Dickerson v. Warden, Marquette Prison

• Citation: 298 N.W.2d 841,99 Mich.App. 630
• Decision Date: 27 August 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 46384
• Parties: Chester Gene DICKERSON and Oscar Joseph Pratt, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WARDEN, MARQUETTE PRISON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 841

298 N.W.2d 841

99 Mich.App. 630

Chester Gene DICKERSON and Oscar Joseph Pratt, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WARDEN, MARQUETTE PRISON, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 46384.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Aug. 27, 1980.

Released for Publication Dec. 9, 1980.

Chester Gene Dickerson, in pro. per.

Oscar Joseph Prat in pro. per.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas C. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellee.

Before CYNAR, P. J., and V. J. BRENNAN and CAVANAGH, JJ.

V. J. BRENNAN, Judge.

Chester E. Dickerson and Oscar J. Pratt, inmates of the Marquette Branch Prison, appeal from the circuit court's dismissal of their "order for show cause" which alleged, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, a denial of Federal constitutional rights under color of state law. The plaintiffs claim that they were reclassified to a more restrictive inmate status without being afforded an opportunity to present proof to dispute the charges which served as the basis for their reclassification.

The incident which led to the reclassification occurred on June 6, 1978, when the plaintiffs were visited by Barbara Kreusher. Because of the trio's suspicious behavior, the visit was terminated, and the plaintiffs were searched. During the search, the plaintiffs struggled with a guard, and plaintiff Pratt flushed an object down a toilet. A subsequent search of the sewer line disclosed a round, dark object about three inches in length containing a sizeable quantity of marijuana. The guard identified this object as that which he saw plaintiff Pratt flush down the toilet.

On June 7, 1978, both plaintiffs were served with a notice of intent to conduct an administrative hearing concerning their security classifications. Following a hearing on June 8, 1978, the pair were placed in solitary confinement, which was termed "administrative segregation, triple O, F Unit; and also placed on closed visits". According to a prison spokesperson, the purpose of the June 8, 1978, classification hearing was not to investigate the alleged misconduct or criminal behavior but merely to decide whether to place the inmates in some form of restrictive custody until the matter was settled. A disciplinary hearing was conducted eight months later, at which time the plaintiffs received penalties of 7 days in solitary confinement. The plaintiffs remained in solitary confinement in the interim.

On July 18, 1978, the circuit court denied the petition in an opinion and order. ¹ The judge did not reach the underlying merits of the dispute, finding that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. The plaintiffs appeal. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal which we deny.

The first question before us is whether the plaintiffs have made out a claim actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a Federal statute, state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. International Prisoners' Union v. Rizzo, 356 F.Supp. 806 (E.D.Pa., 1973); Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal.3d 518, 119 Cal.Rptr. 204, 531 P.2d 772 (1975); Alberty v. Daniel, 25 Ill.App.3d 291, 323 N.E.2d 110 (1974); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis.2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977). Despite the foregoing, if the petitioner in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails to plead that a constitutional right has been violated under color of state law, there can be no redress under the statute. In the instant case, the plaintiffs allege a violation of their rights to procedural due process. Specifically, they claim that they were reclassified to more restrictive inmate status without being afforded an opportunity to present proof to dispute the charges which served as the basis for the reclassification.

It cannot be gainsaid that the plaintiffs, as inmates of Marquette Prison, do not have a right to the same constitutional protections accorded nonimprisoned citizens. These plaintiffs have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a judicial proceeding providing the full panoply of rights and protections guaranteed to the criminally accused under both our Federal and State Constitutions. Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights justified by considerations underlying the penal system. While the convicted prisoner does not forfeit all his constitutional protections when the prison gates close behind him, prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and thus do not call into play all those rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). ²

In Wolff the Supreme Court determined that before a prisoner could be denied "good-time credit", the following due process requirements must be met: (1) advance written notice of the charges of at least 24 hours prior to the disciplinary hearing; (2) a written statement by the factfinder(s) explaining the reason for any disciplinary action must be supplied to the prisoner; and (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, if this would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, must be afforded to the prisoner. While Wolff was concerned with the question of the State's deprivation of good-time credits, footnote 19 extends these minimal due process requirements to the imposition of "solitary confinement" as a disciplinary measure.

"19. Although the complaint put at issue the procedures employed with respect to the deprivation of good time, under the Nebraska system, the same procedures are employed where disciplinary confinement is imposed. The deprivation of good time and 'solitary' confinement are reserved for instances where serious misbehavior has occurred. This appears a realistic approach, for it would be difficult for the purposes of procedural due process to distinguish between the procedures that are required where good time is forfeited and those that must be extended when solitary confinement is at issue. The latter represents a major change in the conditions of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is claimed and proved that there has been a major act of misconduct. Here, as in the case of good time, there should be minimum procedural safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary determination of the factual predicate for imposition of the sanction. We do not suggest, however, that the procedures required by today's decision for the deprivation of good time would also be required for the imposition of lesser penalties such as the loss of privileges." (Emphasis added.) 418 U.S. at 571-572, 94 S.Ct. at 2982.

Following Wolff, the Supreme Court declined to extend due process procedural requirements to the transfer of prisoners from one penal institution to another, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976), reh. den., 429 U.S. 873, 97 S.Ct. 191, 50 L.Ed.2d 155 (1976), regardless of whether or not the transfers are the result of the inmates' behavior. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976):

"The Clause does not require hearings in connection with transfers whether or not they are the result of the inmate's misbehavior or may be labeled as disciplinary or punitive."

Significantly, the Court did point out in Montayne that "(n)o loss of good time, segregated confinement, loss of privileges, or any other disciplinary measures accompanied the transfer". (Emphasis added.) 427 U.S. at 238, 96 S.Ct. at 2545. And in Meachum, the Court stated that its holding in Wolff stood. 427 U.S. at 225, 96 S.Ct. at 2538. In the wake of Montanye and Meachum, the Federal Courts of Appeal have found that Wolff still applies where the prisoner is subjected to disciplinary confinement or segregation. See, for instance, Aikens v. Lash, 547 F.2d 372, 373 (CA 7, 1976), Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850, 854 (CA 5, 1976).

In the instant case the inmates were originally placed in administrative segregation following a "security classification hearing" as distinguished from a disciplinary hearing. A prison official at the show cause hearing explained:

"MR. MAYNARD: In cases of this nature, generally, they are instructed that this is not-it's a matter of a security classification hearing and they are not to discuss or talk about the incident-the misconduct-the alleged misconduct or the alleged criminal behavior because it may tend to jeopardize their position in the eventual action. And it's merely to decide ... and to inform them of the decision that they are going to be placed in some form of restrictive custody until this matter is settled."

The hearing at issue here was termed administrative and not disciplinary. Accordingly, the sanction imposed was termed "administrative segregation". The plaintiffs contend, however, and it is not disputed, that administrative segregation is identical to solitary confinement. In either situation, all privileges and rights are identical.

The warden argues that since the initial hearing was one of reclassification and not disciplinary, those minimal due process protections of Wolff do not apply. Under ordinary circumstances, we would agree that prisoners may be transferred from one prison to another or have their status reclassified without bringing Wolff into play. Under the circumstances presented by this case, however, and regardless of how the warden chooses to characterize it, the initial hearing was, in fact, a disciplinary one since: the initial hearing was instituted after specific acts of misconduct had occurred; the punishment imposed was solitary confinement; and the length of solitary confinement, some eight months, was significantly disproportionate to the penalty of 7 days in solitary confinement finally imposed after the plaintiffs were found guilty in a subsequent "disciplinary" hearing. The plaintiffs do not dispute that they received a notice of intent to conduct an administrative hearing concerning...