Dick v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Inc.

Decision Date23 February 2011
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:09–CV–1601–B.
PartiesCurtis C. DICK, Plaintiff,v.J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Curtis C. Dick, Cedar Hill, TX, pro se.Kevin S. Mullen, Jessica Brown Wilson, Michael Scott McDonald, Littler Mendelson, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JANE J. BOYLE, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant J.B. Hunt. Transport's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 67), filed August 17, 2010. Also before the Court are certain ancillary matters, including Plaintiff's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 78), filed October 8, 2010, Defendant's Motion to Strike (doc. 92), filed October 15, 2010, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (doc. 93), filed October 17, 2010, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend (doc. 99), filed October 26, 2010, and Plaintiff's Motion Request for Judicial Notice (doc. 110), filed January 31, 2011.

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED. Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend should be and hereby is GRANTED as well. The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion to Strike, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, and Plaintiff's Motion Request for Judicial Notice.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
A. Underlying Facts

This action arises from Plaintiff Curtis Dick's (Dick) former employment as a truck driver with Defendant JB Hunt (“JBH”). Dick's tenure with JBH lasted from August 2005 to September 2008. Dick was not employed by JBH for the entirety of this three-year span, rather the two had an on-again, off-again relationship where Dick ended up working for five separate employment periods. The instant suit arises from facts involving the first and fifth employment periods. Dick is an African–American. (Pl.'s 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 7).

The first employment period began when JBH initially hired Dick on August 2, 2005. (Def.'s App in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.'s App.”) 2–3). After four days on the job, Dick allegedly caused a preventable accident, striking a parked vehicle while driving a JBH truck. (Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.'s Br.”) 2–8). Dick does not dispute that this accident occurred. ( See Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Resp. (“Pl.'s Br.”) 5 ([JBH] did not ask Plaintiff to submit for a drug test, which is common in the industry following an accident.”)). Following the accident, Dick's first employment period with JBH ended. The parties dispute precisely who terminated the relationship. Dick contends that he quit to take another job, that JBH never asked him to submit to drug testing (which he contends is common industry practice following a preventable accident), and that JBH allowed him to stay on the road during the short period between the accident and his resigning. ( Id.). In its Motion for Summary Judgment, JBH agrees that Dick walked off the job. (Def.'s Br. 4). At the same time, JBH maintains it ultimately terminated Dick. ( Id.). By walking off the job, Dick refused to participate in an accident review. ( Id. at 4; Def.'s App. 3). JBH then elected to conduct his accident review without him, concluding that his employment should be terminated. (Def.'s App. 3). Based upon these events, JBH then transmitted a message to Drive–A–Check (“DAC”), a private database that distributes driver information and history to companies subscribing to its services. ( Id. at 3–4). In this message, JBH stated that Dick had been involved in a preventable accident, was “discharged,” and would have to be reviewed before being rehired. ( Id. at 3). The JBH communication to DAC forms the basis of Dick's defamation claim.

In February 2007, May 2007, and August 2007, JBH rehired Dick. (Def.'s Br. 5). Each time, Dick quit after a short time, and the parties do not point to any relevant conduct arising from any of these three employment periods. ( See id.). The fifth and final time that JBH hired Dick was in September 2008. ( Id.). This final employment period, lasting until March 31, 2008, forms the basis of Dick's Title VII and ADA claims. The parties agree to little, if any, of the relevant events and conduct surrounding this final period.

The parties strongly dispute the nature and quality of Dick's work during the fifth employment period. Dick contends that he had a good performance record throughout his relationship with JBH and cites to a 2009 JBH Company Driver Settlement Report as indicative of his continued good performance during this final period in particular. (Pl.'s Br. 5). Dick also contends that during the fifth employment period, he sent eight internal complaints to JBH higher-ups about safety related matters and Department of Transportation (“DOT”) rules violations, to which he never received a response. (Pl.'s Resp. 2–3). JBH, on the other hand, alleges that Dick began having service and performance-related issues from the moment the fifth employment period began. (Def.'s Br. 13). In support of this contention, JBH cites to several pieces of evidence, including: (1) a verbal warning given to Dick after he cut off another vehicle while changing lanes; (2) discipline meted out for service failures, violation of hours of service, incorrectly parking a load, and choosing to ignore warnings on electronic logs; (3) a three day suspension for violating company policy; (4) a verbal warning for being idle too often; (5) a written warning about another lane change complaint; (6) a written warning about failing to timely deliver a load; and (7) a second three day suspension. ( Id. at 13–14). JBH also contends that Dick has admitted to several of these events and conduct at various points. ( See id. at 13).

Perhaps the single most disputed event in this case is a phone call Dick made on February 17, 2009 to JBH Safety Representative Kevin Hartgrave. The parties agree that Dick contacted the Safety Department on or about that date, but that is the full extent of their agreement. Dick admits that he told Hartgrave that he was wanting to get professional help or a counselor to “talk [his] situation through.” (Def.'s App. 86, 97). At the same time, he denies ever self-reporting mental instability or confessing to having a mental problem. (Pl.'s Br. 2, 4). JBH has a markedly different picture of what Dick told Hartgrave. JBH offers evidence that Plaintiff in fact expressly stated that he needed psychiatric treatment. ( See Def.'s App. 210, 220–226). JBH company policy mandates that when a driver makes a statement that he wishes to seek mental treatment, the Safety Department representative speaking with the driver must immediately revoke the driver's driving privileges. (Hartgrave Dep. 13:22–14:18, Def's App. 212). Based upon his conversation with Dick, Hartgrave decided that Dick should no longer be cleared to drive. ( Id. at 13:10–15:10). Dick contends that this determination was wrong, that his privileges should not have been revoked, and that he should not have been placed on leave. (Pl.'s Br. 4). It is undisputed that Dick's driving privileges were in fact revoked.

The parties do not dispute that after receiving Hartgrave's Safety Maintenance Record entries, Richard Doarn, JBH's Haslet Operations Manager who was one of Dick's supervisors, placed Dick on personal medical leave. Doarn subsequently sent Dick a letter, dated February 17, 2009, informing him that he was being placed on leave because of his statement that he was “suffering mental instability” and “unable to complete [his] job functions,” that he had earned six weeks of Personal Medical Leave, and that he would need to be released by his attending physician before he could return to work. (Def.'s App. 164). On February 18, 2009, Dick visited a licenced professional counselor who determined that Dick was currently fit for work but needed further sessions to deal with job-related stress in his life. ( Id. at 136). The counselor sent JBH a letter containing this information on February 19th. That same day, JBH called Dick and informed him that he needed to undergo a DOT-mandated physical by a qualified physician before returning to work. (Def.'s Br. 11). JBH company policy required such a policy in order to conform with applicable state and federal regulations. ( See Def.'s App. 158). JBH set up a DOT exam with a qualified physician, and Dick agreed to attend. (Def.'s Br. 11). However, when Dick arrived, he became suspicious that the physician was conspiring with JBH to fail him and left. ( Id.).

The parties agree that Dick never received a DOT-mandated exam by a qualified physician afterwards. On several occasions, JBH representatives contacted Dick and informed him that he either needed to take such an exam and return to work or qualify his unpaid medical leave with a statement from a physician that he could not work. ( Id. at 11–12). Dick did have his personal physician send a letter to JBH on March 6, 2009 that, like the letter from the counselor, indicated that Dick was cleared to work. (Def.'s App. 139). Despite repeated additional warnings, Dick never received a DOT physical nor submitted a physician's statement that he could not work, and he was administratively terminated, per company policy, on March 31, 2009. (Def.'s Br. 13–14).

B. Procedural History

Dick filed three separate EEOC charges in late March and early April 2009, cumulatively alleging that he was discriminated and retaliated against on the basis of race and disability. (Def.'s App. 11–18). JBH alleges that the EEOC found no cause to believe that any of these alleged wrongs occurred. (Def.'s Br. 15). Dick also filed a Surface Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”) complaint with the Department of Labor against JBH, alleging that JBH discriminated and retaliated against him for lodging safety-related complaints. ( Id.). An administrative law judge concluded that Defendant was...

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