DiChiarro v. Woodland Maint. Grp., LLC
| Docket Number | 2-21-0418 |
| Decision Date | 23 December 2021 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (2d) 210418,196 N.E.3d 654,458 Ill.Dec. 350 |
| Parties | Lisa DICHIARRO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WOODLAND MAINTENANCE GROUP, LLC ; Daniel Huber; and Brian McShane, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Ted A. Meyers, of Meyers & Flowers, LLC, of St. Charles, for appellant.
Michael R. Luchsinger and Faredin Ameti, of Doherty & Progar, LLC, of Chicago, for appellees.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Lisa Dichiarro, filed a multiple-count complaint against defendants, Woodland Maintenance Group, LLC (Woodland), Daniel Huber, and Brian McShane, alleging violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Act (Act) ( 820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2018)). Relevant here, count III of plaintiff's first amended complaint sought damages from Woodland for retaliatory discharge, arising from plaintiff's claim that she was terminated because of "her repeated demands for payment of the [u]npaid [w]ages due and owing to [her] under the terms and conditions of her [e]mployment [a]greement." Relying on McGrath v. CCC Information Service, Inc. , 314 Ill. App. 3d 431, 246 Ill.Dec. 856, 731 N.E.2d 384 (2000), the circuit court of Kane County granted Woodland's motion to dismiss count III, reasoning that the Act does not manifest a clear public policy that would allow an employee who was denied past-due wages the right to bring a common law retaliatory-discharge claim against his or her employer. The trial court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider the dismissal of count III.
¶ 2 Thereafter, plaintiff informed the trial court that the legislature amended section 14(c) of the Act 10 years after McGrath was decided. See Pub. Act 96-1407 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) ( 820 ILCS 115/14(c) ) (hereinafter, the 2011 amendment).1 Plaintiff averred that the 2011 amendment empowered an employee wrongfully terminated for requesting past-due wages to seek all available legal and equitable remedies, including a common law retaliatory-discharge claim. The trial court declined to revisit its ruling on the basis that there was no appellate precedent establishing that McGrath is no longer controlling on the issue. Nevertheless, the court certified the following question for review pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019):
"Whether the [2011] amendment to Section 14(c) of the Wage Payment and Collection Act abrogated the ruling in McGrath *** and establishes a clear public policy which allows an employee who has been terminated for exercising her rights under the Act to pursue a common law and/or statutory remedy for retaliatory discharge against her employer."
We granted plaintiff's application for leave to appeal. We hold that the 2011 amendment to section 14(c) of the Act created a statutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge for an employee who has been terminated for exercising his or her rights under the Act. However, the 2011 amendment did not abrogate the holding in McGrath , in that the amendment did not provide or set forth a clearly mandated public policy upon which employees could base a common law retaliatory-discharge claim. Accordingly, we answer the certified question affirmatively in part and negatively in part and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
¶ 4 The following facts are taken from plaintiff's first amended complaint as well as other supporting documents included in the record submitted on appeal. See Wisnasky v. CSX Transportation, Inc. , 2020 IL App (5th) 170418, ¶ 4, 440 Ill.Dec. 206, 151 N.E.3d 678. Woodland operates a landscaping business. Plaintiff worked as a salesperson for Woodland. Pursuant to a written employment agreement, plaintiff earned compensation in the form of a base salary with the possibility of additional compensation based on the landscaping sales she procured. In April 2019, plaintiff informed Woodland's management that she was owed over $33,000 in compensation plus accrued and unpaid vacation that she earned in 2018 and 2019. Plaintiff had several meetings with Woodland's management in May and June 2019 to resolve the issue of the compensation due her under the employment agreement. At a meeting on June 4, 2019, Huber and McShane, both of whom served as Woodland's executive management team, met with plaintiff and refused to pay her the alleged past-due compensation. At that time, Huber also ripped up plaintiff's employment agreement, declaring that it was no longer in effect. On June 7, 2019, Huber and McShane scheduled a meeting with plaintiff at which plaintiff's employment was terminated effective immediately.
¶ 5 On July 3, 2019, plaintiff instituted the instant action, alleging violations of the Act based upon the failure to tender proper wages and wrongful termination, as well as common law retaliatory discharge.2 On September 19, 2019, the parties executed a "Release and Settlement Agreement," pursuant to which defendants tendered to plaintiff the past-due wages plus the statutory interest and attorney fees assessed under the Act. As part of the settlement agreement, defendants acknowledged that "[a]ny common law or statutory claim for wrongful termination and/or retaliatory discharge (or other claim relating to the termination of employment)" were not released and could be pursued by plaintiff.
¶ 6 On October 16, 2019, plaintiff filed a three-count, first amended complaint against defendants. Both count I, naming Woodland as defendant, and count II, naming Huber and McShane as defendants, sought statutory damages for violations of section 14(c) of the Act ( 820 ILCS 115/14(c) (West 2018)). Count III, naming Woodland as defendant, sought damages for retaliatory discharge under the common law arising from plaintiff's claim that she was terminated because of her "repeated demands for payment of the [u]npaid [w]ages due and owing to [her] under the terms and conditions of her [e]mployment [a]greement." Woodland moved to dismiss counts I and III of plaintiff's first amended complaint. The court denied Woodland's motion to dismiss count I but took under advisement whether plaintiff could maintain an action for retaliatory discharge based upon a violation of the Act.
¶ 7 On March 3, 2020, the trial court granted Woodland's motion to dismiss count III. The court noted that, to establish a claim for retaliatory discharge, an employee must show that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. , 85 Ill. 2d 124, 129, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). Relying on McGrath , 314 Ill. App. 3d 431, 246 Ill.Dec. 856, 731 N.E.2d 384, the court held that the dismissal of count III was required because the Act did not manifest a clear public policy that would allow an employee who was denied past-due wages the right to bring a common law retaliatory-discharge claim against his or her employer. The trial court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider the dismissal.
¶ 8 Sometime later, plaintiff informed the trial court that, 10 years after McGrath was decided, the legislature amended section 14(c) of the Act to add, inter alia , the following two sentences to the end of the provision:
Pub. Act 96-1407 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) ( 820 ILCS 115/14(c) ).
In response, the trial court told the parties that it would not revisit its ruling, as there was no appellate precedent that established that McGrath was no longer controlling on the issue.3
¶ 9 Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for certification pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) to obtain appellate guidance on the issue. On July 9, 2021, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion and certified the following question in accordance with Rule 308(a) :
"Whether the [2011] amendment to Section 14(c) of the Wage Payment and Collection Act abrogated the ruling in McGrath *** and establishes a clear public policy which allows an employee who has been terminated for exercising her rights under the Act to pursue a common law and/or statutory remedy of retaliatory discharge against her employer."
On July 28, 2021, plaintiff filed with this court an application for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 308(a). On September 1, 2021, defendants filed a response in opposition to plaintiff's application for leave to appeal. On September 14, 2021, we granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal.
¶ 11 Under Illinois common law, an employer may discharge an employee at will, at any time, with or without cause. Roberts v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 , 2019 IL 123594, ¶ 22, 434 Ill.Dec. 309, 135 N.E.3d 891 ; Palmateer , 85 Ill. 2d at 128, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876. Illinois courts, however, have recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge as a limited and narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Fellhauer v. City of Geneva , 142 Ill. 2d 495, 505, 154 Ill.Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870 (1991). The retaliatory-discharge-action exception to the at-will employment doctrine is an outgrowth of the recognition that "a proper balance must be maintained among the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out." Palmateer , 85 Ill. 2d at 129, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 ; see also Roberts , 2019 IL 123594, ¶ 22, 434 Ill.Dec. 309, 135 N.E.3d 891.
¶ 12 To state a claim for retaliatory discharge, an employee must plead that (...
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