Díaz Aviation Corp. v. Airport Aviation Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1859.,12–1859.
• Citation: 716 F.3d 256
• Parties: DÍAZ AVIATION CORPORATION, d/b/a Borinquen Air, Plaintiff, Appellant, Sixto Díaz–Saldaña Plaintiff, v. AIRPORT AVIATION SERVICES, INC.; José Algarín; Rafael Matos; Puerto Rico Ports Authority; Fernando Bonilla; Federico Sosa–Román, a/k/a Fred Sosa–Román; Edwin Santana–de la Rosa; Arnaldo Deleo; Edgar Sierra; Eric García; Alvaro Pilar, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

716 F.3d 256

DÍAZ AVIATION CORPORATION, d/b/a Borinquen Air, Plaintiff, Appellant,

Sixto Díaz–Saldaña Plaintiff,

v.AIRPORT AVIATION SERVICES, INC.; José Algarín; Rafael Matos; Puerto Rico Ports Authority; Fernando Bonilla; Federico Sosa–Román, a/k/a Fred Sosa–Román; Edwin Santana–de la Rosa; Arnaldo Deleo; Edgar Sierra; Eric García; Alvaro Pilar, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 12–1859.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

June 14, 2013.

Sixto M. Díaz–Saldaña, on brief for appellant.

Guillermo De Guzmán–Vendrell and De Guzmán Law Offices, on brief for appellees Airport Aviation Services, Inc. and Edwin Santana–de la Rosa.

Arturo Díaz–Angueira and Cancio, Nadal, Rivera & Díaz, P.S.C., on brief for appellees José Algarín and Rafael Matos.

Margarita Mercado–Echegaray, Office of the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, on brief for appellees Fernando Bonilla and Federico Sosa–Román.

Myra M. Vélez–Plumey and Fernández, Collins Cuyar & Plá, on brief for non-appellees Puerto Rico Ports Authority, Alvaro Pilar, Arnaldo Deleo, Edgar Sierra and Eric García.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

A company that sells aviation fuel at a Puerto Rico airport brought suit against a rival company, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, and employees of those entities, claiming that the defendants wrongfully interfered with its business. The district court dismissed the claims against some defendants before trial, and granted judgment for the remaining defendants after a bench trial. Finding no error, we affirm.

I

The plaintiff-appellant is Díaz Aviation Corporation (“Díaz Aviation”), a company that also does business under the trade names Borinquen Air and Amber Service. Díaz Aviation has provided aviation services at the Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport (“LMMIA”) in Carolina, Puerto Rico, since 1960. Although the business began as an airline, in 1985 it began selling aviation fuel. By 2005, Díaz Aviation was selling around $2 million of fuel per year, and its main customer was the United States military.

Sixto Díaz–Saldaña (“Díaz”) is the founder, sole shareholder, and general manager of Díaz Aviation. He is also a licensed attorney, and has chosen to represent his corporation throughout this litigation, in the district court and on appeal.

One group of defendants consists of Airport Aviation Services, Inc. (“AAS”) and some current and former employees of AAS. AAS is a Puerto Rico corporation that sells aviation fuel at LMMIA; it was formerly part of a consortium of Puerto Rican companies known as “Empresas Santana.” Edwin Santana de la Rosa was formerly a stockholder, director, and officer of AAS; however, he sold his stock in AAS and resigned from all positions at AAS in March 2008. José Algarín is the president and CEO of AAS. Rafael Matos is the Director of Fuel Sales and Operations Manager of AAS.

The second group of defendants is the Puerto Rico Ports Authority (“PRPA”) and various PRPA employees. The PRPA is a corporation owned by the Puerto Rico government that ran LMMIA during the relevanttime frame. Fernando Bonilla is a former Executive Director of the PRPA. Federico Sosa–Román is a former manager of LMMIA. Alvaro Pilar is the Executive Director of the PRPA. Arnaldo Deleo is the Director of Aviation of PRPA and manager of LMMIA. Edgar Sierra is the Director of Operations at LMMIA. Eric Gracia is the Assistant Director of Operations at LMMIA.

Díaz Aviation filed a complaint in the federal district court on June 26, 2009, and filed an amended complaint on February 17, 2010. Broadly speaking, the amended complaint alleges that a corrupt relationship existed between AAS and PRPA, and that both organizations and their employees took improper actions in order to drive Díaz Aviation out of business. Díaz Aviation alleges that Santana has paid bribes to the governing political party of Puerto Rico, and that as a result, the PRPA has systematically favored AAS and discriminated against Díaz Aviation. The complaint points to several specific actions and incidents, including:

-In March 2005, the PRPA brought an eviction action against Díaz Aviation in Puerto Rico court. This action ultimately failed because Díaz Aviation had paid rent and the PRPA had accepted it.

-In 2009, AAS won a contract to supply the military with fuel at LMMIA. Díaz Aviation alleges that AAS has wrongfully claimed that this is an exclusive contract, and has interfered with Díaz Aviation's fuel sales to the Air Force.

-On October 23, 2009, Algarín complained to a PRPA employee about Díaz Aviation; the next day, the PRPA removed Díaz Aviation's fueling permits and expelled Díaz Aviation's trucks from the fueling ramps for approximately two weeks.

-On January 20, 2010, PRPA employees removed a military airplane that Díaz Aviation was fueling, claiming that the airplane was illegally parked; AAS then sold fuel to the airplane.

The complaint does not include headings for separate counts or causes of action, but it references numerous federal and Puerto Rico statutes in a scattered fashion. This lack of organization makes it difficult to determine what causes of action Díaz Aviation is pursuing. The causes of action referenced most prominently in the complaint are Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., based on bribery and fraud. The complaint also mentions 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (the False Claims Act); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy against federal rights); Article 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5142; ¹P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1822 et seq. (Puerto Rico ethics law); and P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4883 (criminal statute barring public employees from using their position for the benefit of a third party).

All defendants filed motions to dismiss, and the district court granted the motions filed by the PRPA and individual PRPA defendants Bonilla, Pilar, Sosa, Deleo, Sierra, and Gracia. The district court dismissed these claims under the Local Government Antitrust Act (“LGAA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 35, 36, which immunizes local governments and local government employees from federal antitrust damages. See Díaz Aviation Corp. v. P.R. Ports Auth., 2010 WL 2991251, at *4–5 (D.P.R. July 27, 2010). The district court's ruling did not mention or discuss any non-antitrust claims.

Following discovery, Díaz Aviation and the remaining defendants (AAS, Santana, Algarín, and Matos) filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions of Díaz Aviation, AAS, Algarín, and Matos, finding that disputed factual issues remained. See Díaz Aviation Corp. v. Airport Aviation Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 5335519, at *8, 12–13 (D.P.R. Nov. 7, 2011). The district court granted Santana's motion for summary judgment because he had already left AAS when the disputes about fueling occurred. Id. at *11.

In February 2012, a bench trial occurred between Díaz Aviation and AAS, Algarín, and Matos. By that time, the claims had been narrowed to the Sherman Act and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code (“Article 1802”). In spite of the district court's advice that Díaz Aviation should retain outside counsel, Díaz chose to represent his corporation while also serving as a witness.

Díaz Aviation's case consisted of testimony from employees of the Puerto Rico Police, PRPA, AAS, and Díaz Aviation (including Díaz himself), along with several documentary exhibits. The testimony focused mostly on incidents between Díaz Aviation, PRPA, and AAS in 2009 and 2010 relating to fueling activities, and particularly fueling of military airplanes. Where necessary, we will describe the evidence in greater detail below.

After Díaz Aviation concluded its case, the defendants filed for a judgment on partial findings in their favor, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(c). The district court granted the motion, finding that Díaz Aviation had failed to meet its burden of proof on all claims. See Díaz Aviation Corp. v. P.R. Ports Auth., 2012 WL 706119 (D.P.R. Mar. 5, 2012). The district court's factual findings and legal reasoning are described below.

Díaz Aviation moved for a new trial or for reconsideration of the district court's previous decision. The district court denied the motion, saying that its earlier decision was supported by the evidence at trial. Díaz Aviation filed a timely appeal.

II

Díaz Aviation's notice of appeal and original docketing statement have led to a dispute about the scope of the appeal. Díaz Aviation's notice of appeal stated that it:

hereby appeal[s] to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit from the ORDER, Docket 346, dated June 12, 2012, denying a motion, filed on March 21, 2012, Dockets 342 and 343, seeking a new trial or the modification of the OPINION AND ORDER entered on March 5, 2012, Dockets 339 and 340 (Judgement).

In other words, the notice of appeal listed as the subject of appeal the denial of reconsideration of the final judgment, but not the judgment itself. Further, the original docketing statement listed only three appellees: AAS, Matos, and Algarín. Yet Díaz Aviation's appellate brief urged reversal not just of the denial of reconsideration, but of the final judgment after trial, and the earlier judgments dismissing the claims against the PRPA defendants and Santana.

After Díaz Aviation filed its brief, Sosa wrote to this court asking us to disregard any arguments against him because he was not listed as an appellee in the docketing statement, and the notice of appeal did not encompass the orders dismissing him from the case. We allowed Díaz Aviation to amend its docketing statement to include additional appellees if it wished, and invited the parties to address the scope of the notice of appeal in their briefs. Díaz Aviation then filed an amended docketing statement listing every de...