Dickinson v. FL NAT. ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC.

Decision Date21 June 2000
Docket NumberNo. 4D00-358.,4D00-358.
Citation763 So.2d 1245
PartiesFred DICKINSON and the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Appellants, v. FLORIDA NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC., et al., Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Rick Polston of Polston, Dean & Healy, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellants.

Barry M. Silver of Barry M. Silver, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellees.

WARNER, C.J.

The Department of Motor Vehicles appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to change venue of the underlying cause of action to Leon County. Because we conclude that the appellees have failed to prove any exception to or waiver from the common law rule requiring that civil actions brought against a state agency lie in the county where the agency maintains its headquarters, see Carlile v. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla.1977),

we reverse.

The appellees filed suit in Palm Beach County seeking a declaratory judgment that the legislative act authorizing the "Choose Life" specialty license plate is unconstitutional and seeking a temporary and permanent injunction preventing the Department from manufacturing or issuing the plates. The allegations of the complaint do not allege that the act authorizes the Department to take any affirmative action in Palm Beach County or that the Department has taken or intends to take any such affirmative action in Palm Beach. The sole basis alleged in the complaint for the plaintiffs' venue choice of Palm Beach County is the plaintiffs' residence in that county.

The Department filed a motion to transfer venue to Leon County where its headquarters are located. The motion was supported with appropriate affidavits. In response, the appellees argued first that the "sword wielder" exception to the common law venue privilege applied to their case, because the Department was committing a constitutional violation, and it would be inconvenient and costly for the plaintiffs to bring suit in Leon County. In addition, they claimed that the Department had waived its privilege by removing "this" case to federal court in Jacksonville, not Leon County. Finally, they alleged undue delay in moving for a change of venue. We conclude that none of these arguments overcome the common law venue privilege.

Pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1999), actions shall only be brought in the county where the defendant resides. In the case of state agencies, the county of "residence" is where the agency's headquarters are located. See Carlile, 354 So.2d at 363-64

. An exception to this home venue privilege is found in the "sword wielder" doctrine, explained in Carlile:

The so called "sword-wielder" doctrine applies only in those cases where the official action complained of has in fact been or is being performed in the county wherein the suit is filed, or when the threat of such action in said county is both real and imminent....
. . . .
This exception to the common law privilege of venue is limited to those cases wherein the primary purpose is to obtain direct judicial protection from an alleged unlawful invasion of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff within the county where the suit is instituted, because of the enforcement or threatened enforcement by a state agency of a statute, rule or regulation alleged to be unconstitutional as to the plaintiff, and where the validity or invalidity of the statute, rule or regulation sought to be enforced comes into question only secondarily and incidentally to the main issue involved.

354 So.2d at 365 (emphasis added)(citing Smith v. Williams, 160 Fla. 580, 35 So.2d 844 (1948))(other citations omitted).

In Smith, the court drew a distinction between cases in which a judicial declaration is sought "where no unlawful invasion of a lawful right secured to the plaintiff by the Constitution or laws of the jurisdiction is directly threatened in the county where suit is instituted" and a case "in which the primary purpose of the litigation is to obtain direct judicial protection from an alleged unlawful invasion of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff within the county where the suit is instituted...." 35 So.2d at 847. In the first instance, the agency will be entitled to invoke its venue privilege; in the second, the sword wielder exception applies. See id. at 846-47.

The complaint filed in this case constitutes a challenge to the "Choose Life" license plate act itself, rather than a focus on the effect of the law on the rights of the individual plaintiffs. The complaint alleges the general adverse affect that the law will have, rather than identifying any specific harm that the individual plaintiffs will suffer different from the citizenry at large. It does not allege the violation of a personal constitutional right of appellees which has been or will be committed by the department in Palm Beach County.

We conclude that where the official action being challenged is uniform and statewide, and does not involve an invasion of personal rights of the plaintiff, as in the case here, the sword wielder exception would not apply to excuse compliance with the home venue rule. In New England Int'l Sur., Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep't of Ins., 511 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), we concluded that an insurer could not maintain its action for injunctive and declaratory relief in Palm Beach County against the Department of Insurance, since the suit was not brought to protect "some specific property or other constitutional right situated in Palm Beach County..." (emphasis added). Cf. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Williams, 158 Fla. 369, 28 So.2d 431 (1946)(wholesaler who sold fish caught in Lake Okeechobee to buyers in Dade County could not maintain suit in Dade to challenge regulations restricting fishing...

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9 cases
  • Stovall v. Cooper, 2D02-4606.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 27, 2003
    ...case of state agencies, the county of `residence' is where the agency's headquarters are located." See Dickinson v. Fla. Nat'l Org. for Women, 763 So.2d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So.2d 362, 363-64 (Fla.1977). Thus, under the gene......
  • SCHOOL BD. OF OSCEOLA v. State Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 22, 2005
    ...we conclude the sword-wielder exception does not apply to excuse compliance with the home venue rule. See Dickinson v. Fla. Nat'l Org. for Women, 763 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); New England Int'l Sur., Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep't of Ins., 511 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (concludi......
  • Burgess v. Crosby, 1D03-3701.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 23, 2004
    ...969 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Curry v. Wainwright, 419 So.2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). See generally, Dickinson v. Florida Nat. Organization for Women, Inc., 763 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that a petition for writ of mandamus which challenges the quasi-judicial action of an agency is......
  • FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERV. COM'N v. Wilkinson
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 17, 2001
    ..."only secondarily and incidentally to the main issue involved." Carlile, 354 So.2d at 365. See also Dickinson v. Fla. Nat'l Org. for Women, 763 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Although the supreme court officially acknowledged the sword-wielder doctrine in Carlile, it has not yet applied th......
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