Dickerson v. Attorney General

• Decision Date: 12 February 1986
• Parties: Lewis H. DICKERSON v. ATTORNEY GENERAL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 757

488 N.E.2d 757

396 Mass. 740

Lewis H. DICKERSON v. ATTORNEY GENERAL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 5, 1985.

Decided Feb. 12, 1986.

John P. Osler, Boston, for plaintiff.

Linda G. Katz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Atty. Gen.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS and NOLAN, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The plaintif, Lewis H. Dickerson, brought a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County challenging the constitutionality of G.L. c. 278, § 33E (1984 ed.), which requires defendants convicted of murder in the first degree to obtain leave from a single justice of this court in order to appeal postconviction motions. Dickerson claims that the "gatekeeper" provisions of G.L. c. 278, § 33E, deny him equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and arts. 1, 6, and 7 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Upon joint motion of the parties, a single justice reserved and reported Dickerson's complaint to the full bench. We conclude that the "gatekeeper" provisions of G.L. c. 278, § 33E, are constitutional, and a declaration to that effect shall be entered.

Dickerson was convicted of murder in the first degree, unlawfully carrying a firearm, and armed robbery. He was sentenced, as the law required, to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. We upheld Dickerson's convictions on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 364 N.E.2d 1052 (1977).

In 1980, Dickerson filed a motion for new trial in the Superior Court pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30, 378 Mass. 900 (1979), challenging the constitutionality of the trial judge's instructions to the jury. This motion for postconviction relief was denied without a hearing on January 21, 1981. Dickerson sought leave to appeal the denial of this motion. On August 4, 1981, a single justice of this court, acting pursuant to her powers under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, denied Dickerson's petition for leave to appeal on the ground that his motion raised no "new and substantial question."

Dickerson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. This petition was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissed the petition on the ground that Dickerson failed to exhaust State remedies. Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150 (1st Cir.1984). Dickerson then filed this action for declaratory relief.

Dickerson argues that G.L. c. 278, § 33E, operates to discriminate against capital defendants ¹ for the purpose of postconviction appeals. Under § 33E, a defendant indicted for, and convicted of, first degree murder has a right of direct appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court. The scope of our review of capital cases under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, is quite broad: we are required to review the "whole case" to determine whether the verdict is "against the law or the weight of the evidence." We are also empowered by the statute to "(a) order a new trial or (b) direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt," if the interests of justice so require.

After this plenary review on direct appeal, the statute circumscribes the avenues of postconviction relief available to capital defendants. Under c. 278, § 33E, a capital defendant may not appeal a decision of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief "unless the appeal is allowed by a single justice of the supreme judicial court on the ground that it presents a new and substantial question which ought to be determined by the full court." A single justice's denial of a defendant's petition for leave to appeal is final and unreviewable. Leaster v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 547, 432 N.E.2d 708 (1982).

By contrast, a noncapital defendant is not required to seek leave from a single justice in order to appeal an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief. Under Mass.R.Crim.P. 30 (c)(8), 378 Mass. 900 (1979), "[a]n appeal from a final order under this rule may be taken to the Appeals Court by either party." In addition, a noncapital defendant aggrieved by a decision of the Appeals Court panel under Mass.R.Crim.P. 30 (c)(8), may petition for reconsideration by a majority of the Justices of the Appeals Court, or may petition the Supreme Judicial Court for further appellate review. G.L. c. 211A, § 11 (1984 ed.). The question thus presented is whether this disparity of treatment ² deprives defendants convicted of murder in the first degree of equal protection of the laws. ³

As a preliminary matter, we consider the level of equal protection scrutiny to be applied in this case. For the purpose of equal protection analysis, our standard of review under the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Commonwealth v. Franklin Fruit Co., 388 Mass. 228, 235, 446 N.E.2d 63 (1983). Commissioner of Pub. Health v. Bessie M. Burke Memorial Hosp., 366 Mass.734, 744 n. 18, 323 N.E.2d 309 (1975). Absent a showing that a statute burdens a suspect group or fundamental interest, it will be upheld as long as it is rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate State interest. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 942, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Opinion of the Justices, 373 Mass. 883, 886, 366 N.E.2d 733 (1977). The Supreme Court of the United States has applied a traditional "rational basis" test to statutes regulating appellate review of criminal convictions. See Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 538, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 1176, 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1499, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966). The statute is presumed to be constitutional, Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259, 272, 97 S.Ct. 1047, 1055, 51 L.Ed.2d 313 (1977), and will not be invalidated where any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. See Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 85, 93, 375 N.E.2d 1175 (1978); Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 28, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).

The "gatekeeper" provisions of G.L. c. 278, § 33E, survive this "rational basis" scrutiny. While it might appear incongruous that those convicted of murder in the first degree are afforded a narrower opportunity for appeal of postconviction motions than other criminal defendants, the rationale for this classification derives from the plenary review which capital defendants receive on direct appeal. Under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, this court has extraordinary powers in reviewing capital convictions on direct appeal: we consider the whole case, both the law and the evidence, to determine whether there has been any miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Hurley, 391 Mass. 76, 81, 461 N.E.2d 754 (1984); Commonwealth v. Hall, 369 Mass. 715, 717 (1976). Unlike appellate review of convictions of other crimes, our consideration of first degree murder cases is not limited to issues based on objections rendered at trial. Commonwealth v. Smith, 384 Mass. 519, 524, 427 N.E.2d 739 (1981). Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 168, 380 N.E.2d 113 (1978). We are empowered under G.L. c. 278, § 33E, to consider questions raised by the defendant for the first time on appeal, or even to address issues not raised by the parties, but discovered as a result of our own independent review of the entire record. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Repoza, 382 Mass. 119, 130, 414 N.E.2d 591 (1980); Commonwealth v. Callahan, 380 Mass. 821, 822, 406 N.E.2d 385 (1980). This uniquely thorough review of first degree murder convictions is warranted by the infamy of the crime and the severity of its consequences. See G.L. c. 265, § 2 (1984 ed.). Cf. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 540, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 43...