Dickun v. Pittsburgh Railways Co.
| Decision Date | 27 April 1932 |
| Docket Number | 50 |
| Citation | 308 Pa. 20,161 A. 739 |
| Parties | Dickun v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued March 16, 1932
Appeal, No. 50, March T., 1932, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Allegheny Co., July T., 1929, No. 1852, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of Michael Dickun v. Pittsburgh Railways Company. Affirmed.
Trespass for death of plaintiff's wife. Before SNEE, J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $7,240. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned, inter alia, was refusal of judgment for defendant n.o.v., quoting record.
Judgment affirmed.
D. H McConnell, with him J. R. McNary, for appellant, cited: Walker v. Traction Co., 97 Pa.Super. 7; Gavin v. Transit Co., 271 Pa. 73; Giles v. Bennett, 298 Pa. 158.
James J. Lawler, with him Charles B. Prichard, for appellee, cited: Murphy v. Transit Co., 285 Pa. 399; Giles v. Bennett, 298 Pa. 158; Dangelo v. R.R., 301 Pa. 579; Shields v. Transit Co., 261 Pa. 422; Emmelt v. Transit Co., 89 Pa.Super. 417; Haughey v. Rys., 210 Pa. 363; Killmeyer v. Wheel Co., 243 Pa. 110; Kilpatrick v. Transit Co., 290 Pa. 288; P.R.R. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. 329.
Before FRAZER, C.J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.
Appellants operate a two-track trolley system on the north side of Duquesne Boulevard in Kenmore, a sparsely built suburban district of the City of Pittsburgh. The deceased, in an effort to board one of its trolley cars, crossed Duquesne Boulevard to a brick paved platform for passengers on the south side of the tracks, and then proceeded to cross the two tracks to a similar platform on the north side. These platforms were used by passengers to board or alight from cars. She had proceeded but a few steps on the second track, on which the car was running, when she was struck by it, receiving injuries from which she subsequently died.
It is the contention of the appellant that it was not guilty of negligence and that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. There is ample evidence to sustain the charge of negligence. The car was not a regular one, but was a special running at a speed of 25 to 30 miles an hour. There was no whistle or gong sounded, nor was any effort made to check the speed of the car passing the station. It ran from 100 to 110 feet beyond the stopping place after striking her.
Deceased was under no duty to anticipate defendant's negligence her duty was only to guard against injury from a car approaching at a reasonable speed and under proper control: Klingensmith v. West Penn Rys. Co., 303 Pa. 487, 490. The case is not similar to that of a pedestrian at a public crossing in an urban district, but is one of an intending passenger wishing to take a car at a station where the car regularly stops, and where it is necessary to cross the tracks to be on the side where entrance to the car is obtained. This distinction was pointed out in Klingensmith v. West Penn Rys. Co., supra, where we said that the cases of pedestrians injured at public crossings are not controlling in situations like this. Here we have a person intending to take a car that she knew was scheduled to stop at that place at that time, and it is not like the case of a person stepping directly in front of a car and being struck the instant he steps between the...
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