Diamond Auto Sales, Inc. v. Erbe

• Decision Date: 18 October 1960
• Docket Number: No. 50118,50118
• Citation: 105 N.W.2d 650,251 Iowa 1330
• Parties: DIAMOND AUTO SALES, INC.; Eastown Motors, Inc.; Pioneer Auto Company, Inc.; Michael P. Murray, d/b/a Murray Motor Sales; Ted McGrevey, d/b/a Ted McGrevey Used Cars; B & L Motor Sales, a partnership composed of Ben Rosenfeld and Mary Rosenfeld; Winick Brothers Auto Company, a partnership composed of Mose J. Winick and Sam H. Winick, Appellants, v. Norman ERBE, Attorney General of Iowa; Ray Hanrahan, County Attorney of Polk County; Russell I. Brown, Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety of Iowa; and Donovan H. Day, Director of State Dealers License Division in the Department of Public Safety of the State of Iowa, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 650

105 N.W.2d 650

251 Iowa 1330

DIAMOND AUTO SALES, INC.; Eastown Motors, Inc.; Pioneer Auto Company, Inc.; Michael P. Murray, d/b/a Murray Motor Sales; Ted McGrevey, d/b/a Ted McGrevey Used Cars; B & L Motor Sales, a partnership composed of Ben Rosenfeld and Mary Rosenfeld; Winick Brothers Auto Company, a partnership composed of Mose J. Winick and Sam H. Winick, Appellants, v. Norman ERBE, Attorney General of Iowa; Ray Hanrahan, County Attorney of Polk County; Russell I. Brown, Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety of Iowa; and Donovan H. Day, Director of State Dealers License Division in the Department of Public Safety of the State of Iowa, Appellees.

No. 50118.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 18, 1960.

Henry Wormley and Anthony Critelli, Des Moines, for appellants.

Norman A. Erbe, Atty. Gen., Carl H. Pesch, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ray Hanrahan, County Atty. for Polk County, Des Moines, for appellees.

Brody, Parker, Miller, Roberts & Thoma, Des Moines, for Iowa Automobile Dealers Ass'n, amicus curiae.

THOMPSON, Justice.

The plaintiffs are used motor vehicle dealers operating businesses in the State of Iowa. Their petition alleges that Chapter 243 of the Acts of the 58th General Assembly, enacted on April 2, 1959 and effective on July 4 following is void and unconstitutional, prays a declaratory judgment so holding and asks for injunctive relief against enforcement of its provisions. We set out Chapter 243 herewith: 'Sunday Sales of Motor Vehicles. Section 1. Section three hundred twenty-two point three (322.3), Code 1958, is hereby amended by adding thereto a new subsection as follows: 'No person licensed under this chapter shall, either directly or through an agent, salesman or employee, engage in this state, or represent or advertise that he is engaged or intends to engage in this state, in the business of buying or selling at retail new or used motor vehicles on the first day of the week, commonly known and designated as Sunday.''

Plaintiffs' proposition relied upon for reversal are three: The act is an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with plaintiffs' business and is in violation of Section 1 of Article 1 of the Iowa Constitution, I.C.A.; the law is not uniform in application and is discriminatory, in violation of Section 6 of Article 1 of the Iowa Constitution and of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and it is too vague, uncertain and indefinite to be enforceable as a criminal statute. We shall discuss these in the order stated.

1. It is elementary that the courts have no concern with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of the enactments of the legislature and may not interfere because of any supposed lack of those elements in the legislation under attack. This freedom from lack of responsibility for what the legislature does is at times a comforting position for the judiciary, but it has no further significance here. The question we must determine is whether the law-making body acted within its constitutional powers.

Sections 1 and 6 of Article 1 of the Iowa Constitution are quoted:

'Freedom and equality--inalienable rights

'Section 1. All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights--among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

'Laws of uniform operation--grant of privileges or immunities

'Section 6. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.'

The material part of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is likewise set out: 'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'

II. It is Section 1 of Article 1, and the 14th Amendment, supra, which are relied upon by the plaintiffs in upholding their first ground for reversal. It is contended Chapter 243, supra, is an unreasonable and arbitrary interference with their businesses and so is in conflict with Article 1 and the 14th Amendment. The record shows that the plaintiffs are all dealers in used, or second hand, motor vehicles. Consequently we have no concern here with the application of the statute to new vehicles. A litigant will not be heard to attack the constitutionality of a statute unless his own rights will be infringed thereby. Browneller v. Natural Gas Pipeline Company, 233 Iowa 686, 692, 8 N.W.2d 474, 477, and citations. It follows that the plaintiffs here must rely upon a denial of their own rights rather than of those of dealers in new vehicles, or others.

The record shows that when House File 311, which was later enacted as Chapter 243, supra, was introduced, there was attached to it an 'Explanation of House File 311', which appears to be the legislative reasons for the law. We quote the explanation: 'Licensed motor vehicle dealers are prohibited by existing laws from selling motor vehicles which do not meet specific safety standards and they are required to furnish the purchaser, prior to delivery of the motor vehicle, certain legal documents that are peculiar to the trade. This bill would amend the motor vehicle dealers licensing law to protect the public:

'(1) from the hazards of driving in Sunday's highly congested traffic unsafe cars purchased from dealers on Sunday when mechanics are not on duty and state enforcement agents are not available for checking dealer lots; and:

'(2) from the risks of being involved in the improper sale of a motor vehicle due to the inaccessibility of essential legal documents on Sunday and, in some cases, protective liability insurance. Thus this bill would aid the commissioner of public safety in his enforcement of the existing motor vehicle laws.' The plaintiffs introduced evidence which they think showed the invalidity of the reasons given by the legislature. But before discussing this phase of the question it is appropriate to point out that we are not limited to those matters. If any reasonable state of facts can be conceived which will support the validity of the law, it is our duty to sustain it; and it is plaintiffs' duty to negative every conceivable basis for upholding it. Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 400, 35 N.W.2d 66, 71; Eckerson v. City of Des Moines, 137 Iowa 452, 476, 115 N.W. 177, 187; McGuire v. Chicago, B. & Q. Railway, 131 Iowa 340, 350, 108 N.W. 902, 905, 33 L.R.A.,N.S., 706.

Other well settled rules of constitutional law must be kept in mind. Regularly enacted laws are presumed to be constitutional, and this presumption must be overcome by one attacking a statute by proving its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. State ex rel. Cairy v. Iowa Co-Operative Association, 250 Iowa 839, 844, 95 N.W.2d 441, 443, and cases cited.

It is also established that the fact a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 932, 77 N.W.2d 15, 20, and citations.

Turning then specifically to the attack on the questioned act because it unreasonably and arbitrarily interferes with the businesses of the plaintiffs, we must determine whether the reasons given by the legislature, or any other conceivable state of facts, have been negatived by the plaintiffs by the required quantum of proof. Chapter 243 is unquestionably an attempted exercise of the police power of the state and must be sustained as such or overthown as an arbitrary and unreasonable use of the power. The concept of this power has been broadened in later years. We said, in Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, supra, at page 930 of 247 Iowa, at page 19 of 77 N.W.2d: 'Formerly the police power was thought to be limited to measures that promoted merely the public health, safety or morals. Its scope is now generally recognized as much less restricted. It has repeatedly been held to include at least the promotion of prosperity and the general welfare.' (Citing authorities). It is in the light of modern authority that we must consider the act before us.

The legislature said the act is needed because of the danger arising from driving motor vehicles purchased on Sunday when mechanics are not available. The plaintiffs' evidence shows that generally mechanics do not work on Sunday. They counter this, however, by evidence that they check all used cars coming to their lots and sell them only when they are put in good condition for safe driving. This, it seems to us, is a matter for the legislature to weigh. There is evidence that many prospective purchasers of used automobiles prefer to drive then a short distance before buying. Perhaps they choose to have them checked by mechanics of their own selection. In any event we cannot say the evidence of safety is so conclusive the legislature had no reasonable basis for its determination at this point.

The legislative conclusion that danger of fraud or mistake might arise on Sunday sales of used cars because county recorders' offices are not open so that title and liens can be checked is likewise beyond our power to hold as an arbitrary and unreasonable basis for the act. All dealers in either new or used motor vehicles are required to first procure licenses from the state. Section 322.3, Code of 1958, I.C.A. But this is not a complete guarantee against mistake, fraud or misrepresentation; at least we cannot hold the legislature has been proved to have been arbitrary and unreasonable in so concluding. Many vehicles are subject to conditional sales contracts, mortgages, or tax liens of record. The Sunday buyer has no opportunity to check this for himself; if the...