Dickinson v. Granade

• Decision Date: 01 June 2016
• Docket Number: CA 16-0153-KD-C
• Parties: DAVID LEE DICKINSON, Plaintiff, v. CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

DAVID LEE DICKINSON, Plaintiff, v. CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, Defendant

CA 16-0153-KD-C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

June 1, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This prisoner action has been referred to the undersigned, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and General Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R) & (S), for appropriate action. For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action based upon Dickinson's failure to prosecute this action by fully complying with the Court's order entered April 21, 2016 (Doc. 2). As well, the undersigned has screened Dickinson's "Bill in Equity" in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and now recommends that this action be dismissed, prior to service of process, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and because it is patently frivolous. Finally, this Court has a duty sua sponte to ensure that it has jurisdiction to entertain this action and since subject-matter jurisdiction is not apparent from the face of plaintiff's amended pleading—that is, his "Bill in Equity"—this action is due to be dismissed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 25, 2002, Dickinson was indicted (in this Court) on one count of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and one count of possessing a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United States v. Dickinson, Criminal Action No. 02-00078-CG, Doc. 1. By superseding indictment, returned on June 27, 2002, Dickinson was charged again with the aforementioned carjacking and possessing a firearm during a crime of violence, and, as well, was charged with possessing an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). See id., Doc. 32. Dickinson entered a counseled guilty plea to Counts 1 and 2 of the superseding indictment—that is, carjacking and possessing a firearm during a crime of violence—on July 26, 2002, see id., Doc. 45, and, on November 13, 2002, he was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 166 months, 46 months as to Count 1 and 120 months as to Count 2, the sentence in Count 2 to run consecutive to that in Count 1, see id., Doc. 51. Dickinson's appeal was dismissed in October of 2003, see id., Doc. 57, and his collateral motion to vacate was denied on October 6, 2005, along with his motion to renounce his United States citizenship, see id., Doc. 73.

All was quiet in Dickinson's criminal case for some ten years, until January 29, 2016, when he sent a letter addressed to the Clerk of Court and attached thereto the following: (1) Declaration of Private Citizen Status; (2) Notice of Acceptance and Conveyance; (3) Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit; (4) Notice of Release and Indemnification; and (5) Deed of Trust (legal title to court case). See id., Doc. 74. Through the attached documents, all addressed to the Clerk of Court, Charles R. Diard, Jr., Dickinson purports to: (1) "convert back" to his former status as a private citizen of the United States in accordance with § 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution—Declaration of Private Citizen Status; (2) declare he is the cestui que trust, as a private citizen, enforcing his equitable rights by claiming a beneficial interest in his criminal case—indeed, his criminal case has become his private property because he has accepted the "deed" to his criminal case—and conveying to the Clerk of Court legal titleof the criminal case, as trustee, and to administer the trust as instructed in the Notice of Appointment—Notice of Acceptance and Conveyance; (3) appoint the Clerk of Court as trustee of his criminal case and "requesting" the Clerk of Court "to perform an extinguishment and a full accounting" of his criminal case and grant him any additional equitable relief to which he is entitled—Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit¹; (4) hold harmless and indemnify the Clerk of Court (as well as Judge DuBose) with respect to any costs, fines, charges, claims, etc., that might arise as a result of treating Dickinson as a private citizen—Notice of Release and Indemnification; and (5) convey to the Clerk of Court a copy of the Judgment in a Criminal Case entered against him on November 13, 2002, the first page of which is covered in Dickinson's handwriting that requests the Clerk to accept "this deed" to his criminal case—Deed of Trust. See id., at 2-12.

Some thirty days following the filing of the above information, on February 29, 2016, Dickinson sent another letter addressed simply to the Clerk of Court and attaching thereto the following "documents": (1) Declaration of Private Citizen Status; (2) Notice of Interest; (3) Notice of Release and Rescission of Signature of Suretyship; (4) Notice of Acceptance and Conveyance; (5) Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit; (6) Notice of Release and Indemnification; and (7) JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE (Deed/Legal title to case). See United States v. Dickinson, Criminal Action No. 02-00078-CG, Doc. 75, at 1. The attachments to this letter are this time all addressed toJudge Callie V.S. Granade and purport to accomplish the following for Dickinson: (1) a "conversion back" to his former status as a private citizen of the United States, conferred on the date of his natural birth on March 5, 1980, in accordance with § 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution—Declaration of Private Citizen Status, id. at 2;² (2) a declaration that he is the "beneficiary of the Constitution of the United States, and the cestui que³ of the private business trust created by the State of California on the 5th day of March, 1980 under the name DAVID LEE DICKINSON" and that he currently holds 100% beneficial and equitable interest in his criminal case because it (the criminal case) is "trust res⁴ of the said private business trust," that is, Dickinson himself—Notice of Interest, see United States v. Dickinson, Criminal Action No. 02-00078-CG, Doc. 75, at 3; (3) a notification that he is releasing "any and all personal property interest, legal and equitable, in the public United States citizen 'DAVID LEE DICKINSON,'"—as opposed to his private persona—and in his criminal case—Notice of Release and Rescission of Signature of Suretyship, id. at 4; see also id. ("I, David Lee Dickinson, intend no longer to be held as Surety⁵ for, and hereby Release myself and Rescind my Signature(s) to be held as Surety for the State-created[] publicUnited States citizen 'DAVID LEE DICKINSON,' 'DAVID L. DICKINSON,' 'David Lee Dickinson,' or any variations or derivatives of the 'nom de guerre' thereof, and furthermore, I Release myself as Surety for any and all bonds that funds the case. Through this notice, I have permanently Released myself as Surety for the public U.S. citizen "DAVID LEE DICKINSON," and am legally bound by this Release in accordance to law."); (4) a notification of his acceptance of his criminal case—more specifically, the judgment—as a private citizen of the United States—and conveyance to Judge Granade of "legal title" to his criminal case "in trust, for the benefit of DAVID LEE DICKINSON, and to establish a private trustee relationship[]"—Notice of Acceptance and Conveyance, id. at 5; (5) a notification of appointment of Judge Granade as trustee of his criminal case and accompanying demand that Judge Granade "perform an extinguishment and a full accounting of the case immediately," including that she do all in her power as trustee "to cause the immediate release of [his] physical body from imprisonment, and the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons[,]" and ordering that she "make the payment[]"⁶—Notice of Appointment and Special Deposit, id. at 6 (emphasis in original);⁷ (6) a notification purporting to hold harmless and indemnify Judge Granade with respect to any costs, fines, charges, claims, etc., that might arise as aresult of treating Dickinson as a private citizen—Notice of Release and Indemnification; and (7) conveying to Judge Granade a copy of the Judgment in a Criminal Case entered against him on November 13, 2002, all pages of which are covered in Dickinson's handwriting that calls Judge Granade's attention to her acceptance of this "Deed" to his criminal case—JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE (Deed/Legal title to case), see id, at 8-14.

All of the foregoing is necessary background inasmuch as it appears that Judge Granade's "failure" to disclaim her "trusteeship" was the impetus for Dickinson filing a self-styled "Complaint for Breach of Trust" in this Court on April 11, 2016. (Doc. 1, at 1-4.) Because it was "unclear to the undersigned exactly what type of case Dickinson has or this Court's jurisdiction to consider his complaint[,]" the undersigned entered an order on April 21, 2016, reading, in relevant part, as follows:

This lack of clarity derives, in part, from the fact that Dickinson filed in his underlying federal criminal case, that is, United States v. Dickinson, Criminal Action No. 02-00078-CG, the very "trust" documents upon which he seeks to base his complaint in this case. (See Doc. 1, at 2.) Another complicating factor is that the "relief" Dickinson is seeking in this case is the dismissal of his criminal case and his immediate release from prison. (Seeid. at 2 & 4.) And, finally, if Dickinson, in fact, is attempting to file a civil "breach of contract" action—as opposed to a motion to vacate in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2255—he is required to file a motion to proceed without prepayment of costs and fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) & (2) ("Subject to subsection (b), any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action,

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