DiBello v. St. Jean
| Decision Date | 12 March 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 762-A,762-A |
| Citation | 262 A.2d 824,106 R.I. 704 |
| Parties | William DIBELLO v. Arthur ST. JEAN et al. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This civil action was brought in the Superior Court by the plaintiff to recover for personal injuries and property damage allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle collision. While three separate defendants are charged with negligence, we are concerned only with the action against the defendant S. Rosenthal & Son, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation. That defendant moved under Rule 41(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the action for failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules, and, when that motion was granted, the plaintiff appealed.
Although the record and docket transmitted to us are not as clear as they might be concerning the precise sequence or the exact nature of the proceedings, the parties apparently agree on what transpired. We consider the case as they understand it and in the posture in which they have briefed and argued it.
The motor vehicle collision giving rise to plaintiff's claim occurred on April 12, 1965. Litigation commenced about a year and a half later on December 10, 1966, when plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court. While service on the individual defendants was promptly completed, process for service on this defendant was not delivered to the sheriff until July 11, 1968, 19 months subsequent to the commencement of the action and more than three years after the motor vehicle collision. Service was then made as provided for by what is now G.L. 1956, (1968 Reenactment) §§ 31-7-7 and 31-7-8, by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the Registrar of Motor Vehicles on July 15, 1968, and by sending notice of that service and a copy of the process by registered mail to defendant at its address in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Thereafter, defendant, proceeding under Rule 41(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, moved to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to comply with the rules. After a hearing the trial justice found that plaintiff's failure to satisfactorily explain the 19 month delay which intervened between the filing of his complaint and the delivery of the process to the sheriff constituted noncompliance with the implicit requirement of Rule 4(b) of the rules. Accordingly, and in reliance on Caprio v. Fanning & Doorley Constr. Co., R.I., 243 A.2d 738, the trial justice granted the motion. The dismissal order which was then entered did not specify whether it was with or without prejudice.
The plaintiff does not dispute that his delay in issuing process was unreasonable, nor does he attempt to excuse it. Moreover, he recognizes that the more than two years which have elapsed since the motor vehicle collision of April 1965 now bars a new action on account of the personal injuries, and he is therefore not concerned with whether or not the dismissal order was with or without prejudice to his right to commence a new action to recover for those injuries. What does concern him is that the dismissal order, being unqualified, was with prejudice and under Rule 41(b)(3), operated as an adjudication of the merits of his claim for property damage. 1 In an attempt to salvage that claim he now argues that the trial justice should have treated defendant's motion to dismiss as if it were a motion for summary judgment. If that had been done, he says, only the personal injury claim, where the limitation period is two years ( § 9-1-14), would have been disposed of, and no judgment would have been rendered against him on the property-damage claim because that claim was not then barred by the limitation period which he claims governs in such actions.
The obvious defect in the procedure which plaintiff suggests the trial justice should have pursued is that the rules do not permit it. He confuses a 41(b)(2) motion to dismiss with a motion to dismiss filed under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the latter instance, the motion, if supported by affidavits and other materials outside of the pleadings, may be treated by the court in its discretion as if it were a motion for summary judgment. Warren Education Ass'n v....
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Rhode Island Resource Recovery Corporation v. Brien
... ... "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not ... excluded by the court" (citations omitted)); DiBello ... v. St. Jean , 106 R.I. 704, 707, 262 A.2d 824, 825 (1970) ... (explaining that it is within court's discretion whether ... to ... ...
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Rhode Island Res. Recovery Corp. v. Brien
...when "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court" (citations omitted)); DiBello v. St. Jean, 106 R.I. 704, 707, 262 A.2d 824, 825 (1970) (explaining that it is within court's discretion whether to consider documents and convert motion to summary judgment); W......
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Palmigiano v. State
...12(b)-(c). See Menzies v. Sigma Pi Alumni Ass'n of Rhode Island, Inc., 110 R.I. 488, 294 A.2d 193 (1972); DiBello v. St. Jean, 106 R.I. 704, 262 A.2d 824 (1970). In view of the fact that the trial justice relied upon matters outside the pleadings, we shall treat the state's motion as though......
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Jacques v. State
...Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Menzies v. Sigma Pi Alumni Ass'n of Rhode Island, 110 R.I. 488, 294 A.2d 193 (1972); DiBello v. St. Jean, 106 R.I. 704, 262 A.2d 824 (1970). The State filed motions for summary judgment under the provisions of R.I.G.L. §§ 10-9.1-6(b) and Super.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).......