Dickerson v. Longoria

Decision Date24 May 2010
Docket Number2009.,No. 74,74
Citation995 A.2d 721,414 Md. 419
PartiesCarman DICKERSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Carter Bradley v. Ricardo LONGORIA, et al.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

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Leah M. Nicholls (Institute for Public Representation Georgetown University Law Center, Deepak Gupta of Public Citizen Litigation Group, Stefan Shaibani of Law Firm of Stefan Shaibani, PLLC, Washington, DC), all on brief, for appellant.

John J. Murphy (D. Elizabeth Walker of Walker & Murphy, LLP, Rockville), on brief, for appellees.

Kelly Bagby, AARP Foundation Litigation, Michael Schuster, AARP, Washington, DC, brief of Amici Curiae AARP, Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., Maryland Disability Law Center, NCCNHR — The National Consumer Voice for Quality Long-Term Care and Voices for Quality of Care in support of appellant.

Monisha Cherayil, C. Matthew Hill, Public Justice Center, Baltimore, brief of Public Justice Center, Maryland Employment Lawyers Association, Maryland Consumer Rights Coalition, National Association of Consumer Advocates, and Civil Justice as Amici Curiae for appellant.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS, and BARBERA, JJ.

GREENE, J.

This case concerns a medical malpractice claim that the Estate of Carter Bradley ("the Estate")1 filed against Heritage Care, Inc. ("Respondent"). We have been asked to determine whether the Estate may be required to arbitrate its claims against Respondent because of an arbitration agreement that Carman Dickerson ("Dickerson") allegedly signed on behalf of Carter Bradley ("Bradley") when Bradley was admitted to Respondent's nursing home, the St. Thomas More Nursing and Rehabilitation Center ("St. Thomas More").2 Prior to Bradley's death, Dickerson, who is now the personal representative of the Estate in this litigation, represented herself as Bradley's agent when she signed the arbitration agreement with Respondent. Respondent argues, and the trial court held, that Dickerson was, in fact, Bradley's agent for purposes of signing the arbitration agreement and that the Estate must submit its claims against Respondent to arbitration in accordance with that agreement. The Estate, on the other hand, contends that it is not bound by the arbitration agreement and supports this contention with a variety of arguments.

We shall decide this case by applying general agency principles to determine whether Bradley authorized Dickerson to sign the arbitration agreement on his behalf. Upon applying those principles, we agree with the Estate that it is not bound by the arbitration agreement because Dickerson did not have actual or apparent authority to bind Bradley to that agreement. The general rule is that one may delegate to another the right to make decisions on his or her behalf. Indeed, in this case there is evidence suggesting that Bradley gave Dickerson authority to make health care and financial decisions on his behalf. The decision to sign the arbitration agreement in this case was not, however, a health care or financial decision. Instead, it was primarily a decision to waive Bradley's right of access to the courts and his right to a trial by jury. On the basis of the record in this case, there is no evidence suggesting that Bradley authorized Dickerson to make this type of decision on his behalf or represented to Respondent that Dickerson had authority to do so. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and hold that the Estate is not bound by the arbitration agreement.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, seeking to compel the Estate to arbitrate the medical malpractice claims that the Estate had filed against Respondent.3 Respondent asserted that the Estate was required to arbitrate those claims pursuant to the arbitration agreement that Dickerson signed when Bradley was admitted to St. Thomas More, arguing that Dickerson signed the agreement as Bradley's agent. The court conducted a one-day trial and held that Bradley, and subsequently Bradley's Estate, was bound by the arbitration agreement. The Estate noted a timely appeal of that ruling to the Court of Special Appeals, and, while the case was before the intermediate appellate court, the Estate petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. Before the Court of Special Appeals could issue an opinion in the case, we granted the Estate's petition. Dickerson v. Longorio, 409 Md. 46, 972 A.2d 861 (2009).

FACTS

This case concerns the arbitration agreement that Dickerson signed when Bradley was admitted to Respondent's nursing home facility, St. Thomas More. The arbitration agreement purported to bind Bradley to arbitrate claims such as the one the Estate brought against Respondent. The parties do not dispute the facts as described by the trial court. Accordingly, we adopt those findings as follows, with citations and footnotes omitted:

Bradley suffered from a host of ailments including dementia, schizophrenia, organic brain disease, diabetes, mobility issues, and was unable to care for himself in an independent setting. Mr. Bradley lived with ... Ms. Dickerson, from sometime in 1997 to October, 2004. During this period, Ms. Dickerson frequently represented that she was Mr. Bradley's power of attorney and proceeded to make all necessary medical decisions for Mr. Bradley. For example, on July 12, 2004, Ms. Dickerson represented to HCR Manor Care that she was the designated "legal representative" for Mr. Bradley as well as his "legal guardian" with "durable power of attorney for health care/resident advocacy." On July 14, 2004, the nurse practitioner's notes indicated that the treatment plans for Mr. Bradley were discussed with Ms. Dickerson "POA," and again on September 29, 2004, Ms. Dickerson made the representation that she was Mr. Bradley's power of attorney, though there are notes in Mr. Bradley's Medical Records which indicate that there was a need to "clarify" Ms. Dickerson's legal status.
In October 2004, Ms. Dickerson planned to attend a family reunion and was unable to provide care for Mr. Bradley during her trip. The Veteran's Administration Medical Center ("Medical Center") provided Ms. Dickerson with a list of nursing homes where Mr. Bradley could stay in her absence. Mr. Bradley was aware that he would be staying for a short time at a nursing home and acquiesced to Ms. Dickerson's decision as to which nursing home he would reside.
On October 6, 2004, Ms. Dickerson, acting on behalf of Mr. Bradley, admitted him to Randolph Hills Nursing Home. Ms. Dickerson indicated that she was acting as Mr. Bradley's agent based upon her position "as financial power of attorney appointed by the Resident Mr. Bradley" and "as a family member or other person with authority to manage, use or control the Resident's income, funds and/or assets." While at the facility, Mr. Bradley was diagnosed with tuberculosis, a diagnosis which would later be retracted. Under the impression that Mr. Bradley had a severely contagious disease, Ms. Dickerson made arrangements for him to be admitted to the Medical Center. Once it was explained that Mr. Bradley did not have tuberculosis, the medical notes indicate that Mr. Bradley ... did not want to return to Ms. Dickerson's home.
The Medical Center transferred Mr. Bradley to St. Thomas More Nursing & Rehabilitation Center ("St. Thomas More") for physical therapy in order to increase Mr. Bradley's mobility. Ms. Dickerson discussed the move with Mr. Bradley, who agreed to be transferred. On the day that St. Thomas More admitted Mr. Bradley as a resident, Ms. Dickerson and Mr. Bradley did not discuss his admittance to the facility, but Ms. Dickerson testified that "Mr. Bradley just assumed that she would take care of it." Ms. Dickerson testified that she signed "a stack" of papers at the request of Isabel Torres (now Isabel Artega). A form entitled "Obligations of the Agent," was included in the papers that Ms. Dickerson signed. This form explained the responsibilities of an agent, and Ms. Dickerson signed it as Mr. Bradley's financial power of attorney.
The admittance papers also included a Resident and Facility Arbitration Agreement ("Agreement"), which is central to the claims in the case. Ms. Dickerson signed the Agreement on behalf of Mr. Bradley. The Agreement provided that any disputes between a resident and the facility shall be settled through arbitration, and "all claims based in whole or in part on the same incident, transaction, or related course of the care or service provided by the Facility to the Resident, shall be arbitrated in one proceeding." The agreement also stated that "the arbitrator will be selected by the Facility from a list of individuals who are certified in alternative dispute resolution or are retired judges who routinely offer their services as arbitrators," but also provided that the Agreement may be rescinded by written notice within fifteen (15) days.
In January, 2005, Mr. Bradley was transferred to Providence Hospital for emergency medical treatment. Ms. Dickerson did not actively participate in admitting Mr. Bradley to Providence Hospital, but on January 22, 2005, she represented herself as Mr. Bradley's power of attorney and gave consent for elective transfusion of blood products. On January 27, 2005, Ms. Dickerson, once again, represented herself as Mr. Bradley's "legal custodian" in a phone conversation with the nurse transfer coordinator at Providence Hospital. Almost a month after Mr. Bradley was admitted to Providence Hospital, he passed away. During his lifetime, Mr. Bradley never executed any documents purporting to make Ms. Dickerson his power of attorney, though Ms. Dickerson readily admits that she was Bradley's fiduciary payee for purposes of endorsing and depositing his checks.

Based on these facts, the trial court determined that Bradley's Estate was required to arbitrate...

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