Diamond v. Diamond

Decision Date02 July 2012
Docket NumberNo. 32,695.,32,695.
Citation2012 -NMSC- 022,283 P.3d 260
PartiesJhette DIAMOND, Petitioner–Petitioner, v. Adrienne DIAMOND, Respondent–Respondent.
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court

283 P.3d 260
2012 -NMSC- 022

Jhette DIAMOND, Petitioner–Petitioner,
v.
Adrienne DIAMOND, Respondent–Respondent.

No. 32,695.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 2, 2012.


[283 P.3d 261]


Pegasus Legal Services for Children, Peter H. Klages, Tara Ford, Grace Catherine Spulak, Elizabeth V. McGrath, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner.

Donna J. Lynch, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.


OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} This appeal presents this Court with a matter of first impression: does the New Mexico Emancipation of Minors Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A–21–1 to –7 (1995) (the Act), which provides that a minor may be emancipated for “one or more purposes” set forth in the Act, seeSection 32A–21–7(D), authorize a district court to declare a minor emancipated for some rather than all of those enumerated purposes? Based on the plain language and legislative purpose of the Act, we answer that question in the affirmative and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} Petitioner Jhette Diamond (Daughter), then sixteen years old, petitioned the district court in January 2007 for a declaration of emancipation pursuant to the Act. Daughter left the home of her mother Adrienne Diamond (Mother) at age thirteen and had been living with several different households since that time.

{3} The district court held a hearing on Daughter's petition in February 2007. Mother did not appear at the hearing or otherwise oppose the petition. Daughter, represented by counsel, told the district court that she had moved out of Mother's home due to domestic violence and substance abuse issues. Daughter had been working since the age of eleven, including for the past several years as a restaurant server and busser, while maintaining a high grade-point average as a sophomore at Española Valley High School. Counsel described Daughter as “focused on her future,” and thriving with the support of the couple with whom she was living. Daughter had no intention of returning to live with Mother, who maintained a relationship with the man whose violent behavior and substance abuse had contributed to Daughter's decision to leave Mother's home in the first place.

{4} The district court concluded that by all accounts Daughter was capable of making appropriate choices for herself and covering her own expenses, describing Daughter's situation as “a classic case” for emancipation. Because Mother had not provided any financial support to Daughter before or after Daughter began living apart from Mother, Daughter asked if the emancipation order could be styled to reserve her right to pursue financial support from Mother. The court agreed provided that counsel could confirm that the Act authorized the court to do so.

{5} The district court issued a “Declaration of Emancipation of Minor” in March 2007, finding that Daughter had been living independently and managing her own financial affairs without support from Mother, determining that emancipation would be in Daughter's best interest, and declaring Daughter “an emancipated minor in all respects, except that she shall retain the right

[283 P.3d 262]

to support from [Mother]” pursuant to Section 32A–21–5(D) of the Act. Mother filed a pro se motion to set aside the declaration because she had not received adequate notice of the original emancipation hearing. Mother additionally argued that she had supported Daughter even after Daughter moved out by paying for Daughter's traffic tickets, medical and dental care, and school clothes, and “[was] always giving [Daughter] spending money.” Mother also disputed that Daughter was managing her own financial affairs.

{6} The district court held a hearing on Mother's pro se motion in April 2007. Mother repeated her objections to Daughter's emancipation because, in her view, Daughter was not mature enough to act in her own best interest. The district court asked Mother for evidence or examples of Daughter's lack of maturity, and Mother could not think of any.

{7} Consistent with her prior representations to the court, Daughter testified that she had been working since age eleven. Daughter added that during the time she was still living with Mother, her earnings went to household expenses such as utility bills, and stated that “whenever my mom asked me for money, I gave it to her.” Daughter also reiterated that she had left Mother's home due to violence that Mother's boyfriend perpetrated against both Mother and Daughter, as well as the boyfriend's chronic alcohol and drug abuse.

{8} The incident precipitating Daughter's decision to stop living with Mother, Daughter testified, took place in October 2003. One evening, in the course of an argument, Mother's boyfriend shook Mother and threw her against a bed. Mother began to have a panic attack, and her boyfriend departed. Although she was only thirteen years old at the time, Daughter drove Mother to the hospital. Some time after Mother and Daughter returned from the hospital, Mother's boyfriend reappeared at their home and demanded to see Mother. Daughter told him to leave. Mother's boyfriend pushed his way into the home, and when Daughter continued to block his access to Mother, the boyfriend picked Daughter up and threw her over a couch. Daughter kicked the boyfriend in the face and he again left the home.

{9} After this altercation, Daughter told Mother that she did not want Mother's boyfriend to come over to their home anymore. Instead of asking her boyfriend to stay away, Mother went to live with him at his home, leaving Daughter alone in their trailer with no water, gas, or electricity service due to unpaid bills. Daughter remained in the trailer until being evicted several months later in the middle of winter. During this period, Daughter continued to work and attend school full time. Because there was no food at Mother's home, Daughter frequently obtained food from a woman who employed her at a local restaurant.

{10} Daughter then lived for several months with neighbors, again while attending school full time and remaining employed. She later moved in with the brother of one of her neighbors, where she lived for several years, continuing to work at a local restaurant, paying for her own expenses and contributing to rent and other household expenses. Several months before filing her petition for emancipation, Daughter began living with members of the same extended family, a couple who allowed her to stay with them rent-free so that she could focus on school.

{11} Disputing Mother's assertions about having covered certain expenses, Daughter testified that it was actually a concerned teacher who paid for her traffic ticket, that Daughter herself paid for dental care, and that Medicaid covered the cost of medical care when Daughter broke her arm at school. Daughter acknowledged that on a single occasion Mother had purchased several items of clothing for her, but that she could not recall Mother ever providing her with spending money, contrary to Mother's claim that she “always” did so. Daughter testified that since living apart from Mother, she would visit Mother at her home approximately once a month but that she could remember only a handful of occasions when Mother visited her or otherwise attempted to contact her, including once when Mother turned up at Daughter's school to ask her for money.

[283 P.3d 263]

{12} Daughter also explained why she was seeking emancipation. Although at that point in time she had already been living apart from her Mother for two to three years, paying her own expenses, attending school, and working, Daughter testified that she had difficulty obtaining medical insurance, accessing her school report cards, or applying for a driver's permit, all of which required parental consent. Emancipated status also would allow Daughter to open a bank account. Daughter stated that she would be uncomfortable if she were required to resume living with Mother, especially because Mother's abusive boyfriend remained a presence in Mother's home, and because she was doing well on her own.

{13} After hearing testimony from Mother and Daughter, the district court ruled from the bench that even assuming that all of Mother's contentions were true, emancipation remained in Daughter's best interest. The district court then re-declared Daughter to be emancipated and issued a formal order to that effect, which included the same provision as the court's prior order that Daughter was “an emancipated minor in all respects, except that she shall retain the right to support from [Mother]” pursuant to Section 32A–21–D(5) of the Act.

{14} As permitted by the district court's emancipation orders, in February 2008 Daughter filed a petition asking the district court to order Mother to pay retroactive and prospective child support to Daughter.1 Although Daughter's support petition was not expressly denominated as such, the parties and the district court treated it as an action to establish parentage and for support under the Uniform Parentage Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 40–11–1 to –23 (1986, as amended through 2004) (repealed and recodified at NMSA 1978, §§ 40–11A–101 to –903 (2009)).

{15} A hearing officer determined that Mother had not provided a home or financial support for Daughter since Daughter's emancipation. The hearing officer recommended that Mother be ordered to make support payments to Daughter in the amount of $390.00 per month from March 1, 2008 until Daughter reached the age of eighteen 2 or graduated from high school, whichever event occurred later. The hearing officer reserved for later determination the issue of any child support obligation predating March 1, 2008 (including periods of time both predating and following Daughter's emancipation). The district court affirmed the hearing officer's report over Mother's written objections, and in January 2009 directed that a portion of Mother's retirement benefit, her sole source of income, be garnished and paid to Daughter.

{16} The parties filed several subsequent motions before the...

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