Dickerson v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 16 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-2955 |
| Parties | Darius Dickerson Plaintiff, v. The City of Chicago, a municipal corporation, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Darius Dickerson claims that six Chicago police officers used excessive force against him during his arrest in 2018. He sues the six individual officers and their employer, the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law to redress his alleged resultant injuries. The Defendant Officers and the City separately move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [35]; [46]. For the reasons explained below, this Court grants the Defendant Officers' motion [35], and grants in part and denies in part the City's motion [46].
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a twenty-seven year-old African-American man living in Chicago, Illinois. [30] ¶ 4. At all relevant times, Defendant Officers Tomas E. Almazan, Colin J. Sullivan, Jack M. Reed, Cedrick Parks, Quintin Bradley, and Scott Soreghen worked as police officers for Defendant City of Chicago. Id. ¶ 5.
On August 24, 2018, at approximately 10:00 p.m., the Defendant Officers arrested Plaintiff near the intersection of 132nd Street and Ellis Avenue in Chicago. Id. ¶ 7. During the arrest, Defendant Officers placed Plaintiff into a chokehold that restricted Plaintiff's breathing, forcefully struck Plaintiff, and placed Plaintiff face-first on the pavement. Id. ¶ 9. While attempting to place handcuffs on him, one of the Defendant Officers placed a knee and hand forcefully on Plaintiff's back. Id. Plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that none of the Defendant Officers intervened to prevent their fellow officers from using extreme and excessive force against Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 10.
As a result of the incident, Plaintiff sustained injury to his chest, head, and upper body that required hospital treatment shortly after his arrest and will require future treatment. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. Plaintiff also sustained injury to his spine, which has required ongoing treatment, and has caused past, present, and future pain and suffering. Id. ¶ 14.
On December 17, 2019, Plaintiff, then proceeding pro se while incarcerated, filed a case against the City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, and “Officer John Doe Defendants” in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois for excessive force. [11]. Plaintiff served the City on May 18, 2021, approximately a year and a half after he filed his state court complaint. [1]. Shortly after being served, on June 2, 2021, the City removed the case to this Court. [1].
On July 21, 2021, this Court issued an initial screening order. [13]. In the order, the Court dismissed the Chicago Police Department because it is not a suable entity, and it dismissed the City of Chicago because Plaintiff did not articulate a cognizable theory of municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 668 (1978). [13] at 4. The Court did, however, find that Plaintiff could proceed with a constitutional claim against the unknown police officer if he identifies the officer by name in an amended complaint and effectuates service. Id. at 4. The Court also recruited counsel for Plaintiff, instructing new counsel to begin the process upon his appearance. Id. Specifically, the Court instructed new counsel to identify the officer, seek amendment of the complaint to name the officer, and request the issuance of summons. Id. The Court cautioned: “Time is generally of the essence, as many claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.” Id.
After appointed counsel appeared in this case, Plaintiff issued written discovery requests to the City on October 19, 2021, aimed at discovering the identities of the officers involved in Plaintiff's arrest. [25] at 1-2. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on December 15, 2021. [30]. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for: excessive force against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); failure to intervene against all Defendants under Section 1983 (Count II); battery against the Defendant Officers (Count III); and respondeat superior and indemnification against the City for any tort judgment Plaintiff obtains against the Defendant Officers (Count IV). [20] ¶¶ 16-34.
The Defendant Officers and the City have moved to dismiss the entirety of the amended complaint. [35]; [46].
A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a claim, not the merits of the case. Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., No. 21-1304, --- F.4th ----, 2022 WL 2913751, at *7 (7th Cir. July 25, 2022); Gunn v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the claim “must provide enough factual information to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (). A court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion accepts the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleading party's favor. Lax v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2021).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). Deciding the plausibility of the claim is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2016)).
The Defendant Officers move to dismiss the claims against them as time-barred. [35]. The City, on the other hand, moves to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff's amended complaint lacks sufficient facts to state a plausible Monell theory of liability. [46]. This Court will address each motion in order below.
As the parties all agree, a two-year statute of limitations applies to section 1983 claims, including those based on Monell liability, in Illinois. Herrera v. Cleveland, 8 F.4th 493, 494 (7th Cir. 2021); Bowers v. Dart, 1 F.4th 513, 518 (7th Cir. 2021). A section 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or should have known that his constitutional rights have been violated. Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31; AFL-CIO, 942 F.3d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 141 S.Ct. 1282 (2021). On the other hand, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's state-law battery and indemnification claims is one year. See 745 ILCS § 10/8-101; Williams v. Lampe, 399 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Illinois local governmental entities and their employees . . . benefit from a one-year statute of limitations for ‘civil actions' against them.”); see also Phillips v. City of Chicago, No. 18-CV-0316, 2021 WL 1614503, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 26, 2021).
The limitations period on claims for excessive force, failure-to-intervene, and battery claims begin to run immediately at the time of injury. See Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 2010) (excessive force); Missak v. Eagle Mkt. Makers, Inc., No. 14 C 1757, 2014 WL 2598802, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2014) (battery); Liebich v. DelGiudice, No. 20-CV-2368, 2022 WL 874610, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2022) (). Thus, all of Plaintiff's claims accrued on August 24, 2018, the night he sustained his alleged injuries. The limitations period for Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims then ran for two years until August 24, 2020, and the period for his statelaw claims ran for one year until August 24, 2019. While Plaintiff filed his original complaint against the City on December 19, 2019 (within the two-year limitations period for his constitutional claims), he did not name the Defendant Officers until he filed his amended complaint on December 15, 2021. Thus, as Plaintiff concedes, the claims against the Defendants Officers are time-barred absent an exception, such as the relation back doctrine or equitable tolling.
Plaintiff argues that his claims are timely because they relate back to the original complaint's filing date under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C). [40] at 6. The relation-back doctrine recognizes that “a potential defendant who has not been named in a lawsuit by the time the statute of limitations has run is entitled to repose-unless it is or should be apparent to that person that he is the beneficiary of a mere slip of the pen, as it were.” Joseph v Elan Motorports Techs. Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1), relation back is proper when “the party to be brought in by amendment . . . knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). The Seventh Circuit has recently reaffirmed that “naming a John Doe defendant does not constitute a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).” Herrera v....
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