed a Petition for Removal on December 16, 2020. (Doc. 1.) Defendants then moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6), (Doc. 7), and filed a brief in support of their motion, (Defs.' Br. (Doc. 8)). Plaintiff responded, (Doc. 9), and filed a brief in support of his response, (Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 10)); and Defendants replied, (Doc. 11).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under federal law, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To be facially plausible, a claim must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable” and must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true. Id. Further, “the complaint, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, [is] liberally construed in the plaintiff's favor.” Est. of Williams-Moore v. All. One Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.Supp.2d 636, 646 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (citation omitted).

Nevertheless, the factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” so as to “nudge[] the[] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680; Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying the Twombly/Iqbal standard to evaluate the legal sufficiency of pleadings). A court cannot “ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege any facts which set forth a claim.” Est. of Williams-Moore, 335 F.Supp.2d at 646. Consequently, even given the deferential standard allocated to pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage, a court will not accept mere legal conclusions as true and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the...