Dible v. Ault, No. C99-4010-MWB (N.D. Iowa 7/12/2001)

• Decision Date: 12 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. C99-4010-MWB.,C99-4010-MWB.
• Parties: WILLIAM EMS. DIBLE, Petitioner, v. JOHN AULT, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Page 1

WILLIAM EMS. DIBLE, Petitioner, v. JOHN AULT, Respondent.

No. C99-4010-MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

July 12, 2001.

ORDER REGARDING MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

MARK W. BENNETT, Chief Judge, District Court.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Before the court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner, William S. Dible, is an inmate at the Anamosa State Penitentiary, Anamosa, Iowa. On August 25, 1993, following a bench trial, petitioner Dible was convicted of first-degree burglary, second-degree burglary, second-degree arson, and first-degree criminal mischief. On February 11, 1994, Dible was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.

Petitioner Dible appealed his sentence. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed his sentence on September 20, 1995. Dible then filed an application for postconviction relief. Dible's application for postconviction relief was denied by an Iowa district court on July 3, 1997. His appeal of the denial of his application for postconviction relief was denied by the Iowa Court of Appeals on November 30, 1998. On September 17, 1999, Dible filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dible's petition asserts fifteen grounds for relief:

1. GROUND ONE: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Iowa Burglary statute as being unconstitutionally vague, unconstitutional because it can be arbitrarily applied, it was unconstitutionally applied ex post facto and/or in the alternative, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately research the Iowa burglary statute and improperly advised the Petitioner regarding the Iowa burglary statute.

2. GROUND TWO: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the theory of self-defense in regards to Petitioner's first degree burglary conviction.

3. GROUND THREE: Trial counsel was ineffective for actually and constructively denying the Petitioner his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf.

4. GROUND FOUR: Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to I.R.E. 404(b) evidence entered at trial by the State as inadmissible and precluded by I.R.E. 403 as unduly prejudicial and not supported by the evidence.

5. GROUND FIVE: Trial counsel was ineffective for displaying a conflict of interest by protecting the third party interests of Sunday Gasket [sic] over the Petitioner's interests by not properly cross-examining Sundy Gaskell, failing to call John Dible as a witness, failing to conduct an investigation of thefts concerning medical supplies and drugs, lying about contacting his wife as an expert witness, and by not pursuing certain defenses.

6. GROUND SIX: Trial counsel was ineffective for displaying a conflict of interest by protecting the third party interest of Karen Frampton over the Petitioner's interests by not properly conducting a direct examination of Frampton, not calling J.C. Nash and others as witnesses, not withdrawing and testifying as a witness, and not pursuing certain defenses.

7. GROUND SEVEN: Trial counsel was ineffective for displaying a conflict of interest by providing evidence from Dible's Suzuki to the prosecution, by failing to withdraw as a witness, by acquiring an interest in Dible's Suzuki, lying to Dible about material facts, by failing to pursue certain defenses as a result of his conflicts and/or trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prove the items seized in Dible's Suzuki were inadmissible due to a broke[n] chain of custody.

8. GROUND EIGHT: Trial counsel was ineffective for being intoxicated during the Petitioner's trial and during numerous pretrial conferences with the Petitioner, constructively denying the Petitioner assistance of counsel.

9. GROUND NINE: The State of Iowa committed prosecutorial misconduct by violating a reciprocal discovery agreement, committing numerous Brady Rule violations, and using false and perjured testimony. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover prosecutorial misconduct.

10. GROUND TEN: Trail [sic] counsel's individual and cumulative errors of ineffectiveness, actually and constructively denied the Petitioner his right to counsel, violated the Petitioner's rights guaranteed under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amend-ments to the U.S. Constitution, and but for constitutional errors, no fact-finder would have found the Petitioner guilty of the underlying offenses.

11. GROUND ELEVEN: The Petitioner incorporates Ground One through Ground Ten as though set forth herein and alleges that post-verdict attorney, Jeffery [sic] Neary, was ineffective for failing to prove the allegations set forth in Ground One through Ground Eleven, that the Petitioner demonstrated sufficient reason for failing to allege post-verdict attorney's ineffectiveness on direct appeal, and but for constitutional errors of post-verdict attorney, no fact-finder would have found the Petitioner guilty of the underlying offenses.

12. GROUND TWELVE: The Petitioner incorporates Grounds One through Grounds Eleven as though set forth herein and alleges that the Petitioner's Appellate counsel, Shari Stevens, was ineffective for failing to present or develop adequately the allegations and Grounds One through Ground Eleven on direct appeal and but for appellate counsel's constitutional errors, no fact-finder would have found the Petitioner guilty of the underlying offenses.

13. GROUND THIRTEEN: The Iowa courts erred in ruling there was sufficient evidence for a First Degree Burglary conviction.

14. GROUND FOURTEEN: The Petitioner, Dible, has exhausted all remedies available to him by the State of Iowa. All rulings regarding all proceedings pursued by Dible in the state courts of Iowa resulted in decisions that are contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States and/or all rulings in the state courts of Iowa resulted in decisions that were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state courts of Iowa violating Dible's rights guaranteed under the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.

15. GROUND FIFTEEN: The facts underlying Dible's claims presented to the state courts of Iowa and presented herein, are sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional errors, no reasonable fact-finder would have found the Petitioner guilty of the underlying offenses and the Petitioner's rights guaranteed by the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.

See Report and Recommendation at pp. 11-15 (quoting Doc. No. 19, pp. 2-4).

This case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On October 20, 2000, Judge Zoss filed an exceptionally thorough and comprehensive Report and Recommendation in which he recommends that Dible's petition be denied. Dible filed objections to Judge Zoss's Report and Recommendation on November 13, 2000. The court, therefore, undertakes the necessary review of Judge Zoss's recommended disposition of Dible's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard Of Review

Pursuant to statute, this court's standard of review for a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation is as follows:

A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) provides for review of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation on dispositive motions and prisoner petitions, where objections are made, as follows:

The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that it is reversible error for the district court to fail to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report where such review is required. See, e.g., Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298, 306 (8th Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 860 (1996); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994)); Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995) (also citing Belk). Because objections have been filed in this case, the court must conduct a de novo review. With these standards in mind, the court will briefly review the requirements of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and then turn to consider petitioner Dible's objections to Judge Zoss's Report and Recommendation.

B. The Requirements of § 2254(d)(1)

Section 2254(d)(1) of Title 28, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, provides as follows:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). As the United States Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529...