Dickerson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue
| Decision Date | 12 November 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 67693,67693 |
| Citation | 253 Kan. 843,863 P.2d 364 |
| Parties | Richard DICKERSON, Appellee, v. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Collateral estoppel is discussed and applied under the unique facts of this case in connection with the relationship of a county prosecutor's acceptance of a drug case plea bargain and the later efforts of the Kansas Department of Revenue to impose and collect a drug tax under K.S.A.1992 Supp. 79-5202.
2. The binding effect of a plea agreement between a prosecutor and a defendant is a question of law which is not within the specialized expertise of the Director of Taxation.
3. A district court's reasons for its decision are immaterial if the ruling was correct for any reason.
4. A ruling that an opposing party is deemed to have admitted a movant's uncontroverted facts because of a failure to follow Supreme Court Rule 141 (1992 Kan.Ct.R.Annot. 124) rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. The determination of jurisdiction is for the court. Jurisdiction is not proven or disproven because a party says so in a Rule 141 statement of uncontroverted facts.
5. Under a Kansas Drug Tax Act proceeding, prosecutors should follow K.S.A. 79-5201 et seq., and trial courts should not accept plea agreements involving K.S.A.1992 Supp. 79-5205 drug tax assessments. K.S.A. 79-5208 is the penalty provision for violation of the Act. In a criminal proceeding, a defendant convicted under the Act may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or fined not more than $10,000 or both.
6. K.S.A.1992 Supp. 79-5205 vests the sole authority for tax assessment in the Director of Taxation and provides for a jeopardy assessment procedure to collect the tax. K.S.A. 79-5208 provides for the assessment of a penalty in the amount of 100% of the tax for failure to pay in addition to the tax imposed under K.S.A.1992 Supp. 79-5202. The Kansas Department of Revenue can collect interest on the tax at 18% annually from the date the tax is due. K.S.A. 79-2968.
Vernon D. Grassie, Girard, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
Brian Cox, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant Kansas Dept. of Revenue.
The central issue in this appeal is whether, under the unique facts of this case, a plea bargain in a criminal drug case collaterally estops a drug tax proceeding commenced by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR). Ancillary questions relating to exhaustion of administrative remedies, jurisdiction of the district court in the instant action, and the interpretation of our summary judgment Rule 141(b) (1992 Kan.Ct.R.Annot. 124) are also considered.
KDR appeals the district court's decision enjoining the collection of a tax assessment and fine on marijuana possessed by Richard Dickerson. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in an unpublished per curiam opinion. 841 P.2d 466. We granted KDR's petition for review.
The district court's determinations of law frame the issues on appeal. Consequently, our standard of review is unlimited. Gillespie v. Seymour, 250 Kan. 123, Syl. p 2, 823 P.2d 782 (1991).
We affirm the trial court and the Court of Appeals. KDR, as an agency of the State, is bound by the plea agreement bargained for by Dickerson.
The facts were set forth by the Court of Appeals as follows:
KDR believes that three facts were not correctly stated in the Court of Appeals' decision and should be found as follows: (1) Dickerson did not enter a plea of guilty to possessing 100 grams of marijuana; (2) there was no plea agreement that Dickerson could plead guilty to possessing 100 grams of marijuana; (3) the amount of marijuana possessed by Dickerson was not determined in the criminal proceeding. We do not agree.
In his memorandum opinion in the civil injunction action, the trial judge concluded:
KDR is incorrect when it asserts that the amount of marijuana was not specified in the original criminal proceeding. The record from the criminal case is before us. The trial court, in the injunction action, took judicial notice of Dickerson's criminal case file. The criminal record included testimony which explained the nature of the plea agreement that formed the basis for the journal entry. The criminal case record contains several references by the trial court to 100 grams of marijuana. Because KDR's focus has been transfixed on its factual contention that Dickerson did not plead to a specific amount, we set out the transcript of the pertinent portion of the criminal case audiotape recorded at Dickerson's February 26, 1990, arraignment, waiver of preliminary hearing, and entry of plea:
THE STATE: "Specifically your Honor at this time the State would move to amend Count I of the information to charge pursuant to K.S.A. 79-5201 et seq. that the defendant would be charged with possession of untaxed marijuana in the amount of 100 grams under the provisions of 79-5208....
By agreement the parties would stipulate that the defendant did in fact possess 100 grams at time of arrest and the penalties under 79-5208 would include assessment of a penalty of 100% in addition to the tax of $3.50 per gram. There is a 100% penalty of $3.50 per gram also....
....
THE COURT: "A previous charge of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell would now be amended to charge that in fact you did possess 100 grams of marijuana therefore subjecting you...
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