Dial v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-566-MMH-LLL |
| Decision Date | 23 August 2023 |
| Parties | DONALD DIAL, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
1
DONALD DIAL, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
No. 3:20-cv-566-MMH-LLL
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division
August 23, 2023
ORDER
MARCIA MORALES HOWARD United States District Judge.
I. Status
Petitioner Donald Dial, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on May 31, 2020, by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).[1] Dial challenges a 2016 state court (St. Johns County, Florida) judgment of conviction for armed robbery. He raises six grounds for relief. See id. at 4-15. Respondents have submitted a memorandum opposing the Petition, in which they argue that the Petition is untimely filed. See Response to Petition (Response; Doc. 14). They also
submitted exhibits. See Response Ex. 1. Dial filed a Reply. See Reply to Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Reply; Doc. 15). This action is ripe for review.
II. Relevant Procedural History
On April 8, 2016, the state charged Dial by Amended Information with one count of armed robbery. Response Ex. 1 at 5. Dial proceeded to trial, and on April 29, 2016, a jury found him guilty as charged in the Amended Information. Id. at 1134-35. On May 27, 2016, the trial court adjudicated Dial as a prison releasee reoffender and sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment. Id. at 1058, 1060.
On direct appeal, Dial, with the assistance of appellate counsel, filed an initial brief arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the consideration of Dial's trial testimony. Id. at 1089-95. The state filed an answer brief. Id. at 1099. The Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA) per curiam affirmed Dial's conviction and sentence without a written opinion on April 4, 2017. Id. at 1119. The mandate issued on April 28, 2017. Id. at 1121.
Dial then filed three motions for postconviction relief in state court. Response Ex. 1 at 1123-29, 1190-95, 1203-38. He first filed a motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) on March 2, 2018. Id. at 1123-29. The trial court summarily denied relief. Id. at 1139-42. On June 26, 2018, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed without opinion the trial
court's denial, and on July 20, 2018, it issued the mandate. Dial v. State, 248 So.3d 1159, 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018).[2] On May 8, 2018, Dial filed a second motion to correct illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a). Response Ex. 1 at 1190-95. The trial court found the allegations raised in the second Rule 3.800(a) motion were not cognizable and dismissed the motion. Id. at 1199-1201. J
On December 20, 2018, Dial filed his third motion for postconviction relief, this time under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to: object to the Amended Information and the jury instructions read at trial (ground one); renew and preserve for appeal a race-based challenge to the state's use of a peremptory strike during jury selection (ground two); object when the jury was instructed on an element not charged in the Amended Information (ground three); and ensure the jury was properly instructed regarding Dial's decision to testify at trial (ground four). Id. at 1203-38. The trial court summarily denied relief on all grounds. Id. at 1252-69. On March 24, 2020, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the trial court's denial without a written opinion, id. at 1397, and on April 17, 2020, it issued the mandate, id. at 1399.
III. One-Year Limitations Period
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through theexercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
The parties dispute the timeliness of this Petition. Respondents contend the Petition is untimely filed, arguing the May 2018 Rule 3.800(a) motion was not a tolling event. According to Respondents, because the trial court found the claims were only cognizable under Rule 3.850, the lack of oath rendered the May 2018 motion improperly filed for tolling purposes. The Court finds this argument to be without merit.
Despite Petitioner's failure to raise this claim in a proper procedural manner before the trial court, he properly filed the motion. The Supreme Court makes clear that “an application is ‘properly filed' when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). Determining if a petitioner properly filed an application is a separate issue from whether the claims themselves are meritorious or free from procedural bars. Id. at 9. Under Artuz, “properly filed” means delivered to the proper person, within the applicable time, with the required filing fees, in a form that enables the court to consider the motion. Id. at 8.
The Eleventh Circuit later applied Artuz to a situation similar to the circumstances before the court here and concluded that a Rule 3.800(a) motion tolled the limitations period even though the state court dismissed it because the petitioner brought it pursuant to the wrong statutory vehicle. Delancy v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 246 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 906 F.3d 1339, 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 2018). In so finding, the Eleventh Circuit instructed that a court should not look beyond the face of the Rule 3.800(a) motion to determine whether petitioner properly filed it for tolling purposes. Id. at 1330-31. Instead, the determination on whether a petitioner properly filed a motion should center on whether it met state procedural and filing requirements. Id. at 1330-31.
Dial submitted to the state court a Rule 3.800(a) motion in May 2018. Respondents contend this motion did not toll his one-year limitation period, resting their argument on Dial's failure to properly file his motion pursuant to Florida procedural requirements. While the trial court discussed in its order the fact that Dial's claims would be cognizable in a Rule 3.850 motion, it is evident from the trial court's order that it did not construe his motion to be a Rule 3.850 motion. Instead, the trial court dismissed the motion and gave Dial an opportunity to file a Rule 3.850 motion. Dial's filing remained a Rule 3.800(a) motion. And Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) does not require an oath. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a). Thus, despite the trial court's finding
that the claims contained within the May 8, 2018 Rule 3.800(a) motion were not cognizable, Dial still properly filed his Rule 3.800(a) motion with the trial court. See Artuz, 531 U.S. at 9; Delancy, 246 F.3d at 1331. Based on this reasoning, the Court finds this action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
IV. Evidentiary Hearing
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [Dial's] claim[s] without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
V. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly circumscribed' and ‘highly deferential.'” Id. (quoting Hill v....
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