Dickson v. Mitta

• Decision Date: 24 October 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-CV-437 (DNH/CFH),1:22-CV-943
• Parties: SIMONE M. DICKSON, Plaintiff, v. MITTA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

SIMONE M. DICKSON, Plaintiff,
v.
MITTA, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 1:22-CV-437 (DNH/CFH), 1:22-CV-943

United States District Court, N.D. New York

October 24, 2022

Simone M. Dickson Plaintiff pro se

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

Christian F. Hummel U.S. Magistrate Judge

I. Background

Plaintiff pro se Simone M. Dickson (“plaintiff) purported to commence an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on May 4, 2022, by filing a complaint. See Dickson v. Mitta et al., 1:22-CV-437 (DNH/CFH) (“Dickson I”), Dkt. No. 1. In lieu of paying this Court's filing fee, she submitted a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See id at Dkt. No. 2. Plaintiff filed a similar complaint and an identical IFP application in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on July 8, 2022. See Dickson v. Capitol Psychiatrist Center, et al., 1:22-CV-943 (GTS/CFH) (“Dickson II”), Dkt. Nos. 1, 2. The District of Columbia transferred the

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complaint to the Northern District of New York on September 12, 2022. See id at Dkt. No. 4.

The complaints raise identical claims against the same defendants but have two differences. First, in the case caption on the first page of both complaints, plaintiff names “Capitol District Psychiatrist Center.” See Dickson I, Dkt. No. 1 at 1; Dickson II, Dkt. No. 1 at 1. However, the Northern District of New York did not include the institution as a defendant on the docket. See Dickson I. Second, plaintiff attaches to her complaint originally filed in the District of Columbia numerous exhibits that she did not submit with her complaint originally filed in the Northern District of New York. See Dickson II, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 13, 16-17, 21-53. The undersigned determines that, for the convenience of the parties and for the sake of judicial efficiency, the two actions should be consolidated under case No. 1:22-CV-437, the first filed complaint. Additionally, the Capital District Psychiatric Center^[1] (“CDPC”) should be named as a defendant on the docket. The undersigned has reviewed plaintiff's identical IFP motions and determines that she financially qualifies to proceed IFP for the purpose of filing.^[2]

II. Initial Review

A. Legal Standard

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Section 1915^[3] of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It is a court's responsibility to determine that a plaintiff may properly maintain his complaint before permitting him to proceed with his action.

Where, as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, “the court must construe his [or her] submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This does not mean the Court is required to accept unsupported allegations that are devoid of sufficient facts or claims. Although detailed allegations are not required at the pleading stage, the complaint must still include enough facts to provide the defendants with notice of the claims against them and the grounds on which these claims are based. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Pro se litigants are “not exempt . . . from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law[.]” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Ultimately, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when

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the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

Pleading guidelines are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). Specifically, Rule 8 provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “The purpose . . . is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 55 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rule 8 also requires the pleading to include “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction” and “a demand for the relief sought . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), (3). Although “[n]o technical form is required,” the Federal Rules make clear that each allegation contained in the pleading “must be simple, concise, and direct.” Id at 8(d)(1).

Further, Rule 10 provides in pertinent part that:

[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence - and each defense other than a denial - must be stated in a separate count or defense

Fed. R. Civ P. 10(b). This serves the purpose of “providing] an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Flores, 189 F.R.D. at 55 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A complaint that fails to

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comply with the pleading requirements “presents far too [] heavy [a] burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of their claims.” Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). The Second Circuit has held that “[w]hen a complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the court has the power, on its own initiative . . . to dismiss the complaint.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). However, “[dismissal . . . is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id (citation omitted). If dismissal is warranted and the plaintiff is pro se, the court generally affords the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1995).

B. Plaintiffs Complaints

Plaintiff contends that she was under the medical care of “Nurse Abna” from September 7, 2017, through November 2017; “Dr. Mitta was from August 2021 to present”; and “Iyna Maynor was from January 2022 to present.” Dickson I, Dkt. No. 1 at 4; Dickson II, Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that “Nurse Abna purposefully tried to poison me medicinally with intent to kill me but I refused the medicine[]”; Dr. Mitta went against [the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”)] and purposely up my dosage for no reason and I was human trafficked and kidnapped[]”; and “Iyna Maynor went against her objective at the company and tried to take control of my finances and she took my unemployment for nothing didn't give me medicine.” Id. Plaintiff attaches documents from the Supreme Court of the Third Judicial District in

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Albany, New York, dated May and June 2022, which authorized CDPC to administer medicine to plaintiff and involuntarily detain her.^[4] See Dickson II, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 33-36. She also submits a claim form for the State of New York Court of Claims concerning the same defendants and allegations. See id at 16-17. She includes an evaluation and discharge summary from CDPC, affidavits from physicians at CDPC concerning the need to retain and involuntary medicate plaintiff, and letters from CDPC to plaintiff explaining their applications to the court. See id at 24-29, 39-41, 42-53.

Plaintiff purports to bring this action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1039, 1113, 3435, 3481. See Dickson I, Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff asserts that defendants' conduct is a “hate crime[,]” and she complains of retaliation, “ignorance, bribery, attempt [sic] murder, [and] intentional tort[.]” Id at Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff states that she “would like” defendants “to be fired,” “would like them to be prosecuted criminally,” and she is “sueing [sic] them financially.” Id at 4. Plaintiff seeks “405 million from CDPC - Dr. Mitta, Iyna Maynor/Nurse Abna 3 million a month for life.” Id at 5.

C. Analysis

1. Jurisdiction

Plaintiff's complaint fails to establish this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Dickson I, Dkt. No. 1; Dickson II, Dkt. No. 1. Subject matter jurisdiction can be established either through federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a case “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States[]” is a

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federal question case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), a case in which a citizen of one State sues a citizen of another State, and the amount in controversy is more than $75,000, is a diversity case. If the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over federal claims, the Court may choose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .”).

Plaintiff has not named a...