Diaz v. City of Hartford Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 31 March 2021
• Docket Number: 3:18-CV-01113 (KAD)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: DIAZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF HARTFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

DIAZ, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF HARTFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

3:18-CV-01113 (KAD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

March 31, 2021

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANT JEREMY ALLEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 74); DEFENDANTS LUAN BOJKA, RICARDO COLON, WILLIAM COTE, SAMUEL CRUZ, CARLO FAIENZA, ROBERT FOGG, LUIS FRANCO, CHRISTOPHER MASTROIANNI, LUIS RUIZ, AND CARLOS TORRES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 77); DEFENDANTS STEPHEN BARONE AND SEAN SPELL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 80)

Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge

This civil rights action arises out of the aftermath of a car-chase during which plaintiffs Emilio Diaz ("Diaz") and Ricardo Leon Perez ("Perez") allege that they were subjected to unnecessary and excessive force by defendant police officers who effectuated their arrest. Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and state law against Officer Stephen Barone, Detective Christopher Mastroianni, Officer Samuel Cruz, Officer Ricardo Colon, Officer Luan Bojka, Officer William Cote, Officer Carlo Faienza, Officer Luis Franco, Sergeant Sean Spell, Officer Jeremy Allen, Officer Robert Fogg, Officer Carlos Torres, and Sergeant Luis Ruiz as follows:

Count	Cause of Action	Plaintiff	Defendants Named
1	Section 1983/Connecticut; Constitution	Diaz	All Defendants
2	Section 1983/Connecticut; Constitution	Perez	All Defendants

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3	Negligence	Diaz	All Defendants
4	Negligence	Perez	All Defendants
5	Recklessness	Diaz	All Defendants
6	Recklessness	Perez	All Defendants
7	Negligent Infliction of Emotional; Distress	Diaz	All Defendants
8	Negligent Infliction of Emotional; Distress	Perez	All Defendants
9	Intentional Infliction of Emotional; Distress	Diaz	All Defendants
10	Intentional Infliction of Emotional; Distress	Perez	All Defendants

Pending before the Court are three separate motions for summary judgment. Officer Allen moves for summary judgment on all Counts. (ECF No. 74). Detective Mastroianni, Officer Cruz, Officer Colon, Officer Bojka, Officer Cote, Officer Faienza, Officer Franco, Officer Fogg, Officer Torres, and Sergeant Ruiz move for summary judgment on all Counts. (ECF No. 77). Officer Barone moves for summary judgment on all Counts and Sergeant Spell moves for summary judgment on Counts Two through Ten. (ECF No. 80).¹ The Court heard oral argument on the motions on November 24, 2020.

Facts

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

Prior to the Pursuit

On June 4, 2016, Perez consumed 3-4 blunts of PCP in addition to 2-3 blunts of marijuana while Diaz consumed a six pack of beer, two blunts of marijuana laced with PCP, 4-5 bags of heroin and $10 worth of cocaine. (Mastroianni, et al., Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ("Mastroianni

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SMF"), ECF No. 79 ¶¶ 31, 35). After consuming the drugs, Perez picked up Diaz at Perez's brother's apartment in a Toyota Camry. (Id. ¶ 33). The Toyota Camry was a rental, but had been reported stolen by the rental agency when Perez kept the car after the rental period expired. (Id. ¶¶ 38-40).

The Pursuit

The pursuit began after Perez beeped his horn while passing a marked police car driven by Officer Barone on Zion Street in Hartford, Connecticut. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶ 41; Barone and Spell Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ("Barone SMF"), ECF No. 80-2 ¶¶ 25-26). Officer Barone attempted to pull Perez over, but Perez sped away, failing to stop for stop signs or stop lights, because he knew that he was driving a stolen car. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶¶ 41-42; Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶¶ 26-27).

When the car reached Affleck Street, it stopped. Officer Cote approached the car, opened the driver's side door, and attempted to pull Perez out of the car. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶ 43). Officer Cruz then opened the rear driver's side door to assist in Perez's removal. (Id. ¶ 44). Instead of exiting the car, Perez shifted the car into reverse and stepped on the gas. (Id. ¶ 45). Officer Cruz was hit by an open door and sustained a left knee injury. (Id. ¶ 46). Perez, accompanied by Diaz, left the scene of the attempted stop, again, at a high rate of speed. (Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶ 44).

As the pursuit continued, Perez drove recklessly despite there being traffic, pedestrians, and children on bicycles. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶¶ 49-50; Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶ 49). Diaz did not ask Perez to slow down, to stop the vehicle, or to be let out of the vehicle. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶ 60). Eventually, West Hartford police deployed stop sticks to deflate the car's tires though Perez continued to drive on the tire rims. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF

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No. 79 ¶¶ 56-57; Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶¶ 56-57). Soon thereafter, the pursuit ended in the vicinity of 800 Flatbush Avenue in West Hartford. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶ 59; Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶ 61). In his last effort to evade apprehension, Perez struck multiple police cruisers. (Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶ 61).

After the Pursuit

After the Camry was stopped and boxed in by police vehicles, the parties' versions of events diverge. Specifically, the parties disagree as to whether Perez and Diaz actively resisted arrest following the stop thereby rendering the use of force necessary, or whether they surrendered themselves to the police, obviating the need for force. The following facts, however, are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

Arrest of Diaz

After the pursuit, Officer Bojka broke open the passenger side window with his baton. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶ 136). Before Diaz exited the car, Officer Bojka struck Diaz multiple times with the baton, one strike of which may have connected with Diaz's forehead. (Id. ¶ 137).

After Diaz exited the car, Officer Colon struck Diaz in the head with closed fists, (id. ¶ 147), and Officer Allen deployed his taser on Diaz, (Allen Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ("Allen SMF"), ECF No. 74-2 ¶ 12). According to Diaz, Officer Allen tased him in the back while he was flat on the ground facedown. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48). Thereafter, Officer Colon kicked Diaz, (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶ 148), and Officer Fogg struck Diaz's right shoulder with his right foot and used his knee to pin Diaz's shoulder to the ground, (id. ¶ 102). While Diaz was on the ground, Detective Mastroianni applied foot strikes to Diaz's back/torso area until other officers were able to handcuff him. (Id. ¶ 130).

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After Diaz was handcuffed and kneeling in the grass, Sergeant Spell "used his foot onto the lower back side of Diaz's head or shoulder area to force him onto the ground." (Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶¶ 90, 95).² Eventually, Diaz was taken by ambulance to the hospital. (Id. ¶ 97).

Arrest of Perez

While still in the car, Perez testified that he was hit in the forehead with a baton. (Perez Dep., ECF No. 84-4 at 177). After officers removed³ Perez from the car, non-party Detective Abhilash Pillai, Officer Cote, and Officer Barone placed Perez on the ground. (Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶¶ 69, 71). Officer Faienza then tased Perez, which enabled Detective Pillai and Officer Barone to handcuff him. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶¶ 95-96; Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶ 79). Before Perez was handcuffed, Officer Cote kicked Perez in the shoulder twice and on the right side of his face once and Officer Barone struck his torso multiple times with closed fist strikes. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶ 123; Barone SMF, ECF No. 80-2 ¶ 77).

After Perez was apprehended, Officer Franco escorted Perez to the hospital in an ambulance. (Mastroianni SMF, ECF No. 79 ¶ 113). On the ride to the hospital, Officer Franco claims that he used the heel of his hand to turn Perez's face away from him to prevent Perez from spitting at him. (Id. ¶ 114).⁴ At the hospital, Perez claims that Officer Franco punched him while he was handcuffed to the hospital bed. (ECF No. 84 at 6-7).

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Standard of Review

The standard under which the Court reviews motions for summary judgment is well-established. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," while a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Significantly, the inquiry conducted by the Court when reviewing a motion for summary judgment focuses on "whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250. As a result, the moving party satisfies his burden under Rule 56 "by showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case" at trial. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the movant meets its burden, "[t]he nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial[.]" Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 103 n.2 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rubens v. Mason, 527 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 2008)). "[T]he party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading" to establish the existence of a disputed fact. Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009); accord Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). "[M]ere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts" will not suffice. Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Nor will wholly...