Diamond Coal & Coke Co, Petition of
| Decision Date | 19 April 1921 |
| Citation | 297 F. 238 |
| Parties | Petition of DIAMOND COAL & COKE CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
W. R Murphy, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for petitioner.
This is a proceeding by the Diamond Coal & Coke Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, to limit its liability for the results of the breaking loose of nine barges during a rise of the Monongahela river on January 2, 1919. The limitation of liability is claimed under section 4283 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. St. Sec. 8021), which reads as follows:
'The liability of the owner of any vessel, for any embezzlement loss, or destruction, by any person, of any property goods, or merchandise, shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity, or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall in no case exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending,'
-- and under section 4289 of the Revised Statutes as amended by the Act of June 19, 1886, 24 Statutes at Large, 80, 81 (Comp. St. 8027), so as to read as follows:
'The provisions of the seven preceding sections, and of section eighteen of an act entitled 'An act to remove certain burdens on the American merchant marine and encourage the American foreign carrying trade, and for other purposes,' approved June twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, relating to the limitations of the liability of the owners of vessels, shall apply to all sea-going vessels, and also to all vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges, and lighters.'
At the time the petition was filed, suit had already been brought by the Hazelwood Dock Company against the petitioner to recover damages from the petitioner for the loss, destruction, and injury occasioned to property of the plaintiff by the barges of the petitioner as they were carried down the river. To the petition filed, the Hazelwood Dock Company filed its answer, and as well also did the Iron City Sand Company, a corporation under the laws of Pennsylvania, which had suffered similar injuries to its property from like cause.
The petitioner, having invoked the provisions of law for the purpose of limiting its liability, necessarily has assumed the burden of proving that it comes within such provisions. To be more explicit, the petitioner must satisfy the court, in order that its liability shall not exceed the value of the barges, that the injury by their collision was occasioned 'without the privity, or knowledge of such owner,' and also that the said barges were 'vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation.' From the large mass of testimony taken in this case it must be found, not only that the plaintiff has not sustained the burden resting upon it to prove either branch of its case, but that it clearly shows that the breaking away of the barges, and their subsequent collision as they moved down stream, occurred as the result of negligence which cannot be said to have been 'without the privity or knowledge of such owner,' and, further, that said barges had been so withdrawn from navigation that they could not be included in terms 'vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation.'
On September 22, 1918, there had accumulated at the Bird's Run dock of the petitioner a large number of barges, too many in fact to enable the petitioner to promptly conduct its business at said dock. In order to have more room at said landing, it was deemed proper by those in charge of said docks to get rid of some of the accumulated barges. Two, at least, were taken into the river, broken up and destroyed. On the date last mentioned, A. R. Budd, the vice president and general manager of the coal company, directed that seven of the barges mentioned above should be taken directly across the river to be tied there. Later, at different times, an eighth and a ninth barge were sent across to the same place and tied with the other barges. The place to which these barges were sent had not been used as a landing for many years, and for years previous to the placing of the barges there the character of the bank had been changed. The change was due to a heavy fill by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company under trestles built by said railroad, intended to support the railroad track resting thereon. When the barges were taken to this place, they were tied up in single...
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