Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. IP 90-200-C.,IP 90-200-C.
• Citation: 817 F. Supp. 737
• Parties: G. Mae DICKINSON, Metra McCulley, Thomas J. Wilson, Marilyn Wilson, Everett N. Loeb, Jr., Frank Holt, Ralph E. Sadler, Barbara Hurst-Wells, and William A. Crawford, Plaintiffs, v. The INDIANA STATE ELECTION BOARD, Evan Bayh, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, and as an ex officio member of the Indiana State Election Board, Alan K. Mills, Timothy S. Durham, and Robert H. Wright, all in their official capacities as members of the Indiana State Election Board, and Paul S. Mannweiler, John S. Keeler, and John C. Ruckelshaus III, individually as officeholders in Indiana State Representatives District 49, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

817 F. Supp. 737

G. Mae DICKINSON, Metra McCulley, Thomas J. Wilson, Marilyn Wilson, Everett N. Loeb, Jr., Frank Holt, Ralph E. Sadler, Barbara Hurst-Wells, and William A. Crawford, Plaintiffs, v. The INDIANA STATE ELECTION BOARD, Evan Bayh, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, and as an ex officio member of the Indiana State Election Board, Alan K. Mills, Timothy S. Durham, and Robert H. Wright, all in their official capacities as members of the Indiana State Election Board, and Paul S. Mannweiler, John S. Keeler, and John C. Ruckelshaus III, individually as officeholders in Indiana State Representatives District 49, Defendants.

No. IP 90-200-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

December 8, 1992.

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Richard A. Waples, William R. Groth, Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & Towe, Stephen Laudig, Laudig & George, Richard Swanson, Segal & Macey, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiffs.

Alan Mills, Diane Cruz-Burke, Barnes & Thornburg, Gene R. Leeuw, Klineman Rose Wolf and Wallack, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

McKINNEY, District Judge.

The plaintiffs in this voting rights action have moved for the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with their pursuit of the case. All the defendants opposed this motion in timely fashion, and it stands ready for resolution. After extensive consideration, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the plaintiffs' motion, with modifications.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs, who are registered voters from Marion County, Indiana, initiated this action on March 2, 1990, alleging that the alignment of Indiana House Districts 49 and 51 violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1973, as amended ("section 2"). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that these at-large, multi-member districts illegally diluted the voting strength of blacks living within them.¹ The plaintiffs sought three remedies, in addition to attorney's fees and costs: (1) a declaratory judgment that Districts 49 and 51 violated section 2, (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction against any further elections for representatives from these districts as then constituted, and (3) replacement of these districts with new, single-member districts.² The plaintiffs sued two distinct groups of defendants. The first group (collectively referred to as the "State defendants") consisted of the Indiana State Election Board, Governor Evan Bayh (in his official capacity and as an ex officio member of the Board), and Alan K. Mills, Donald B. Cox, and Robert H. Wright (in their official capacities as Board members). The second group (collectively referred to as the "Rule 19 defendants"³) included Paul S. Mannweiler, John S. Keeler, and John C. Ruckelshaus III, "as candidates for Indiana State Representative, District 49."⁴

On June 5, 1990, the Rule 19 defendants moved for summary judgment. The Court granted this motion on June 27, 1990, finding dismissal justified on two key grounds. First, the Court held that while it had power to grant declaratory judgment and to enjoin future elections, it had no authority to order reapportionment, because the only entity with power to realign state house districts— the Indiana General Assembly—was not a party to the suit. Because of this, and because it thought the General Assembly should have some input in the matter, the Court determined that enjoining the 1990 elections would be an improper exercise of judicial authority—even if it were to first find a section 2 violation. Accordingly, the Court found that any consideration of the plaintiffs' claim was improper, and it denied their request for relief in its entirety. Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 740 F.Supp. 1376, 1380-82 (S.D.Ind.1990).

The Court also held that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by laches and equity.⁵ First, the Court held that the plaintiffs had no good reason for waiting until 1990 to challenge an apportionment scheme enacted in 1981. The Court then determined that granting the plaintiffs' requested relief would result in prejudice by causing a "substantial disruption" of the 1990 election. Invalidation of the districting scheme would have required both the vacating of primary results, and either a special primary or party caucus to slate new candidates, so the Court felt that "the potential for voter confusion and assorted problems" was too great. Finally, the Court thought it unwise to proceed to the merits of the plaintiffs' case when the General Assembly by law would shortly be reapportioning the challenged districts anyway, and thereby might cure any section 2 violation. Id. at 1386-91.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. First, the court of appeals held that the General Assembly's absence did not prevent this Court from deciding whether a section 2 violation existed. Though not concluding that the General Assembly should not be a party to the suit, the court of appeals made clear that this Court should go ahead and decide if there was a section 2 violation, and then, if there was, worry about whether or not to join the General Assembly. Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 933 F.2d 497, 500-02 (7th Cir.1991). In essence, this holding mandated a trial of two parts—a liability stage (for determination of whether section 2 had been violated, and the entry of declaratory relief) and a remedial stage (during which available options could be considered). Id. at 503. Second, the court of appeals disagreed with this Court's holding on laches and equity. It held that the plaintiffs' delay in bringing suit "may not have been inexcusable," and that any prejudice resulting from a disruption of elections did "not outweigh the plaintiffs' right to a hearing on the merits." Id.

The court of appeals did agree with this Court's decision on one point, holding that on equitable grounds, "the entry of relief"— presumably, injunctive relief—was "inappropriate" because redistricting by the General Assembly was imminent. The court said that the Assembly should have a chance to "complete its duty" in this area before intervention by this Court. Id. at 502-03.

On June 14, 1991, shortly after this decision, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, realleging their original claims and adding a request for invalidation of the results for the fall 1990 elections in Districts 49 and 51. The complaint also changed the designation of the Rule 19 defendants, who had since been elected, and renamed them "individually as officeholders" in District 49. At about this same time, the General Assembly enacted legislation that replaced Districts 49 and 51 with several new single-member districts. This realignment cured the alleged section 2 violation at the core of the plaintiffs' complaint, and prompted the parties to enter a stipulation "for purposes of resolving the action." The stipulation, which was approved by the Court on October 8, 1991, admitted of no section 2 violation or Voting Rights Act liability on the part of any party. Instead, it stated simply as follows:

4. The Indiana General Assembly in 1991 passed and Governor Bayh signed a new districting plan for the Indiana House of Representatives, which eliminates all multi-member districts and the alleged violation of the Voting Rights Act.

5. Plaintiffs' lawsuit was a significant catalytic factor in achieving the primary relief sought through this litigation despite failure to obtain formal judicial relief.

Stipulation (Oct. 8, 1992) at 2-3. The stipulation also made clear that the plaintiffs could seek any available attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, if they could not reach agreement on payment with the State defendants; it made no mention of any potential fees or costs liability on part of the Rule 19 defendants. Id. at 3.

The plaintiffs formally moved for attorney's fees and costs on October 31, 1991. They asked for $117,496 in attorney's fees— $73,840.00 for William R. Groth (461.50 hours @ $160 per hour), $33,560.00 for Stephen Laudig (209.75 hours @ $160 per hour), and $10,096.00 for Richard Swanson (63.10 hours @ $160 per hour).⁶ They also asked for $1813.64 in costs—$412.69 for Groth,⁷ $954.62 for Laudig, and $446.33 for Swanson.⁸ The State defendants responded on January 29, 1992, and the plaintiffs replied on February 13, 1992. The Rule 19 defendants filed an "Amicus Curiae Brief" on attorney's fees and costs on February 13, 1992. The plaintiffs responded to this pleading, and the Rule 19 defendants replied on February 26, 1992.

II. DISCUSSION

A. General standards

In deciding whether to award attorney's fees and costs in a voting rights case, a court first must determine whether the plaintiff meets the "statutory threshold" of being a "prevailing party" in the litigation, because only such parties may be awarded fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973l(e), 1988; Texas State Teachers' Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1491, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989).⁹ A prevailing party is one who succeeded "on any significant issue in the litigation which achieved some of the benefit the party sought in bringing suit," Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), and achieved some change in the parties' relationship as a result of the suit. Garland, 489 U.S. at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. at 1493.

Next, the court must decide what award is appropriate. If the case involves one claim and one adverse party, the computation is rather simple; where several claims were involved, however, and the plaintiff did not achieve "complete success" on all of them, it becomes more complicated. If the claims involved common facts or related theories, the court has substantial discretion in formulating an award. It may eliminate specific...