Diaz v. Miami-Dade Cnty.
| Decision Date | 04 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-10245,20-10245 |
| Parties | EDWIN DIAZ, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, MATTHEW FRYER, In his Official Capacity as Sergeant, Miami-Dade Police Department, HOWARD ROSEN, Individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Chief of the Special Prosecution for the Miami-Dade State Attorney, Defendants - Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-24919-FAM
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Edwin Diaz, a Miami-Dade County police officer, appeals the district court's order dismissing with prejudice his second amended complaint, which found, in relevant part, that: (1) his claim for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sergeant Matthew Fryer was barred by qualified immunity; (2) he failed to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983 against Miami-Dade County; (3) his § 1983 claim against Deputy Chief Assistant State Attorney Howard Rosen was barred by qualified immunity; (4) his Florida Statute § 112.532 claim against Rosen for money damages was precluded by state law; and (5) he failed to state a claim for negligent inflection of emotional distress under Florida law against any defendant. Diaz also appeals the district court's denial of leave to amend.
Because this case is before us as an appeal from a motion to dismiss, we must accept the facts alleged in the second amended complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1032-33 (11th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the following statement of facts is taken from Diaz's second amended complaint.
In early 2016, Officer Diaz, a twenty-year veteran working in the Narcotics Bureau of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD), became the subject of an internal investigation. The investigation came in the wake of several high-profile arrests of MDPD police officers and was an effort to preserve the public trust and avoid further embarrassment. The MDPD worked in conjunction with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Miami-Dade State Attorney's Office. The investigation into Diaz was based on allegations that he, along with other officers in the Narcotics Bureau, was stealing money and other valuables from crime scenes. The County focused its investigation on Diaz as he had been named in six prior theft complains over a ten-year period. All of these complaints were dismissed either because the allegations were unfounded or because they could not be corroborated. Despite this, the County authorized Sergeant Matthew Fryer to apply for a search warrant citing the six prior complaints against Diaz as probable cause. The search warrant was granted, and the investigation ultimately culminated in a sting operation, the roadside search and seizure of Diaz's person and car, and the interrogation and arrest of Diaz.
The State Attorney's Office ultimately decided that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute Diaz. Unsatisfied with this outcome, Deputy Chief Assistant State Attorney Howard Rosen attended a roll-call meeting at MDPD's NarcoticsBureau on May 6, 2016. There, in the presence of more than forty police officers, Rosen accused Diaz of stealing from crime scenes.
In his second amended complaint, Diaz claims that through their combined efforts, Defendants Miami-Dade County (the County), Sergeant Matthew Fryer (Fryer), and Deputy Chief Assistant State Attorney Howard Rosen (Rosen) "have destroyed Officer Diaz's personal reputation and professional standing."
Diaz brought suit against the County, Fryer, and Rosen in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, asserting five counts: (1) violation of § 1983 for false arrest against Defendant Fryer; (2) violation of § 1983 for false arrest against Defendant Miami-Dade County; (3) violation of § 1983 for defamation against Defendant Rosen; (4) violation of the Florida Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights against defendant Rosen; and (5) state law claim of negligent inflection of emotional distress against all defendants. Defendants the County, Fryer, and Rosen moved to dismiss. The district court entered an order granting the dismissal of all five counts with prejudice on December 19, 2019. This appeal followed.
We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in thelight most favorable to the plaintiff. Young Apartments, 529 F.3d at 1037. "To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more than merely state legal conclusions; they are required to allege some specific factual bases for those conclusions . . . ." Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004). Those factual bases "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
"Qualified immunity shields public officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does not violate a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged action." Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2016). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pled by the defendant official and can be raised and considered in a motion to dismiss. See Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019). "[I]t is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds when the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
"To obtain a dismissal based on qualified immunity, a government official must first establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful act occurred." Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). To overcome aqualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must then show (1) that the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) that the violated right was "clearly established." Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311. These two prongs can be addressed in any order. See Washington v. Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2019).
The grant of qualified immunity is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1486 (11th Cir. 1991).
The first count in Diaz's second amended complaint is against Sergeant Fryer for false arrest under § 1983. Diaz alleges that Fryer is liable for false arrest because he was responsible for preparing the affidavit in support of the search warrant application a week earlier. Diaz claims Fryer included the six prior complaints against Diaz in the warrant application, intentionally omitting the fact that each allegation had been dismissed. The act of submitting this warrant application with knowingly false information is the alleged constitutional violation forming the basis for Diaz's § 1983 claim against Fryer.
As stated above, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that can be raised on a motion to dismiss and will be granted if the complaint "fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311. An officer cannot be held liable for false arrest under § 1983 if the officerdid not participate in the actual arrest or was not in the chain of command supervising the arresting officer. Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 736-37 (11th Cir. 2010) ().
Here, Diaz admits in his response to the motion to dismiss that his "Second Amended Complaint does not allege that Defendant Fryer supervised the investigation at the heart of his lawsuit, nor is there any allegation that he acted in any other supervisory capacity." Diaz's second amended complaint also contains no allegations that Fryer actually participated in the arrest. Because Diaz's complaint does not establish that Fryer violated his clearly established constitutional rights, we find Diaz has not overcome Fryer's qualified immunity defense. Diaz's allegations do not establish that Fryer was the arresting officer or that he was in the chain of command. Sergeant Fryer is therefore entitled to qualified immunity against Diaz's § 1983 false arrest claim.
While the Supreme Court has held that local government entities are "persons" within the scope of § 1983, and thus subject to liability, Diaz cannot rely on a theory of respondeat superior to hold the County liable. McDowell v. Brown,392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978) (). "It is only when the execution of the government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the [county] may be held liable under § 1983." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (). Thus, to impose § 1983 liability on the County, Diaz must show "(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation." McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1289. To successfully prove a policy or custom, it is generally necessary for a plaintiff to demonstrate "a persistent...
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