Diamond Iron Works v. Werley

Decision Date30 June 1925
Docket Number19344.
Citation135 Wash. 228,237 P. 313
PartiesDIAMOND IRON WORKS v. WERLEY.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pacific County; Abel, Judge.

Action of replevin by the Diamond Iron Works against C. A. Werley. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Tolman C.J., dissenting.

Fred M Bond, of South Bend, for appellant.

Theodore B. Bruener, of Aberdeen, and Welsh & Welsh, of South Bend for respondent.

MACKINTOSH J.

In July, 1922, the respondent sold machinery under a conditional sale contract to the Willapa Harbor Lumber & Shingle Co. A memorandum of the sale was filed within the statutory time in the office of the auditor of Pacific county, and was properly indexed as a conditional sale contract. This memorandum described the property as 'machinery as per plans and specifications submitted herewith.' This memorandum consisted of the proposition, from the respondent and signed by it, addressed to the Willapa Harbor Lumber & Shingle Co. The proposition as filed did not have attached any plans and specifications, but it appears from the agreed findings of fact that the plans and specifications were attached to the original contracts which were signed by the vendor and vendee, duplicates of which were in the possession of each. By the same findings of fact it appears that the description of the machinery sold would apply to and fit only shingle mill machinery sold and delivered by the respondent. Thereafter the vendee became bankrupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy, under proper orders of the court, sold all the assets of the estate to the appellant, who took possession of them, including the machinery originally sold by the respondent. The demand of the respondent for the return of the machinery being refused, it began this action in replevin to recover possession. The sole question for determination is whether the filing of this memorandum of sale satisfied the requirements of section 3670, Rem. Comp. Stat., so that the vendor's rights are protected, and the appellant is not entitled as against it to possession of this property. The answer to this question depends upon whether the description of the property contained in the memorandum was sufficient.

This court has had occasion to pass upon the sufficiency of descriptions of personal property sold under conditional sale contracts, and the latest expression of its view of the matter is contained in MacCallum-Donahoe Finance Company v. Warren, 122 Wash. 176, 210 P. 368, where the following appears:

'There is nothing in the conditional sale statutes above cited to require any specific description of personal property sold under conditional sales contract. It is a general rule, however, that the contract of conditional sale should properly identify the property, but it is not necessary that the description should be such as to identify the property
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1 cases
  • Empire State Chair Co., Inc. v. Beldock
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • 3 Febrero 1944
    ...on the exact facts. Indeed, there seems to be but a single case throwing doubt on the general proposition, namely, Diamond Iron Works v. Werley, 135 Wash. 228, 237 P. 313. There, under a state statute, Rem. Comp.Stat. § 3670, not the Uniform Act, a conditional sales contract for "machinery ......

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