DiBattista v. State
| Decision Date | 01 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | C.A. 96-3271 |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
| Parties | VINCENT DiBATTISTA and ROBIN DiBATTISTA v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, its agents, officials |
DECISION
This matter is before the Superior Court on remand from the Rhode Island Supreme Court. In its remand, the Supreme Court directed the Superior Court to treat the motion of defendant Department of Children, Youth and Families as a motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs Vincent DiBattista and Robin DiBattista (the DiBattistas or plaintiffs) were licensed by DCYF as foster-care parents until January 10, 1995.[1] At that time, the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF)[2] revoked plaintiffs' foster-care license due to the plaintiffs' behaviors which DCYF considered inappropriate for state-licensed foster-care parents.[3] The plaintiffs, prose, pursued an appeal of the revocation through the DCYF administrative appeals process and were granted hearings in April and May of 1995.[4] The administrative hearing officer upheld DCYF's revocation of the plaintiffs' foster-care license in his June 5, 1995 decision.[5] Pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-10-3(e)[6] and § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the plaintiffs appealed the matter to the Family Court for administrative judicial review.[7] Subsequently, DCYF filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because the plaintiffs failed to allege any statutory grounds for relief pursuant to the APA.[8] After a hearing on July 28, 1995, although without the benefit of the administrative hearing record, a Family Court justice granted DCYF's motion.[9] However, the justice informed the plaintiffs of their right to appeal.[10] On or about September 8, 1995, a decree granting DCYF's motion to dismiss was filed.[11] According to the certification thereon a copy of the decree had been mailed to the DiBattistas on August 10, 1995.[12] The decree was signed and dated by the justice on or about August 10, 1995.[13] The plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal; however, on or about October 25, 1995 they filed a "motion to vacate the order dismissing [their] appeal."[14] A justice of the Family Court initially heard the plaintiffs' motion on November 8 1995 and ordered memorandum within thirty days.[15] The DiBattistas filed a motion for contempt based upon DCYF's failure to file a memorandum within thirty days.[16]
On January 4, 1996, another justice of the Family Court, after review of the file, heard the plaintiffs motion to vacate entered on June 4, 1998.[26]
On June 23, 1998, within twenty days of that entry, the plaintiffs, prose, petitioned our Supreme Court for Writ of Certiorari and Trial De Nova [sic].[27] On October 22, 1998, the Supreme Court entered an order summarily denying plaintiffs' petition.[28]
On June 17, 1996, plaintiffs, prose, filed in the Superior Court a separate action, entitled "Complaint for Civil Rights Violations." The thirty page complaint against DCYF and various state agents, including two Family Court justices alleged:
[29]
Subsequently, DCYF filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.[30] DCYF argued that most of the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicatory, and, additionally, that the judicial misconduct claims against the Family Court justices were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. A Superior Court justice, after a hearing, agreed with DCYF that the plaintiffs were re-asserting the same issues presented to the Family Court and granted the motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds.[31] Plaintiffs timely appealed the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing their complaint to our Supreme Court.[32] The Court, having determined that:
"the Superior Court erred in giving res judicatory effect to any Family Court judgment in light of the patchy record and pleadings presented for its consideration, noted that the record upon which the Superior Court ruled contained no evidence of any final judgment of the Family Court in the earlier action, nor were there any transcripts or decisions embodying its rulings . . . ."[33]
Further, the Court decided that the defendants' 12(c) motion "should more appropriately have been treated as a motion for summary judgment."[34] Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case, directing the Superior Court to treat the defendants' motion as a motion for summary judgment after providing each party a "reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."[35]
In February of 1999, after firm encouragement from this Court, the plaintiffs obtained the assistance of counsel. Thereafter, the defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment to which the plaintiffs object.[36] After hearing the parties' oral arguments, this Court took the case under advisement and requested additional memoranda on a particular issue regarding damages. Having received the requested memoranda, this decision follows.
Such additional facts, as are pertinent to this decision, shall be set forth in the discussion that follows.
"[S]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be cautiously applied." Boland v. Town of Tiverton, 670 A.2d 1245, 1248 (R.I. 1996). When a trial justice is ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the only question before him or her is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact which must be resolved. Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 93 (R.I. 1996). Summary judgment is proper "only if an examination of the admissible evidence, undertaken in the light most favorable to the non moving party, reveals no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Visconti & Boren Ltd. v. Bess Eaton Donut Flour Co., 712 A.2d 871, 872 (R.I. 1998) (per curiam) (citing Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 93 (R.I. 1996)).
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment carries the burden of "proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material fact and cannot rest on the allegations or denials in the pleadings or the conclusions or on legal opinions." Macera Brothers of Cranston, Inc. v. Gelfuso & Lachut, Inc., 740 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Manning Auto Parts, Inc. v. Souza, 591 A.2d 34, 35 (R.I. 1991)). "The opposing party may not rest upon allegations contained in the pleadings alone to establish a genuine issue of material fact." Sisters of Mercy v. Wilkie, 668 A.2d 650, 652 (R.I. 1996) (citing Nichola v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 471 A.2d 945, 948 (R.I. 1984). If the opposing party cannot establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment must be granted. Grande v. Almac's, Inc., 623 A.2d 971, 972 (R.I. 1993).
In the instant matter, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed with prejudice based on the doctrines of res judicatory and collateral estoppal. The plaintiffs, however, counter that several issues of material fact are in dispute[37] and further that the doctrines of res judicatory and collateral estoppal do not control.
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs ' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicatory because the complaint asserts the same issues, specifically the license revocation against the same parties as finally adjudicated in the first proceeding. They argue that the plaintiffs are attempting to cloak the previously litigated issue of the license revocation in "misapplied constitutional and criminal law."[38]The plaintiffs counter that the doctrine of res judicatory does not control for several reasons including (i) the issue of license revocation was never adjudicated on the merits, (ii) the issues raised in this action could not have been raised in the Family Court, (iii) the DiBattistas were not afforded the same rights as they are entitled to in this action, (iv) the Family Court...
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