Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 10951,10951
• Parties: d 124 DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, a Utah corporation and Pacific Finance, Inc., aUtah corporation, Defendants and Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 705

441 P.2d 705

21 Utah 2d 124

DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, a Utah corporation and Pacific

Finance, Inc., aUtah corporation, Defendants and Respondent.

No. 10951.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 20, 1968.

Wilkinson, Wilkinson & Knowlton, Homer F. Wilkinson, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

L. Ridd Larson, Salt Lake City, for respondent, Travelers Indemnity Co.

JONES, District Judge:

Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment of dismissal.

This was an action to recover on an automobile insurance policy. Appellant maintains that the contract is ambiguous in regard to whether vehicles sold under conditional sales contracts are covered, and that this ambiguity should be resolved in its favor. See Stout v. Washington Fire & Marine, 14 Utah 2d 414, 385 P.2d 608. It asserts that 'the insurance contract itself provided that the insured's interest will be insured on used automobiles even though it might have been sold under a conditional sales contract if the insured has an interest even if the conditional sales contract is in force.' But a reading-over of the entire policy discloses no such ambiguity. Twice therein it is stipulated that vehicles sold under conditional sales are excluded from coverage. Appellant points out that another clause therein recites that 'used' vehicles are to be covered. (The vehicle in question was a used one.) We do not agree with the contention that the latter provision makes the former exclusionary clauses ambiguous. The two different provisions are not conflicting, as each relates to a different subject or classification. The language of this insurance contract appears to be clear and not susceptible of more than one interpretation by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the written instrument, other than oral statements by the parties of what they intend it to mean. 17 Am.Jur.2d, § 243, p. 630. Williston, Contracts (3rd ed.) Secs. 603, et seq. Therefore, the insurance contract in question is not ambiguous.

It is the further contention of the appellant that the undisputed facts show that the vehicle, when wrecked, ws a stolen car under the provisions of the insurance contract and, therefore, it (and not respondent) was entitled to have summary judgment. We examine the record, guided by the provisions of Rule 56, U.R.C.P. for the purpose of ascertaining if no genuine issue as to any material fact remains.

The truck-trailer in question was sold by appellant under a conditional sales contract; the paper thereon was assigned to a finance company (no longer a party to this action); the purchaser became delinquent in meeting his payments; the titleholder located the vehicle parked on a public street, peaceably took possession of the same, and caused it to be moved to a storage yard where it was left and a receipt taken from a bailee; said receipt, together with the keys to the cab, were then forwarded to said titleholder. About this time the buyer called appellant's president on the telephone and attempted to make arrangements so that he could regain possession of the stored vehicle. He was advised to take up the matter with the finance company, the legal titleholder of said conditional sales contract. The record does not disclose just what, if anything, transpired between the erstwhile purchaser and the titleholder,...