Dickerson v. State
Decision Date | 30 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 5D00-1561.,5D00-1561. |
Citation | 783 So.2d 1144 |
Parties | Mathew DICKERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and D. Renee Waters, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alfred Washington, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
Mathew Dickerson (Dickerson), challenges the constitutionality of sections 893.13(1)(e) and 812.171, Florida Statutes (1999), which enhance the penalties imposed on defendants convicted of selling, manufacturing, delivering or possessing a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a convenience business. Dickerson claims that the statutes are void for vagueness. We find the statutes to be constitutional and affirm Dickerson's judgment and sentence.
The relevant portion of section 893.13(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1999), provides:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance not authorized by law in, on, or within 1,000 feet of a physical place for worship at which a church or religious organization regularly conducts religious services or within 1,000 feet of a convenience business as defined in s. 812.171.
(emphasis added). Section 812.171, Florida Statutes (1999), defines a "convenience business" thusly:
The circuit court denied Dickerson's motion to dismiss, concluding that the statute places a reasonable person on notice of what constitutes "convenience business." Dickerson then entered a negotiated plea of no contest and reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss.
In challenging the constitutionality of section 893.13(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1999), Dickerson argues that the trial court should have found the statute to be unconstitutional because the language of the statute is vague in its creation of a 1000-foot drug-free zone around convenience businesses. Specifically, Dickerson contends that the term "convenience business," as defined in section 812.171, fails to adequately advise the public of which businesses fall within the statutory definition of a "convenience business." Rather, Dickerson argues that under the statute only the business owner knows whether or not it is a "convenience business." Finally, Dickerson argues that the State failed to plead and prove that the "Speedway Store" in the instant case is a "convenience business" under section 812.171.
A trial court decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo because it presents a pure question of law. Dep't of Ins. v. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So.2d 599, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), rev. denied, 770 So.2d 158 (Fla.2000). There is a strong presumption that statutes are constitutionally valid. In re Estate of Caldwell, 247 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1971); Libertarian Party of Florida v. Smith, 660 So.2d 807, 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Therefore, we are obligated to interpret statutes in such a manner as to uphold their constitutionality if it is reasonably possible to do so. Capital City Country Club v. Tucker, 613 So.2d 448, 452 (Fla.1993).
When interpreting a statute on constitutional grounds, we first look at the language of the statute itself. See State v. Dugan, 685 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla.1996)
; Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla.1995). Since statutes are presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubts regarding the validity of a statute are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality, "a defendant who challenges the constitutional validity of a statute bears a heavy burden of establishing its invalidity." Wright v. State, 739 So.2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); see Crump v. State, 746 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ( ); Frear v. State, 700 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) ( ).
A challenge to a statute on grounds of vagueness turns initially to the nature of the behavior the statute seeks to regulate. Rice v. State, 754 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Since section 893.13(1)(e) does not regulate constitutionally protected conduct, it could only be found to be unconstitutionally vague if the statutory language is so vague that it fails to give adequate notice of any conduct that the statute proscribes. Id. (citing Travis v. State, 700 So.2d 104, 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997),rev. denied, 707 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 1998)). The traditional rule is that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court." Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So.2d 68, 74-75 (Fla.2000) (citations omitted). Thus, the instant vagueness claim must first be examined in light of the facts at hand. State v. Barnes, 686 So.2d 633, 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996),rev. denied, 695 So.2d 698 (Fla.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 903, 118 S.Ct. 257, 139 L.Ed.2d 184 (1997). "If the record demonstrates that the [defendant] engaged in some conduct clearly proscribed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, then he cannot successfully challenge it for vagueness nor complain of its vagueness as applied to the hypothetical conduct of others." Id. As such, this court must "examine the [defendant's] conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).
approved, 558 So.2d 1 (Fla.1990) ( ).
A vague statute is one that fails to give a person of common intelligence fair and adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited and which, because of its imprecision, may also invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994); S.E. Fisheries Assoc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 453 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1984). A statute is not void for vagueness if the language "conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices." Brown, 629 So.2d at 842 (citations omitted). Dickerson suggests that section 812.171 is vague because it inadequately informs the public which businesses fall within the statutory definition of a "convenience business,"...
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