Dickerman v. Town of Pittsford

• Decision Date: 01 May 1951
• Docket Number: No. 1018,1018
• Citation: 116 Vt. 563,80 A.2d 529
• Parties: DICKERMAN et al. v. TOWN OF PITTSFORD et al.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 529

80 A.2d 529

116 Vt. 563

DICKERMAN et al. v. TOWN OF PITTSFORD et al.

No. 1018.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

May 1, 1951.

Hanford G. Davis, Brandon, for plaintiffs.

Bloomer & Bloomer, Rutland, for defendants.

Before SHERBURNE, C. J., and JEFFORDS, CLEARY, ADAMS and BLACKMER, JJ.

BLACKMER, Justice.

This is a bill in chancery to quite title to a parcel of land and a schoolhouse erected thereon, to determine the ownership of the same and decree title to the lawful owner or owners. The defendants Town and Town School District answered. The case was heard on oral evidence by the court of chancery.

These facts appear from the chancellor's findings of fact and from admissions in the briefs. In 1866 Thomas conveyed a part of his farm to the Fifth School District of the Town of Pittsford. The habendum in the deed is 'To have and to hold the same from the date hereof for and during the time or period that the said School District shall use and occupy the said grounds for school purposes, and as a school house, but if ever said district shall move the school house or give up the said land for the purpose of a school house, this deed or lease shall terminate, and the land revert back to me, the said Thomas, or my heirs or assigns.' The deed was duly recorded. It was the intent of the parties that any school building erected on the premises should not become a part of the realty but should be removable therefrom as a chattel. The plaintiffs are successors in title to Thomas. The defendant School District is the successor in title and corporate function to the Fifth School District. A schoolhouse was erected in 1886 by the school authority. It was used without interruption for school purposes until February 1942. Since that date it has not been used for school purposes. Prior to the town meeting of the Town of Pittsford in March 1949 the plaintiffs endeavored to purchase the school property from the school directors, but the latter refused to sell the subject property. Thereafter the plaintiffs were instrumental in causing the circulation of a petition to have included in the warning for the town meeting an article authorizing a sale of the school property. More than a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the closing of the schoolhouse in February to the time this action was instituted (July 27, 1949). The School District has given up said land for the purpose of a schoolhouse.

The decree awarded the land to the plaintiffs and in paragraph three thereof the personal property on the land 'consisting principally of the school building erected thereon' to the defendants Town and Town School District, which were authorized to remove the building from the premises within a time certain which has now passed. The plaintiffs excepted to the decree, and make claim that the part which decrees the schoolhouse to the Town and School District is not supported by the findings.

The Town of Pittsford is a corporate entity separate and distinct from the Town School District of the Town of Pittsford. Farmer v. Haley, 100 Vt. 75, 78, 135 A. 12; North Troy Graded School District v. Town of Troy, 80 Vt. 16, 32, 66 A. 1033.

It appears, then, that the School District of the Town of Pittsford is the only defendant party interested. No point was made of this below or here; since it is consistent with the positions of the respective parties, we shall treat the case as if the School District were the only defendant so far as the schoolhouse is concerned.

The original deed from Thomas created a determinable fee, and the right of reverter remaining in Thomas was alienable. Collette v. Town of Charlotte, 114 Vt. 357, 360, 45 A.2d 203. The principal question presented to us is whether, on determination of the School District's interest in the land, the schoolhouse passed to the plaintiffs as a fixture.

'The general rule of the common law certainly is that whatever is once annexed to the freehold becomes part of it, and cannot afterwards be removed, except by him who is entitled to the inheritance. The rule, however, never was, at least as far back as we can trace into the books, inflexible and without exception. It was construed most strictly between executor and heir in favor of the latter; more liberally between tenants for life or in tail, and remainderman or reversioner, in favor of the former; and with much greater latitude between landlord and tenant in favor of the tenant. But an exception of a much broader cast, and whose origin may be traced almost as high as the rule itself, is of fixtures erected for the purpose of trade. Upon principles of public policy, and to encourage trade and manufacture, fixtures which were erected to carry on such business were allowed to be removed by the tenant during his term, and were deemed personalty for many other purposes.' Mr. Justice Story, in Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137, 7 L.Ed. 374. Much of the law relating to buildings as trade fixtures is based more or less directly on Van Ness v. Pacard. Anno. 107 A.L.R. 1154.

The general rule is that a building may be a trade fixture. 22 Am.Jur. Fixtures § 66; 36 C.J.S., Fixtures, § 38, note 98. This Court recognized the rule in Snow v. Smith, 86 Vt. 58, 60, 83 A. 269.

It was there said that since the buildings were placed on the rented premises to advance the business for which the premises were leased, they must be held to be trade fixtures. Whether a building is or is not a trade fixture is not dependent on its size, foundation, method of construction etc., but the sole question is whether the building is designed for purposes of trade, and if so designed it is a trade fixture and is removable. 22 Am.Jur. Fixtures § 66; Snow v. Smith, supra, 86 Vt. 60, 83 A. 269.

A simple reference to the habendum in the Thomas deed is sufficient to show that the 'business' (of which more hereafter) which was carried on in or upon the premises was that of education; the use of the land was by the terms of the deed dedicated to that purpose. It is apparent that the schoolhouse was placed on the land to advance the business of education. The schoolhouse was designed for the purpose of education. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to confuse a schoolhouse used for educational purposes with a building intended for use with the operation of the farm from which the Thomas grant was carved. The plaintiffs are chargeable with knowledge of the contents of the habendum, the deed having been duly recorded. And it sufficiently appears from the findings that the educational use of the schoolhouse was patent to anyone who looked. It is not within reason that the plaintiffs, or any of their predecessors in title, could have been misled.

American Steel & Iron Co. v. Taft, 109 Vt. 469, 199 A. 261, is much in point. There, 109 Vt. at page 472, 199 A. at page 263, Snow v. Smith, supra, was cited with express approval. At pages 471-473 of 109 Vt., at pages 262, 263 of 199 A. the holding was that railroad rails, rail accessories and ties are trade fixtures or in the nature of trade fixtures, and as such are removable when the railroad ceases operations, or within a reasonable time after the owner of the reversion demands their removal. In the course of the opinion it was said, American Steel & Iron Co. v. Taft, supra, 109 Vt. 472, 199 A. 262, that tracks, railroad structures and other railroad equipment do not become a part of the realty and may be removed by the railroad company or its assigns on abandonment of the right of way, or within a reasonable time thereafter. The word 'structure' by definition includes a building, a building of some size, an edifice. Webster's New International Dictionary.

In the American Steel case, supra,...