Dickerson v. Pritchard, s. 82-2001

• Decision Date: 11 May 1983
• Docket Number: Nos. 82-2001,82-2415,s. 82-2001
• Citation: 706 F.2d 256
• Parties: Douglas R. DICKERSON, Appellee, v. Robert F. PRITCHARD, Appellant. Ronald Williams; Bob McElhaney; Marguerette Reed and Alan Parker. (Two cases)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 256

706 F.2d 256

Douglas R. DICKERSON, Appellee, v. Robert F. PRITCHARD, Appellant Ronald Williams; Bob McElhaney; Marguerette Reed and Alan Parker. (Two cases)

Nos. 82-2001, 82-2415.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 14, 1983.

Decided May 11, 1983.

Sam Sexton, Jr., Sexton, Nolan & Robb, P.A., Fort Smith, Ark., for appellant.

Robert M. Cearley, Jr., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, BENNETT, United States Circuit Judge, ^* and FAGG, Circuit Judge.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Douglas R. Dickerson brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985(3) (1976) against Robert F. Pritchard, the Sheriff of Franklin County, Arkansas, and four other law enforcement officers (Ronald Williams, Bob McElhaney, Marguerette Reed, and Alan Parker). Dickerson alleged that Pritchard beat him up following an arrest and that McElhaney, Williams, Reed, and Parker stood idly by during this beating. Pritchard appeals the judgment of the district court ¹ entered on a jury verdict against Pritchard for $140.32 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. Pritchard also appeals an award to Dickerson, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1976), of $11,979 in attorneys' fees and $505.10 in costs. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the district court, 551 F.Supp. 306, and the award of attorneys' fees and costs.

I. Background.

Dickerson filed his complaint against the defendants on August 3, 1981. The district court submitted the cause to the jury on July 13, 1982. After the court instructed the jury and the jury retired to deliberate, the attorney for Pritchard, Samuel Sexton, approached the court in chambers and advised the court that he needed to go back to his office to "make a living." Sexton further advised the court that he would leave Jonah Yates, an attorney representing one of the other parties, to "look out after my interests." The trial court consented, and Sexton absented himself from the courtroom.

The jury went out to deliberate at 1:30 p.m. The trial court brought them back into the courtroom at 3:40 p.m. The jury inquired of the court if the jury was required to assess punitive damages if they awarded compensatory damages. The court, in the presence of Yates but not Sexton, reread only the punitive damage instructions. Yates consented to the procedure. The jury then went back to deliberate. At 5:00 p.m., the trial court brought the jury back into the courtroom. The jury informed the court that the jury was not able to reach a verdict. The court then read the jury an instruction encouraging them to reach a decision. Yates was present at this time and made no objection. The jury retired again to deliberate. At 5:17 p.m., the jury returned again to the courtroom, having reached a unanimous verdict. Using a single verdict form, the jury awarded no compensatory damages against the four defendants, Reed, Parker, Williams, and Pritchard. However, using the same form, the jury awarded punitive damages against Pritchard in the amount of $5,000. The court, realizing that an award of compensatory damages is necessary to support a punitive damage award, immediately called for a recess so that Sexton, the attorney for Pritchard, could be located so that he could return to the courtroom. At 5:50 p.m., the court was back in session, but the jury was not in the courtroom. Then, with Sexton present, the court explained what it was going to do:

The Court, as indicated in chambers, believes that there is some indication from the way the verdict form was answered, that the jury misunderstood the verdict forms. Specifically, the Court is afraid that the jury may have thought that they had to return compensatory damages, the way the form reads, against all of the defendants or none at all. That of course is not the way the form was designed, and is not, in the Court's view, the law.

In order to try to salvage something out of this, and in an attempt to determine, if we can, what the jury's intention was, and an attempt to at least give the jury something that they can work with, if they desire to, what the Court plans to do is call the jury back in; read them the two instructions, one on compensatory damages that the Court earlier read, and one on punitive damages that the Court earlier read.

I then intend to give the jury new verdict forms, one set of verdict forms will allow the jury to find separate in favor of each of the defendants, and against the plaintiff. Another set of jury forms will read as to all of the defendants with the exception of Mr. Pritchard, will read: "We the jury find for the plaintiff, Douglas R. Dickerson, (T. 241) against the defendant, Allen [sic] Parker, for example, and assess compensatory damages in the amount of, and a dollar sign and then a blank. ["] We will have one of those for each one of the defendants. Mr. Pritchard's will read the same, except it will have the additional finding of punitive damages. Maybe I had just better read that into the record. We the jury find for the plaintiff, Douglas R. Dickerson, against the defendant, Robert F. Pritchard, and assess compensatory damages in the amount of, (and then there is a blank for them to fill in a dollar figure). And it further reads: We further assess punitive damages against the defendant, Robert F. Pritchard, in the amount of (a dollar sign and a blank, and of course signatures). That is what I intend to do. Mr. Sexton has, naturally, objections to that.

The court then overruled Sexton's objections and brought the jury back into the...