Diaz v. Moore

Decision Date24 August 1994
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 91-40565/LAC.
Citation861 F. Supp. 1041
PartiesOmar G. Rodriguez DIAZ, Plaintiff, v. John H. MOORE and Joseph M. Matthews, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Omar G. Rodriguez Diaz, pro se.

C. Graham Carothers, Tallahassee, FL, for defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COLLIER, District Judge.

This is an action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff (Rodriguez Diaz) has sued the defendants, John H. Moore (Moore) and Joseph M. Matthews (Matthews) in their official and individual capacities for violation of his civil rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in connection with his application for admission to the Florida Bar. Specifically, Rodriguez Diaz claims that Moore, as executive director of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (the Board), and Matthews, as a former Board member, have violated his due process rights by refusing to either make a final decision on his application for admission or afford him a formal hearing where he can defend specific charges.

Rodriguez Diaz has brought suit against Moore and Matthews individually, claiming that they have maliciously handled his application, in that they have intentionally refused to "act" on it since 1987, when he passed the Florida Bar examination, knowing that such refusal would result in his application becoming obsolete at which point they could then charge him additional sums to have his application returned to active status.1 Rodriguez Diaz also argues that Moore's and Matthews' demand that he undergo a psychiatric evaluation by a psychiatrist of the Board's choosing at his expense before any decision will be made on his application was made solely in an effort to harass him and stall any decision on his application. In addition to monetary relief, Rodriguez Diaz requests declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the constitutionality of Article III(B), § 3(a) and (b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar (Section 3), maintaining that it is constitutionally infirm under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment both on its face and as it has been applied to him.2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rodriguez Diaz started law school at Nova University in 1980. He applied for admission to the Florida Bar on September 10 of the same year.3 However, his application was never processed due to his failure to pay the requisite application fee. By letter dated November 29, 1984, Rodriguez Diaz asked that his "1980 application be declared void due to major changes in information sought by the Florida Bar ever since." (doc. 34, exh. 4, no. 2) Rodriguez Diaz then filed a second application for admission to the Florida Bar dated December 3, 1984. At that time, the Board began a routine background investigation of Rodriguez Diaz's character and fitness to practice law. Based on the information provided, the Board was faced with investigating several prior criminal charges, both felonies and misdemeanors, as well as numerous prior civil law suits of which Rodriguez Diaz had been a party. Additionally, the Board had to consider Rodriguez Diaz's employment and educational records which were voluminous.

In August of 1986, the first report on Rodriguez Diaz's background and character investigation was sent to the Board's Character and Fitness Committee for review. The report was not complete because Rodriguez Diaz had refused to disclose much of the information requested.4 Based on the information contained in the report, or lack thereof, the Board made the decision to request that Rodriguez Diaz appear for an informal investigative hearing. By letter dated September 18, 1986, the Board informed Rodriguez Diaz of its decision to hold the hearing for the purpose of inquiring into his prior arrest record, his apparent failure to disclose his prior arrest record to Drake University Law School, and the numerous civil lawsuits of which he was a party. (doc. 34, exh. 2)

The hearing was held one year later in September of 1987.5 Much of the hearing was devoted to the Board's inquiry of Rodriguez Diaz's employment termination with the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and his extensive involvement with the legal system, both as a plaintiff and a defendant.6 The hearing concluded with the Board requesting more information.7 Ultimately, Rodriguez Diaz complied with the requests, and on February 16, 1988, after further investigation of the new information, the Board notified Rodriguez Diaz that he would have to submit to a psychiatric evaluation before a decision would be rendered on his application. (doc. 34, aff. John H. Moore) The Board informed Rodriguez Diaz that the evaluation would have to be performed by a psychiatrist of the Board's choosing at Rodriguez Diaz's expense. On February 19, 1988, Rodriguez Diaz wrote a letter to the Board stating that he would not submit to a psychiatric evaluation under the Board's terms. Included with his letter was a copy of an evaluation performed in September 1987, by a doctor of Rodriguez Diaz's own choosing.

Rodriguez Diaz spent the next eighteen months writing abusive letters to the Board and its executive director objecting to the terms of the Board's request and submitting evaluations by doctors of his own choice together with the results of various psychological tests which he voluntarily submitted to in conjunction with the evaluations.8 However, on November 14, 1990, Rodriguez Diaz sent a letter to the Board agreeing to its request. The Board then replied that despite his recent consent to undergo an evaluation on the Board's terms, his application would not be placed before the Board for consideration because it had become obsolete due to the length of time that had passed since he had last updated his background and character information. The Board's reply indicated that Rodriguez Diaz would have to pay $230.00 to "reactivate" his application, as well as file additional information to update his previous background investigation.9 (doc. 34, exh. 1)

On December 27, 1990, Rodriguez Diaz requested a waiver of the $230.00 fee. The Board responded that he would be required to submit a petition fee of $25.00 before the Board would consider his request to waive the application fee. Rodriguez Diaz then requested a waiver of the $25.00 fee but was informed by the Board staff that this fee could not be waived. To date, Rodriguez Diaz's application remains obsolete, and he has not undergone a psychiatric evaluation by a doctor of the Board's choosing at his expense. (doc. 34, aff. of John H. Moore)

On July 12, 1988, Rodriguez Diaz filed a complaint against the State of Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida, and the Board in the Southern District of Florida (Diaz I).10 In his amended complaint filed September 2, 1988, Rodriguez Diaz alleged that the defendants had violated his rights to due process and equal protection by refusing to admit him to the Bar or to file specific charges against him and hold a formal hearing. (doc. 34, exh. 3) The court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This order was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.

Rodriguez Diaz filed this complaint on September 4, 1990, alleging that the same defendants sued in Diaz I11 had violated his equal protection and due process rights by refusing to "act" on his application for admission to the Florida Bar (Diaz II).12 This Court dismissed his amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and Rodriguez Diaz appealed. The order was affirmed in part and reversed in part by the Eleventh Circuit. (doc. 25) In remanding the case, the appellate court ruled that Rodriguez Diaz had alleged facts sufficient to state a procedural due process claim. It is this claim which is currently before the Court for consideration on defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Conclusions of Law

A motion for summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." F.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir.1987). An issue of fact is "genuine" if the record as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id.

One of the issues raised by the defendants in their motion for summary judgment is lack of jurisdiction. Defendants correctly note that 28 U.S.C. § 1257 prohibits a federal district court from reviewing a final judgment of the highest court of a state. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1314-15, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (reaffirming its reasoning in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923)). Such decisions are reviewable only by the United States Supreme Court. Id. Section 1257, however, does not affect a federal district court's ability to entertain general challenges to bar rules promulgated by a state's highest court in nonjudicial proceedings. Id.

This case falls squarely under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (doc. 34, exh. 8) On March 25, 1992, Rodriguez Diaz filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Supreme Court of Florida in which he raised the same claims and issues raised in this action. (doc. 34, exh. 8) Review of the petition, together with Rodriguez Diaz's reply to the...

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