Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp.
| Citation | 456 F. Supp. 43 |
| Decision Date | 22 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 76-71526. |
| Parties | Edward G. DICKINSON, Plaintiff, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Larry K. Bowerman, Southfield, Mich., for plaintiff.
Catherine M. Thompson, Chrysler Corp., Detroit, Mich., for defendant.
Plaintiff, Edward G. Dickinson, brought this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act, M.C.L.A. § 423.301, and Article I, § 2 of the Michigan Revised Constitution. Plaintiff claims employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex. Defendant, Chrysler Corporation, has moved for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The facts applicable to the motion to dismiss are as follows:
Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging race and sex discrimination. On February 18, 1976, he received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in state court on February 26, 1976. Chrysler was served with plaintiff's complaint on July 7, 1976 and removed the action to federal court on July 23, 1976.
In its motion for dismissal, Chrysler contends that plaintiff failed to file suit in federal court within 90 days after receipt of his right-to-sue letter. Chrysler argues that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions and, therefore, that an action brought in state court cannot satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of Title VII.
Plaintiff contends jurisdiction over Title VII actions is concurrent in the state and federal courts and, accordingly, plaintiff filed suit within the 90-day period. Alternatively, plaintiff argues that, in the event the court rules there is no concurrent jurisdiction, the principle of equitable tolling, or a doctrine akin thereto, should be invoked to preserve his rights as a result of his filing suit in state court.
The court is presented with two issues: first, whether Title VII vests concurrent jurisdiction over actions filed thereunder in the state and federal courts; and, second, if there is no concurrent jurisdiction, what is the effect on this court's jurisdiction of filing in the state court within the 90-day period.
The initial consideration for the court is the question of concurrent jurisdiction. Few courts have rendered opinions on this point. Those that have are not in agreement.1 No appellate or Supreme Court authority is directly on point.
The grant of jurisdiction over Title VII causes of action to federal courts is set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).2 The statutory language contains no explicit statement that federal court jurisdiction is exclusive. An analysis of the legislative history of Title VII, however, is helpful to a resolution of the concurrent jurisdiction question.
Title VII was never intended to be an exclusive remedy for individuals claiming employment discrimination. It was not meant to supplant but rather to supplement existing fair employment practices laws. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1020, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). When the Senate debated the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator Clark, Democratic floor manager for the bill, stated:
Nothing in title VII or anywhere else in this bill affects rights and obligations under the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act. . . . Title VII is not intended to and does not deny to any individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under other Federal and State statutes. If a given action should violate both title VII and the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction. 110 Cong.Rec. 7207 (1964).3
Attempts were made by some members of Congress to make Title VII an exclusive employment discrimination remedy. But, in both 1964 and 1971, amendments which would have made Title VII the exclusive federal remedy for most unlawful employment practices were rejected. 110 Cong. Rec. 13650-13652 (1964); H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.Rep.No.92-238 (1971), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 2137.
The legislative history is clear that Congress intended to preserve the already existing remedies available to individuals under other applicable federal and state statutes. This fact is significant because a holding that an additional remedy such as Title VII is exclusively federal does not harm the total scheme of civil rights legislation. An entire panoply of remedies is available to the individual who claims employment discrimination. Such a litigant may choose the statutory or constitutional basis for his action and the forum, either state or federal, in which to proceed. To designate the federal courts as the sole final arbiter is not inconsistent with a recognition of the availability of other forums under other statutes and procedures.
Additionally, the legislative history of Title VII shows considerable debate relative to the relationship between Title VII and state fair employment practices legislation. Some members of Congress believed that Title VII did not give sufficient recognition to state sovereignty in this area.
In order to compromise with those who felt that the role of the states in civil rights enforcement should be kept viable, the deferral language of Section 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c),4 which was not part of the bill when it emerged from the House of Representatives,5 was introduced in the Senate as a part of the Dirksen-Mansfield-Humphrey-Kuchel substitute to the proposed act. Regarding this amendment, Senator Humphrey commented:
Senator Case remarked:
Clearly, under the mechanics of the bill in the form with which the leadership is concerned, more concern or more deference could not be given to the rights of the States. For example, the Federal agency which would be able to mediate in this connection could not consider taking any action for 2 months, if there were any State machinery at all. The States will be given that much time in which to deal with complaints. Only when the States have no colorable claim to give consideration to such matters, can they be considered by the Federal Government in the time specified; and, of course, that amount of time is to be doubled in the first year. 110 Cong.Rec. 13081 (1964).
And, Senator Dirksen noted:
With respect to the enforcement of the title, we undertook to keep primary, exclusive jurisdiction in the hands of the State commissions for a sufficient period of time to let them work out their own problems at the local level. 110 Cong. Rec. 13087 (1964).
The incorporation of Section 706(c) into Title VII established the policy of avoiding federal action whenever possible by making the state a partner in enforcement. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1974). However, the state administrative procedures alone were incorporated into Title VII with the federal courts remaining as the forum of last resort. Had Congress intended the Title VII litigant to enforce his rights in state court, the entire series of debates relative to the addition of the state administrative remedies would have been meaningless.
It is significant to note that when reference was made by members of Congress to bringing actions in court, the references were to federal court. For example, the Interpretive Memorandum of Senate floor managers Clark and Case, in discussing the enforcement procedures, stated:
Further, the enacted provisions of Title VII adopt a scheme which looks to federal court enforcement. Several subsections refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and federal statutes applicable only in federal courts.7
Although no United States Supreme Court decision directly addresses the issue of concurrent vs. exclusive jurisdiction, the decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, supra, is helpful. There, the Supreme Court specifically used the modifier "federal" when it referred to "courts."8 In an apparent attempt to exhaustively list the forums in which Title VII matters may be litigated, the Court noted:
Title VII provides for consideration of employer-discrimination claims in several forums. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (EEOC); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (state and local agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (federal courts). 415 U.S. at 47, 94 S.Ct. at 1019.
It is significant that state courts are not one of the forums which the...
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...v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 110, 112 (3rd Cir.1986) (Title VII jurisdiction is exclusively federal); 3 Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F.Supp. 43 (E.D.Mich.1978) (same). But see Bennun v. Board of Governors of Rutgers, 413 F.Supp. 1274 (D.N.J.1976) (Title VII jurisdiction is concurre......
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Joo v. Capitol Switch, Inc., 14976
...permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Doran, Inc. v. James A. Green, Jr., & Co., 511 F.Supp. 340, 342 (W.D.Mo.1981); Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F.Supp. 43, 48 (E.D.Mich.1978); compare 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (added in 1986) (eliminating requirement that state court have subject matter jurisdi......
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