Diaz v. Kaplan Higher Educ., L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 13 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–50655,15–50655
• Parties: Rafael DIAZ, Plaintiff–Appellant v. KAPLAN HIGHER EDUCATION, L.L.C., incorrectly listed as Kaplan Higher Education Corporation and Kaplan College San Antonio–Ingram, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

820 F.3d 172

Rafael DIAZ, Plaintiff–Appellant
v.
KAPLAN HIGHER EDUCATION, L.L.C., incorrectly listed as Kaplan Higher Education Corporation and Kaplan College San Antonio–Ingram, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15–50655

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 13, 2016.

820 F.3d 174

Paul Gyron Vick, Esq., Law Offices of Paul G. Vick, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Adam David Boland, Strasburger & Price, San Antonio, TX, Sona Ramirez, Esq., Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., San Antonio, TX, for Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:

Raphael Diaz lost his position as a paralegal instructor at Kaplan College due to Kaplan's nationwide reduction-in-force. In the months leading up to his termination, Diaz alerted Kaplan to a student allegation of impropriety involving the classroom attendance procedures of another instructor in the paralegal program. Diaz sued Kaplan under the anti-retaliation provision of the False Claims Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Kaplan, and Diaz appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

Kaplan College hired Diaz as a paralegal instructor at its San Antonio–Ingram campus in 2010. Diaz was one of only two full-time instructors in the department, along with Irma Zatarain, the department's lead instructor and externship coordinator. A concerned student approached Diaz in April 2012, telling him that Zatarain allowed the student to miss class but marked her as present for attendance purposes. Diaz had the student put the complaint in writing, and then sent it to Kaplan's Assistant Director of Education, who immediately notified Liza Canchola, Kaplan's Executive Director at its Ingram campus. Canchola reported the complaint to Kaplan's compliance department for investigation. Diaz communicated with the compliance department four times that same month (twice by phone and twice by email) about the allegation. Ultimately, the compliance department's investigation was inconclusive.

Canchola was a new Executive Director, having been appointed the previous month—March 2012. One of her first tasks as Executive Director was to implement Ingram's share of Kaplan's nationwide reduction-in-force due to decreasing student enrollment. After evaluating the number of students in Ingram's various programs and the corresponding staff levels, Canchola determined that the Ingram campus needed to eliminate several positions, including one full-time position in the Paralegal Studies department—either Diaz or Zatarain. Canchola and Kaplan's Director of Education evaluated all of the employees in the paralegal department, and Diaz had the lowest rating. Additionally, Zatarain had more direct experience

820 F.3d 175

than Diaz, was the lead instructor and externship coordinator, and had been with Kaplan for more than ten years, compared to Diaz's two. Canchola recommended that Diaz's position be eliminated, and Kaplan's leadership approved. Canchola informed Diaz that his position was eliminated on June 7. Diaz confirmed that Kaplan eliminated other positions that same day.

Diaz sued Kaplan in state court, alleging retaliation under the False Claims Act and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Kaplan removed the suit to federal court and filed a motion for summary judgment. Both parties moved to strike some of the other party's summary judgment evidence. The district court denied both motions to strike and granted Kaplan's motion for summary judgment. Diaz moved for a new trial, which the district court properly considered as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The court denied his motion. Diaz timely appealed the district court's denial of his False Claims Act claim.¹ Having reviewed the briefs and record, we AFFIRM.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, “applying the same standards as the district court.” DePree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir.2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

III. DISCUSSION

Diaz sued Kaplan for retaliation under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).² The district court held and both parties on appeal agree that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to § 3730(h) retaliation claims. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).³

820 F.3d 176

Under this framework, the plaintiff must first prove a prima facie case of retaliation by showing “(1) that he engaged in protected activity, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) ‘that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.’ ” Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep't, 806 F.3d 822, 827 (5th Cir.2015) (quoting Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F.3d 480, 489–90...