Dieter v. Aldi, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 November 2018
• Docket Number: CIV. ACTION NO. 2:18-00846
• Parties: RICHARD DIETER, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALDI, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

RICHARD DIETER, individually and on behalf ofall others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ALDI, INC., Defendant.

CIV. ACTION NO. 2:18-00846

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

November 28, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the court in this class action filed under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., is a motion to dismiss and/or strike class allegations. (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons set forth in this memorandum opinion, the amended class action complaint (ECF No. 13) sets forth sufficient class allegations to proceed to discovery. The motion to dismiss and/or strike class allegations will be denied.

I. Background

Plaintiff Richard Dieter ("plaintiff") filed an amended class action complaint, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"), against Aldi, Inc. ("Aldi"). (Am. Class Action Compl., ECF No. 13.) Aldi filed the pending motion to dismiss and/or strike class allegations with an accompanying brief in support of the motion. (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) Plaintiff filed a response and brief in opposition to the motion. (ECF Nos. 22, 23.) On November 2, 2018, Aldi with leave of court filed a reply in support of its motion. (ECF No. 27.) The motion having been fully briefed is now ripe for disposition by the court.

For the purposes of deciding the motion, the court accepts as true the factual allegations in plaintiff's amended class action complaint. Plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, has a mobility disability and is dependent upon a wheelchair for mobility. (ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 2, 20.) Aldi is a corporation organized under Illinois law and a public accommodation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)

Plaintiff visited Aldi's Allison Park, PA, location within the last year and experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due to excessive slopes in a purportedly accessible parking space and other ADA accessibility violations. (Id. ¶ 23.) Aldi operates over 1,600 stores in 35 states and "corporately" manages all the facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 30-31.) Aldi uses centralized policies, practices, and procedures with respect to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance, and operation of its facilities. (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff alleges that Aldi's "centralized design, construction, alteration, maintenance and operational policies and practices have systematically and routinely violated the ADA." (Id. ¶ 33.)

Plaintiff's investigators examined six Aldi facilities in Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Ohio and discovered that the surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces at each facility had slopes exceeding 2.1%. (Id. ¶ 34.) In addition, two of the facilities also had the sloped surfaces of access aisles¹ exceeding 2.1%. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Aldi systematically discriminated against individuals with mobility disabilities by implementing centralized policies and practices that consistently violate the ADA's accessibility guidelines and routinely result in access barriers at Aldi's facilities. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 33.)

The amended class action complaint describes the nationwide class as:

All persons with qualified mobility disabilities who, due to Defendant's failure to comply with the ADA's accessible parking and path of travel requirements, have experienced or will experience slope-related injuries that occur within the parking facilities at all locations within the United States for which Defendant owns and/or controls the parking facilities.

(Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff asserts class claims for a permanent injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) to remove the barriers currently present at Aldi's facilities and an injunction to modify the policies and practices that have created or allowed inaccessibility to affect Aldi's network of facilities. (Id. ¶ 38.)

II. Standard of Law²

The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that with respect to class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, "[s]ometimes the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether" class certification is appropriate in a given case. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that in "rare" cases, "where the complaint itself demonstrates that the requirements for maintaining a class action cannot be met," a court may strike class allegations contained in a complaint. Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72, 93 n.30 (3d Cir. 2011)(citing Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 727, 740 (S.D. Iowa 2007)). In Landsman, the appellate court noted, however, that in all other cases (the majority of cases) "[t]o determine if the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied, a district court must conduct a 'rigorous analysis.'" Landsman, 640 F.3d at 93 (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2008)). The court of appeals explained:

In [conducting a rigorous analysis], a "court may 'delve beyond the pleadings to determine whether the requirements for class certification are satisfied.'" In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir.2001)). . . . In most cases, some level of discovery is essential to such an evaluation. In Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir.2004), we emphasized the importance of discovery as part of the class certification process. "It seems appropriate," we said, "that the class action process should be able to 'play out' according to the directives of Rule 23 and should permit due deliberation by the parties and the court on the class certification issues." Weiss, 385 F.3d at 347-48 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, "[a]llowing time for limited discovery supporting certification motions may . . . be necessary for sound judicial administration." Id. at 347 n. 17. These concerns were the basis for setting down a "rigorous analysis" requirement in Hydrogen Peroxide, where we recognized that changes in Rule 23 reflected the need "for a thorough evaluation of the Rule 23 factors." In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318.

Landsman, 640 F.3d at 93.

The court must be cognizant when evaluating a defendant's motion to strike class allegations from a complaint that "'[a]n order granting a motion to strike class allegations is tantamount to a denial of class certification after a motion to certify.'" Smith v. Merial Ltd., No. 10-cv-439, 2012 WL 2020361, at *6 (D.N.J. June 5, 2012) (quoting 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions § 3:4 (10th ed. 2013)). "[T]he burden remains with the party seeking class certification regardless who moves the court to make the determination." Blihovde v. St. Croix Cty. Wis., 219 F.R.D. 607, 614 (W.D. Wis. 2003). Regardless whether a defendant files a motion to strike class allegations pursuant to Rule 12(f) based upon insufficient class allegations in a complaint, or a plaintiff files a motion to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23 based upon a morefully developed record, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the requirements set forth in Rule 23 are met, and the court must accordingly apply Rule 23. In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d at 302 n.19; 1 McLaughlin, supra, § 3:4. It would be error for a court to apply the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal to "dismiss" class action allegations in a complaint. In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d at 302 n.19. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in In re Hydrogen Peroxide, that "the requirements set out in Rule 23 are not mere pleading rules." In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316.

At this stage in the case, because there is no factual record, "[w]hen evaluating a motion to strike allegations of a complaint, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and view all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, just as on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)." Durso v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-05352, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160596, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2013).

Based upon the foregoing discussion, Aldi may challenge plaintiff's class action allegations at this stage of the proceedings, i.e. the pleading stage. If this is one of the "rare" cases in which it is "plain enough from the pleadings" that plaintiff cannot sustain its burden to show class treatment is appropriate in this case under Rule 23, plaintiff will not be permitted to proceed with his class action allegations and they will be stricken from the amended complaint. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; Landsman, 640 F.3d at 93 n.30.

III. Discussion

A. Applicable Law: Rule 23

"The class action is 'an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.'" Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013). In order to become certified, a class must satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1)numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). In addition to satisfying the four requirements set forth in Rule 23(a), the class must fit within one of the three types of class actions set forth in Rule 23(b). Mielo v. Steak 'n Shake Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467, 482 (3d Cir. 2018). Plaintiff's amended class action complaint pleads his class claims pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) (ECF No. 13 ¶ 9), but Aldi only challenges the sufficiency of the class allegations with respect to three of the four Rule 23(a) factors. Therefore, the court will not discuss the additional Rule 23(b)(2) factor: whether "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

The court's Rule 23 analysis is "rigorous." Steak 'n Shake, 897 F.3d at 483. The...