Dickerson v. Wheelen
| Decision Date | 12 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 6:19-CV-00084 |
| Parties | RUDY DICKERSON, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD WHEELEN and TIMOTHY BATES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Plaintiff Rudy Dickerson brings a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that two detention officers used excessive force while placing him in a restraint at the Victoria County Jail. (Dkt. No. 1). Dickerson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has provided a More Definite Statement of his claims. (Dkt. No. 15). Victoria County has provided a report with administrative records under Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1987) (a “Martinez Report”). (Dkt No. 20); (Dkt. No. 21). The Defendants, Sergeant Richard Wheelen and Lieutenant Timothy Bates, have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 63), and Dickerson has filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 69), to which the Defendants have filed a Response. (Dkt. No. 70).
The Court TERMINATES the referral of these motions to Magistrate Judge Julie K. Hampton. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 63) and DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Dickerson. (Dkt. No. 69).
While confined at the Victoria County Jail in September 2019 Dickerson filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the Victoria County Sheriff's Office Sheriff Thomas Michael O'Connor, Sergeant Wheelen, and Lieutenant Bates. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 4-5). Dickerson alleges that Sergeant Wheelen and Lieutenant Bates used excessive force when they placed him in “a restraint wrap” at the Jail, resulting in a knee injury. (Id. at 5). He seeks compensatory damages for his pain and suffering. (Id.).
This case was previously assigned to U.S. District Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt.[1] Judge Hoyt screened Dickerson's complaint as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and summarily dismissed the claims against the Victoria County Sheriff's Office for lack of capacity and the claims against Sheriff O'Connor for lack of personal involvement or other basis for supervisory liability. (Dkt. No. 9). Judge Hoyt entered a separate order directing Dickerson to provide a more definite statement of his claims against Wheelen and Bates. (Dkt. No. 14).
Dickerson filed a More Definite Statement, (Dkt. No. 15), alleging that Wheelen and Bates used excessive force against him at the Victoria County Jail on July 5, 2019, while placing him in a restraint that had straps that wrapped around his legs. (Id. at 1, 3). According to Dickerson, the officers placed him in the restraint because he did not answer intake questions during the booking process. (Id. at 3). He alleges that the officers wrapped him too tightly with his knees together. (Id.). He contends that one of the officers-and he admits that he does not know which one-“pulled a strap as tight as [he] could, ” injuring Dickerson's right knee. (Id. at 5). Dickerson claims that his right knee was fractured in two places as a result of the force used to secure his legs in the restraint. (Id. at 4).
After Dickerson filed his more definite statement, Judge Hoyt ordered Victoria County to further supplement the pleadings with a Martinez Report. (Dkt. No. 16). The Martinez Report, which includes records and a video of the incident, shows that the use of force occurred during the intake process at the Victoria County Jail, following Dickerson's arrest during the early morning hours of July 5, 2019, on charges of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit assault. (Dkt. No. 20 at 3); (Dkt. No. 21); (Dkt. No. 22 at 3-4, 22). These records show that detention officers at the Jail placed Dickerson in the restraint as a precautionary measure after he frustrated their efforts by sitting down on the floor and repeatedly refusing to answer booking questions posed by the officers. (Dkt. No. 21); (Dkt. No. 22 at 99-124).
The Court authorized service of process on Sergeant Wheelen and Lieutenant Bates, (Dkt. No. 29), who have now filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 63). They argue that Dickerson cannot show that their actions were unreasonable or excessive for purposes of demonstrating a constitutional violation. (Id. at 9-15). In support, they point to affidavits from all the officers involved in the use of force and the video of the incident, which show that minimal force was used to secure Dickerson with the restraint and that it was applied after he repeatedly refused to cooperate during the intake process. (Id.). They also point to medical records showing that Dickerson reported an injury to his right knee, but that an examination at a local orthopedic hospital showed no evidence of any fracture, dislocation, or injury other than soreness. (Dkt. No. 64 at 3). Dickerson has filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in response, arguing that he was not required to answer the officers' questions and that the Defendants violated his rights by restraining him against his will. (Dkt. No. 69).[2]
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a reviewing court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is “material” if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. “In making that determination, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted).
If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden ordinarily shifts to the non-movant to provide specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis omitted). However, a “good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). “Qualified immunity is a complete defense, and [a defendant is] entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity unless [the plaintiff] can show triable issues as to whether [the defendant] violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable officer would have been aware.” Brewer v. Hayne, 860 F.3d 819, 824 (5th Cir. 2017). When a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the plaintiff “must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact dispute as to whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (alteration omitted). A plaintiff cannot satisfy this burden with conclusory allegations based on speculation or unsubstantiated assertions of wrongdoing. See Mitchell v. Mills, 895 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2018). In addition, courts are not obliged to accept a party's version of events where it is blatantly contradicted by video evidence. In addition, courts need not accept a party's version of events where it is blatantly contradicted by video evidence. Buehler v. Dear, __F.4th, __, __ 2022 WL 619584, at *3 (5th Cir. 2022).
Because Dickerson represents himself, his pleadings are entitled to a liberal construction, meaning they are subject to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam). Even under this lenient standard, pro se litigants are expected to “properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed, state a plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present summary judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014). Courts are not required “to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; [courts] rely on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence upon which he relies.” Buehler v. City of Austin/Austin Police Dept., 824 F.3d 548, 555 n.7 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
The Defendants have invoked the defense of qualified immunity which protects government officials from personal liability for monetary damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity, which is designed to give public servants “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, ” “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1244, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012) (internal quotations omitted). Qualified immunity shields public officials from claims for monetary damages unless a...
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