Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd.

Decision Date21 May 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-2439,90-2439
Citation933 F.2d 497
PartiesG. Mae DICKINSON, Netra McCully and Thomas J. Wilson, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INDIANA STATE ELECTION BOARD, Evan Bayh, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Indiana, and as an ex officio member of the Indiana State Election Board, and Alan K. Mills, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Richard J. Swanson, Segal & Macey, William R. Groth, Fillenwarth, Dennerline, Groth & Baird, Stephen Laudig, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., David M. Wallman, Kimberlie A. Forgey, Deputy Attys. Gen., Robert S. Spear, Chief Counsel, Federal Litigation, Alan K. Mills, Barnes & Thornburg, William M. Evans, Bose, McKinney & Evans, Carolyn Ann Session, Gladys F. Willis, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants-appellees.

Before WOOD, Jr., and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs sued under section two (as amended) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 (1988) (Section Two), for relief from an alleged violation stemming from the Indiana General Assembly's 1981 apportionment. The complaint, filed March 2, 1990, challenged Indiana House Districts 49 and 51 and requested both a declaratory judgment that the districts violated Section Two and an injunction to revise the procedure for the then-upcoming November 1990 election. Plaintiffs also proposed creation of a single-member district consisting of nineteen precincts from the two districts. The district court granted defendants' summary judgment motion on the grounds that the Indiana legislature was a necessary party but was not named by the plaintiffs and that laches and principles of equity barred injunctive and declaratory relief. 740 F.Supp. 1376. Appellants argue that the legislature was not a necessary party-defendant, that the district court erred in barring the action on the basis of laches and equity principles and that the district court could have granted declaratory relief even if injunctive relief was improper.

I.

Indiana House Districts 49 and 51 are three-member districts from which representatives are elected on an at-large basis. District 49 lies to the north of an irregular boundary along 38th Street in Marion County, Indiana, and is 78% white, according to the 1980 census. District 51, lying south of the 38th Street boundary, is predominantly African-American (61.2%), again according to the 1980 count. The majority racial group in each district has consistently elected candidates of its choice to the House.

The plaintiffs claimed that the boundary between the two districts, through irregular deviations from 38th Street (a natural border between the two districts), packs African-American voters into District 51 and dilutes the votes of District 49 African-American voters north of 38th Street. Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that Districts 49 and 51 violate Section Two 1 and a permanent injunction against additional elections in these districts as constituted. They also requested creation of a single-member district comprising the ten precincts in District 49 south of 38th Street and the nine precincts in District 51 north of 38th Street. They argued that the African-American members of these nineteen precincts are sufficiently numerous, geographically compact and politically cohesive to meet the requirements for a single-member district remedy. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2766, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). According to the 1980 census, 50.27% of the new district's population would be African-American.

The alignment of the parties deserves mention. The original set of plaintiffs comprised eight African-Americans, residing and voting in Marion County, Indiana, one of whom (Dickinson) was a candidate for the House of Representatives from District 49. Originally, the defendants consisted of three groups. The first comprised five Democratic candidates running for the Indiana House of Representatives--William Crawford, Joseph Summers and John Day for District 51; Mary Moore and Craig Doyle for District 49. This group moved for, and received, permission to realign as plaintiffs. The second group--Paul Mannweiler, John Keeler and John Ruckelshaus III--consisted of Republican candidates for the Indiana House of Representatives in District 49 named as defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(2) (Rule 19 Defendants). The third group--the Indiana State Election Board, responsible for administering elections in the state; Evan Bayh, governor of Indiana, in that capacity and as an ex officio member of the Election Board; and Alan Mills, Donald Cox and Robert Wright, as members of the Board--represented the state (State Defendants). In a real sense, only the Rule 19 Defendants are adverse to the plaintiffs in this action. They raised the defenses of equity and laches before the district court, whereas the State Defendants did not join the defense and have even supported the plaintiffs' cause. Order on Affirmative Defense (May 30, 1990) (Appellees' App. at 18).

On June 27, 1990, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court first held that because the plaintiffs had not included the state General Assembly as a defendant, the court lacked power to grant any requested relief. Judge McKinney noted that Article IV, section five of the Indiana Constitution provides the General Assembly with exclusive authority for reapportionment and that the Election Board performs only an administrative function. Inclusion of one or more legislative members as Rule 19 defendants was inadequate to confer jurisdiction over the legislature as a whole. Second, the court held that laches barred any relief because plaintiffs unjustifiably waited until 1990 to challenge an apportionment plan that had been in place since 1981. Finally, the court concluded that equitable principles weighed in favor of defendants. The then-upcoming November 6 election was near and the 1990 census was in progress, implying that the balance of hardships weighed against granting a remedy. In its discussion of equitable principles, the court also expressed concern about basing a proposed remedy on the "stale" 1980 census data because the proposed single member district enjoyed only a scant African-American majority (50.27%) of voting age citizens.

II.

The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review. Plaintiffs claim that we should employ the traditional de novo summary judgment review, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Defendants assert, citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2375, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), that a reviewing court examines a dismissal on account of laches under the clearly erroneous standard for facts and the abuse of discretion standard for locating " 'a just result' in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case...." Albemarle, however, does not divest our authority to review the legal issues surrounding laches. Its teaching is that laches sometimes requires factual findings not possible under summary judgment. Whether factual findings support a determination of prejudice sufficient to justify laches depends on the legal claim asserted. The Court in Albemarle, for example, explained the standard under Title VII for claims relating to a delayed backpay remedy.

Because the district court made the equitable findings on summary judgment, we view the record and inferences from facts disclosed in it in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Jeffries v. Chicago Transit Authority, 770 F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050, 106 S.Ct. 1273, 89 L.Ed.2d 581 (1986). The issues of law surrounding the necessary party determination and other legal issues we review de novo.

III.
A. Injunctive Relief
1. General Assembly as Necessary Party

The district court reasoned that because the Indiana Constitution provides that the General Assembly has the power of apportionment, ordering the legislature to take remedial action would be an "extraordinary exercise of federal authority." Assuming the General Assembly were unwilling to adopt a remedy, the court felt that it would not have the equitable power to order the legislature to do so. 2

This is a conclusion compelled neither by amended Section Two nor by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section Two's requirement that federal courts make an affirmative effort to remedy improperly formed districts does not require that the legislature be a party. The determination of whether a Section Two violation has occurred requires no determination of legislative intent, see McNeil v. Springfield Park District, 851 F.2d 937, 940-41 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1031, 109 S.Ct. 1769, 104 L.Ed.2d 204 (1989), and the legislative presence is therefore not needed for determining a Section Two violation. In Smith v. Clinton, 687 F.Supp. 1310 (E.D.Ark.1988), a three-member district court rejected the suggestion that incumbent state legislators had to be joined as indispensable parties in a challenge to a multi-member district. The court found that the legislature's members' interests were represented and that they could intervene if they so desired. 687 F.Supp. at 1313. The federal court's remedial authority under Section Two neither depends on nor necessarily impedes the state legislature's duty to reapportion. There is nothing inherent in a court's determination of liability under Section Two that requires the legislature's presence, even if the legislature has constitutional authority for apportionment. 3

In addition, if the court below believes lawmakers are essential to a just proceeding, the appropriate representative body could be joined when necessary under Rule 19, which governs joinder of parties needed for just adjudication....

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