Diaz v. Lampela
| Decision Date | 24 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 13-cv-1098-WJM-MJW |
| Parties | JOSÉ A. DIAZ, Plaintiff, v. JILL LAMPELA, and BRANDON SHAFFER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Plaintiff José A. Diaz ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Jill Lampela, in her official capacity as Chief of Behavioral Health for the Colorado Department of Corrections ("CDOC"), and Brandon Shaffer, in his official capacity as the Chairman of the Colorado Board of Parole, (together, the "Defendants"),1 claiming constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before this Court is Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss ("Motion"). (ECF No. 17.) For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is granted.
The following allegations, contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, are accepted as true for purposes of Defendants' Motion.
Plaintiff is an inmate within the CDOC at the Kit Carson Correctional Center, Burlington, Colorado. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 18.) In 2002, Plaintiff pled guilty to andwas convicted of a Class IV felony sex offense, for which Plaintiff was sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of eight years to life, in accordance with the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act ("SOLSA"), C.R.S. § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a). (Id. ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff has served eight years of his sentence and is now eligible for parole. (Id. ¶ 20.) After Plaintiff was incarcerated, he entered Phase I of CDOC's Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program ("SOTMP"). (Id. ¶ 21.) After completing Phase I, he entered Phase 2. (Id.) On January 27, 2010, Plaintiff was "terminated" from Phase II for certain behavior which the CDOC termed a "time out" from treatment. (Id. ¶ 22.)
On January 31, 2012, a clinical psychologist conducted an independent psycho-sexual evaluation on Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 23.) The evaluation, which was reduced to a written reported (the "Report"), diagnosed Plaintiff as being a pedophiliac. (Id. ¶ 24.) The Report recommended that Plaintiff receive treatment at the Colorado Institute for Mental Health at Pueblo, because the CDOC/SOTMP did not have PPG assessment facilities. (Id. ¶ 25.)
On May 5, 2012, Plaintiff notified the CDOC by letter of the Report and requested re-admission to the SOTMP. (Id. ¶ 26.) On May 31, 2012, the CDOC responded by letter, instructing Plaintiff to fill out the enclosed application "if [Plaintiff was] interested in being considered for re-entry to the SOTMP treatment program . . . ." (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff followed these instructions and submitted the application to the CDOC on August 17, 2012. (Id. ¶ 28.) When Plaintiff did not receive a response to his request, he submitted a grievance regarding CDOC's refusal to re-admit him to the SOTMP. (Id. ¶ 29.) On January 22, 2013, the CDOC Grievance Office responded to Plaintiff's grievance anddenied Plaintiff's request for re-admittance into the SOTMP, stating that Plaintiff had failed to use the correct application. (Id. ¶ 31.)
On May 21, 2012, the Parole Board denied Plaintiff parole. (Id. ¶ 32.) It issued a "Notice of Colorado Parole Board Action" form that indicated that its reasons for denial were "Risk Related." (Id.) The two categories listed on the form under "Risk Related" were: (1) "Severity/Circumstances of offense," and (2) "Prior criminal history." (Id.)
On these facts, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants on April 24, 2013. (Compl.) Plaintiff asserts five claims, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, in that he was denied treatment for the serious medical condition of pedophilia, (2) a separate Eighth Amendment violation in that his ongoing imprisonment without treatment is punishment for his status of being a pedophiliac, (3) violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause, in that the Parole Board inflicted additional punishment beyond his minimum mandatory sentence without a judicial trial, (4) a separate Eighth Amendment violation in that the denial of parole punished him for his status of being a pedophiliac, and (5) violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, in that the Parole Board failed to use the correct standard governing parole of inmates sentenced under SOLSA. (Id. pp. 12-18.) On June 19, 2013, Defendants moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 17.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a claim in a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In evaluating such a motion, a court must "assume the truth of the plaintiff'swell-pleaded factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). In ruling on such a motion, the dispositive inquiry is "whether the complaint contains 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Granting a motion to dismiss "is a harsh remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the interests of justice." Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). "Thus, 'a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Plaintiff asserts five causes of action, two against Lampela and three against Shaffer. Defendants' Motion argues that all five claims should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The Court will address Plaintiff's claims in turn.
Plaintiff brings an 8th Amendment claim against Lampela. Plaintiff alleges that Lampela was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's condition of pedophilia, which Plaintiff claims is a serious psychological condition requiring treatment. (Compl. ¶¶ 49-57.)
The Eighth Amendment protects against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments encompasses deliberate indifference by prison officials to a prisoner's serious medical needs. Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10thCir. 2008) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976)). Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs can be exhibited by prison medical staff in failing to properly treat a medical condition, or "by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. Conduct that is either "an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or "repugnant to the conscience of mankind" is "sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference." Id. at 105-06.
An Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference involves "a two-pronged inquiry, comprised of an objective component and a subjective component." Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006). The objective prong examines whether a medical need is "'sufficiently serious' to be cognizable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause." Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 753 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). The subjective prong examines the state of mind of the defendant, asking whether "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
With regard to the objective prong, the mere fact that Plaintiff is a convicted sexual offender does not mean that he has a psychological disorder or that he is in need of psychiatric treatment. See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1996); Ramos v. Vaughn, 1995 WL 386573, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2005) (). "Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are 'serious.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-104). A medical need is serious if it is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).
Here, although Plaintiff has been diagnosed as having the mental condition of pedophilia, treatment for his pedophilia has not been mandated. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-25 ().) Further, Plaintiff does not allege that he is in a substantial amount of pain as a result of not having access to PPG assessment facilities. See Hashman v. Heil, 16 F.3d 416, at *1 (10th Cir. 1994) (). Nor does Plaintiff allege that his condition is so severe that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessary for treatment. See Ramos, 639 F.2d at 575. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence establishing that his pedophilia is a serious medical need entitled to protection under the Eighth Amendment.
Since Plaintiff has failed to established a serious medical need, the Court does not need to analyze the subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test. Accordingly, the Court finds...
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