Dickey v. Turner Constr. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | 4:19-cv-00154-HCA |
| Citation | 421 F.Supp.3d 645 |
| Parties | Michael DICKEY, Plaintiff, v. TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
David Ronald Albrecht, Madison Elizabeth Fiedler-Carlson, Fiedler Law Firm PLC, Johnston, IA, for Plaintiff.
Leslie Christine Behaunek, Thomas M. Cunningham, Nyemaster Goode PC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Count 2 filed by Defendant Turner Construction Company ("Turner") on May 28, 2019. [3]. Plaintiff Michael Dickey filed his resistance on June 10, 2019 [6]. Turner filed a reply on June 26, 2019. [11]. The case was referred to the undersigned by then-presiding Senior District Court Judge Robert Pratt, on consent of the parties, on July 8, 2019. [18], [19]. Oral argument was held on August 5, 2019. [21]. The Court decides the motion on the briefs and oral argument.
This case concerns Turner's decision to terminate Dickey from its employ on November 3, 2017. See generally (Def. Notice of Removal; Pl. Complaint [1-2] at 1-6). Dickey was originally hired by Turner on April 27, 2015 as a laborer. (Id. ¶ 5). One of his duties included cleaning break areas. (Id. ¶ 6). On October 30, 2017, a vending machine that Dickey was cleaning behind tipped over. (Id. ¶ 7). Dickey, a night-shift employee, left the spilled candy and money from the machine on employee Jason Godwin's desk with a note explaining what had happened. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 9).
Minutes after Dickey arrived to work on November 1, 2017, Godwin informed him that Labor Supervisor, Andy Buck, wanted Dickey to take a drug test. (Id. ¶ 11). Godwin implied that Buck had asked him to inform Dickey about the need to take a drug test, and that he was to administer the drug test. (Id. ¶ 14). Dickey asked Godwin where Buck was, and Godwin replied that Buck had left early. (Id. ¶ 16). Dickey was not informed why a drug test was necessary. (Id. ¶ 17). Turner's drug-testing policy required that a drug test be conducted within 32 hours of a workplace accident and more than 32 hours had passed since the vending machine had fallen. (Id. ¶ 18-19). Godwin did not have any paperwork for the drug test and had no drug testing training. (Id. ¶¶ 20-24). Dickey told Godwin he did not feel comfortable taking a drug test and refused to take the test. (Id. ¶ 24). Dickey was fired by a termination letter dated November 3, 2017. (Id. ¶ 25). The letter indicated Turner had "reason to believe" Dickey was under the influence of a controlled substance on November 1, 2017. (Id. ¶ 26).
Count 1 of Dickey's complaint alleges that Turner's conduct violated Iowa Code section 730.5, which regulates private sector drug testing. (Id. ¶¶ 35-48). Very broadly, section 730.5 regulates when and how private sector drug tests may be conducted. As a baseline, the statute requires that an employer carry out drug testing consistent with the terms of a written policy provided to all employees. Dickey's complaint alleges that Turner violated its written policy in seeking to test Dickey more than 32 hours after the vending machine incident, and otherwise lacked reasonable suspicion for the drug test. (Id. ¶¶ 40-46). Dickey also alleges that Turner's conduct violated the training mandates of the statute. (Id. ¶ 47). Dickey brings this claim directly under section 730.5's civil enforcement mechanism, which provides an aggrieved employee with a private cause of action when an employer violates the statutory requirements. Iowa Code § 730.5(15).
Dickey seeks relief on Count 1 authorized by section 730.5(15). That is, Dickey seeks inter alia compensatory damages, attorney's fees, court costs, and "appropriate equitable and injunctive relief, including but not limited to reinstatement, and for such other relief as may be just in the circumstances and consistent with the purposes of Iowa Code section 730.5." (Id. at 4-5).
Count 2 of Dickey's complaint alleges that Turner wrongfully discharged him in violation of public policy. (Id. ¶¶ 49-57). Specifically, Dickey alleges Turner fired him in retaliation for refusing to submit to a drug test that violated the requirements of section 730.5. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52). Dickey alleges this action violated Iowa public policy protecting employees from unreasonable, unreliable, and illegal drug testing and points to section 730.5 itself as the source of the public policy. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 53-54).
Dickey seeks relief on Count 2 in the form of compensatory and punitive damages. Dickey alleges that Turner's retaliatory discharge will have a chilling effect on employees' willingness to exercise their rights under section 730.5, (Id. ¶ 54), and accordingly seeks "punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish Defendant and to deter it and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future ..." (Id. at 6).
Turner argues that Count 2 of Dickey's Complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is "stringent." Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. , 335 F.3d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 2003) ; Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc. , 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fusco v. Xerox Corp. , 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1982) ).
For a pleading to state a claim for relief it must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. [ Horras v. Am. Capital Strategies, Ltd. , 729 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2013) ] (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) ). The complaint must contain facts sufficient to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
Ash v. Anderson Merchandisers, LLC , 799 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2015). The Court must accept as true the factual allegations made in the complaint. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. " ‘[D]etailed factual allegations’ " are not required but the pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ "
Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty , 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007) ).
Count 2 of Dickey's complaint alleges that Turner terminated Dickey because he refused to submit to a drug test that did not comply with Iowa Code section 730.5, and Dickey brings a legal claim under the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. "Iowa follows the majority of states by carving out a public-policy exception to the general rule of at-will employment for wrongful-discharge claims." Dorshkind v. Oak Park Place of Dubuque II, L.L.C. , 835 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Iowa 2013). "The public policy exception is based on the theory that the law should not allow employees to be fired for reasons that violate public policy." Borschel v. City of Perry , 512 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 1994). A prima facie case for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy includes the following four elements:
(1) the existence of a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy that protects the employee's activity; (2) this public policy would be undermined by the employee's discharge from employment; (3) the employee engaged in the protected activity, and this conduct was the reason the employer discharged the employee; and (4) the employer had no overriding business justification for the discharge.
Dorshkind , 835 N.W.2d at 300. "The first two elements constitute questions of law to be determined by the court." Id.
Turner argues Dickey's claim for wrongful discharge must be dismissed for two reasons. Turner first asserts that terminating Dickey did not violate any public policy because "no public policy exists that protects drug users in the workplace." (Def. Reply [11] at 5). Turner next asserts that a claim for wrongful discharge is only viable where "the legislature has not provided [the employee] a statutory remedy for an alleged violation of that policy." (Def. Brief [3-1] at 6). Turner thus argues that section 730.5(15)'s civil enforcement provision is Dickey's exclusive remedy for challenging his discharge based on violations of the statute. Section 730.5(15) provides as follows:
a. This section may be enforced through a civil action.
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