Dickerson v. Stirling

• Decision Date: 23 March 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 8:19-cv-01316-RBH,Civil Action No.: 8:19-cv-01158-RBH (Lead Case)
• Parties: Joseph Dickerson, Plaintiff, v. Bryan P. Stirling, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Joseph Dickerson, Plaintiff, v. Bryan P. Stirling, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 8:19-cv-01158-RBH (Lead Case)

Civil Action No.: 8:19-cv-01316-RBH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

March 23, 2020

ORDER (Consolidated Cases)

In this consolidated action, pro se Plaintiff Joseph Dickerson alleges his constitutional rights were violated as a result of his transfer from state prison in South Carolina to a private prison in Mississippi. The matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of United States Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin, who recommends granting Defendant Bryan Stirling's motion for summary judgment.¹

Legal Standards

I. Review of the R & R

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error in the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).

II. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., Md., 789 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2015); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . ; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The facts and inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 413, but the Court "cannot weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations." Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 2015).

Moreover, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "A dispute of material fact is 'genuine' if sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party." Seastrunk v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 3d 812, 814 (D.S.C. 2014). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

At the summary judgment stage, "the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once the moving party has met his burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with some evidence beyond the mere allegations contained in the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial." Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted). Summary judgment is not warranted unless, "from the totality of the evidence, including pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits, the [C]ourt believes no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 729 F.3d 381, 385 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Background²

Plaintiff is committed to the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") and has been serving a fifty-year prison sentence for armed robbery, criminal conspiracy, and cocaine trafficking convictions since 2000. See ECF No. 26 at ¶ 17; ECF No. 42-2 at ¶ 2; ECF No. 42-5 at p. 1. On June 18, 2018, Plaintiff was removed from the general population at Ridgeland Correctional Institution and sent to Kirkland Correctional Institution, and then on June 21, 2018, he was transferred to a private prison in Mississippi—the Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility—owned and operated by CoreCivic, Inc. See ECF No. 26 at ¶¶ 13, 17, 19, 23; ECF No. 42-2 at ¶¶ 2-4. Plaintiff and forty-seven other SCDC inmates housed at various prisons throughout South Carolina were identified by SCDC officials as "problematic" based on suspected involvement in gang and/or contraband related activities and transferred to the Mississippi prison following a deadly riot in April 2018 at Lee Correctional Institution in Bishopville, South Carolina. See ECF No. 26 at ¶¶ 7-16; ECF No. 26-4 at ¶¶ 3, 10-31; ECF No. 39-1 at ¶¶ 5-8, 15.³ Defendant is Director of the SCDC and signed an Inmate Housing Agreement with CoreCivic, Inc. authorizing transfer of the forty-eight inmates. See ECF No. 39-1 at pp. 4-17.

In February 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint in state court against Defendant asserting state and federal claims and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. See ECF Nos. 1-1 & 26-4. In April 2019, Defendant removed the case to this Court (docketed as No. 8:19-cv-01158-RBH), and Plaintiff subsequently filed a second case in this Court (docketed as No. 8:19-cv-01316-RBH) against Defendant asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeking monetary damages. See ECF No. 26. The Magistrate Judge consolidated the cases pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and combined both complaints to form one single Amended Complaint.⁴ See ECF Nos. 25 & 26. The lead case is No. 8:19-cv-01158-RBH.

On July 23, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred back to an SCDC facility in South Carolina. See ECF No. 31. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, Defendant filed a reply, and Plaintiff filed a surreply. See ECF Nos. 39, 42, 43, & 45. The Magistrate Judge then entered the instant R & R. See ECF No. 46.

Discussion

Plaintiff pursues three federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) procedural due process and (2) equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and (3) a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding (a) Plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive relief is not moot; (b) as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, Defendant is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for damages sought against him in his official capacity; (c) all three § 1983 claims fail on the merits; and (d) Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct did not violate a federal right. See R & R at pp. 10-22 & n.10. Plaintiff has filed three specific objections to the R & R. See ECF No. 53.⁵

I. Plaintiff's Objections

A. First Objection

Plaintiff's first objection relates to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity.⁶ See id. at pp. 4-6. The Court notes Defendant moves for summary judgment based on Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, wherein the Supreme Court held "that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also id. at 66 ("[T]he scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of § 1983 are . . . separate issues."); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) ("State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not 'persons' for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that employs them." (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71)); Rose v. SCDC, No. 0:18-cv-03315-RBH, 2020 WL 289273, at *3-4 & n.7 (D.S.C. Jan. 21, 2020) (discussing the difference between "the Eleventh Amendment question" and "the § 1983 statutory question"). This threshold statutory reason is why Defendant cannot be sued for damages in his official capacity under § 1983, and the Court need not reach the separate issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity.⁷ See Rose, 2020 WL 289273, at *3 n.7 (recognizing the proper order of analysis under Vermont Agency⁸ and its progeny).

B. Second Objection

Plaintiff's second objection concerns his procedural due process claim. See ECF No. 53 at pp. 6-12. A due process claim—whether procedural or substantive⁹—requires a plaintiff to demonstrate the deprivation of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property. Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 502 (4th Cir. 1997). Here, Plaintiff alleges a state-created liberty interest "[t]o be free from mistaken out of state transfers," ECF No. 26 at ¶ 35(a), and because he is a convicted prisoner, the Court must analyze his claim under the two-prong framework established in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).¹⁰ See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 249-51 (4th Cir. 2015) (discussing the Sandin line of cases).

Under Sandin, a prisoner must show both (1) a protected liberty interest ...