Didonato v. Panatera

• Decision Date: 03 February 2022
• Docket Number: No. 20-1692,20-1692
• Citation: 24 F.4th 1156
• Parties: Kylie DIDONATO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tim PANATERA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

24 F.4th 1156

Kylie DIDONATO, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Tim PANATERA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-1692

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 13, 2021

Decided February 3, 2022

Nicholas F. Esposito, Attorney, Esposito & Staubus, Burr Ridge, IL, for Plaintiff - Appellant

Michael D. Gallo, Ellen J. O'Rourke, Attorneys, Bruce Farrel Dorn & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Defendant - Appellee Tim Panatera

Stephen G. Collins, Attorney, City of Chicago Law Department, Chicago, IL, Defendant - Appellee City of Chicago

Before Ripple, Rovner, and Scudder, Circuit Judges.

Scudder, Circuit Judge.

Section 1983 lawsuits can raise hard questions about whether misconduct constitutes state or private action. While the wrongdoing alleged here is plenty disturbing, we find the line drawing more straightforward. Kylie DiDonato was seriously injured when she fell and hit her head in Tim Panatera's bathroom. DiDonato later invoked § 1983 and alleged that Panatera—a City of Chicago paramedic—shirked his responsibility to treat her and instead saw her weakened state as an opportunity to sexually assault her. She contended that this inaction by someone acting under "color of state law" violated her rights under the U.S. Constitution. The district court recognized the gravity of Panatera's alleged misconduct, but rightly concluded that DiDonato failed to plead facts showing that Panatera was acting in his capacity as a City paramedic for purposes of a § 1983 claim. We affirm.

I

Kylie DiDonato slipped, fell, and seriously injured her head on a bathtub in Tim Panatera's home in March 2018. Panatera found DiDonato disoriented and badly bleeding on the bathroom floor. But rather than calling 911, driving DiDonato to the hospital himself, or drawing upon his training as a paramedic to treat her, Panatera allegedly did no more than rinse the blood from DiDonato's head and wrap it in a towel. From there, DiDonato contends, Panatera moved her to his bed and sexually assaulted her as she drifted in and out of consciousness. When DiDonato regained consciousness the next afternoon, Panatera drove her home and then reported to work.

With the help of a friend, DiDonato made her way to an emergency room later that day. The ER team sutured her head wounds and informed her that she had sustained head trauma and a concussion.

A few months later DiDonato filed this lawsuit and, in an amended complaint, added a § 1983 claim against Panatera. She alleged that Panatera, as a licensed paramedic, violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by failing to provide medical care after her fall. She also brought a host of state law claims, including for assault, battery, and negligence.

The district court dismissed DiDonato's § 1983 claim for two interrelated reasons. First , the court explained that, under the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services and related cases, DiDonato had to allege that a state actor failed to adhere to a duty to protect and care for a person with whom the state had a "special relationship." 489 U.S. 189, 200–02, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). The classic example is a prisoner: the state owes those in its custody physical protection and medical care. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 103–04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). But, the district court continued, states (and municipalities like the City of Chicago here) are not in a "special relationship" with all residents and thus do not shoulder a constitutional duty to provide medical care to anyone needing help. Applying those principles led the district court to conclude that DiDonato failed to allege facts necessary to show the City—through one of its off-duty paramedics—had a constitutional obligation to protect and care for her following her fall. What was lacking, the district court emphasized, was any allegation that DiDonato, as a functional matter, was ever in the City's care or custody.

Second , and relatedly, the district court concluded that DiDonato failed to plausibly allege that Panatera acted "under color of state law" on the night in question. Section 1983, the court explained, does not cover disputes between private citizens, and an individual's employment by the state does not render any and all action by that person state action. To be sure, the district court acknowledged that some steps Panatera took may have amounted to medical care, such as wrapping DiDonato's head in a towel. But the district court determined that the necessary state action inquiry could not proceed at that level of generality. Instead, the analysis needed to account for the context in which DiDonato's need for help and medical care arose—an entirely private interaction between Panatera and DiDonato within his home. The alleged facts, in short, did not permit a plausible finding that Panatera failed to perform any official duty as a licensed paramedic.

Having dismissed DiDonato's § 1983 claim, the district court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

DiDonato now appeals.

II

A

A plaintiff may hold a public official personally liable for misconduct under § 1983 upon satisfying two "essential elements." Yang v. Hardin , 37 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 1994). First, the challenged conduct must have been "committed by a person acting under color of state law"—a requirement coming directly from § 1983's text. Id. Second, the state actor's conduct must have deprived the plaintiff of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; see also Wyatt v. Cole , 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) ("The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.").

The traditional understanding of what it means for an official to act "under color of state law" encompasses misconduct by officials exercising power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (citation omitted). Indeed, it is "firmly established" that a § 1983 defendant acts "under color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the State." Id. at 49–50, 108 S.Ct. 2250.

But it is equally well settled that a "mere assertion that one is a state officer does not necessarily mean that one acts under color of state law." Gibson v. City of Chicago , 910 F.2d 1510, 1516 (7th Cir. 1990) ; see also Wilson v. Price , 624 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Not every action by a state official or employee is to be deemed as occurring ‘under color’ of state law.") (citation omitted). Nor is it dispositive whether the state employee was on-or off-duty at the time the incident occurred. See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue , 663 F.2d 713, 721 n.4 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[A]cts committed by a police officer even while on duty and in uniform are not under color of state law unless they are in some way ‘related to the performance of police duties.’ ") (citation omitted); see also Pickrel v. City of Springfield , 45 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases concluding that off-duty officers were nonetheless acting under color of state law in particular circumstances). Whether an individual is acting under color of state law "turn[s] largely on the nature of the specific acts" the official performed, "rather than on merely whether he was actively assigned at the moment" to the performance of his official duties. Pickrel , 45 F.3d at 1118.

Our case law illustrates the necessity of a rigorous fact-bound inquiry. Take, for example, our decision in Pickrel. Crystal Pickrel alleged that an off-duty officer acted under color of state law by informing her she was under arrest, throwing her to the ground, and putting her in handcuffs. See id. at 1117. We concluded Pickrel had pled enough to survive a motion to dismiss based on her allegations that the officer was wearing his police uniform, complete with badge and gun, and driving his marked squad car at the time of their encounter. See id. at 1116–18 (emphasizing that the uniform and badge were both "signs of state authority," the gun enabled the officer to "enforce his authority," and the squad car "advertis[ed] the presence of a police officer" to those present).

We adhered to similar reasoning in Lopez v. Vanderwater , 620 F.2d 1229 (7th Cir. 1980). Flor Lopez brought a § 1983 suit against a state court judge who detained him at gunpoint, initiated charges for petty theft, convicted him on an allegedly forged guilty plea, and sentenced him to eight months in jail. See id. at 1231–33. Though then-Judge Vanderwater overstepped the bounds of his state-granted authority, we concluded his actions were taken under color of state law. "Action taken by a state official who is cloaked with official power and who purports to be acting under color of official right is state action," and the judge was only able to take the constitutionally offensive actions he did "because he was cloaked with the office of the judge." Id. at 1236–37.

Where, on the other hand, a plaintiff does not allege that a public official's actions involved some inappropriate invocation or exercise of state authority, there is no § 1983 claim. And that is so, our cases demonstrate, even if the alleged conduct resembles job-related tasks the official performs at the state's behest. We saw this in Barnes v. City of Centralia. 943 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2019). A police officer reported credible threats made against him and his family to a state prosecutor, and the prosecutor decided to press charges against the individual involved. See id. at 829–30. After the charges were dropped, the individual brought a § 1983 case against the officer. We...