Dietman v. Hunter

• Decision Date: 19 April 1955
• Docket Number: No. 33586,33586
• Parties: Albert E. DIETMAN, Appellee, v. George L. HUNTER, County Clerk, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 22

126 N.E.2d 22

5 Ill.2d 486

Albert E. DIETMAN, Appellee, v. George L. HUNTER, County Clerk, et al., Appellants.

No. 33586.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 19, 1955.

Harland D. Warren, State's Atty., and Frederick W. Irion, Ottawa (John J. Bresee, Urbana, of counsel), for appellants.

Berry & O'Conor, Streator, for appellee.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

The supervisor of assessments of La Salle County increased the assessed value of approximately 1400 of the 7000 tracts of real estate in one of the townships of the county above the amounts returned by the township assessor, without giving notice and an opportunity to be heard to the owners of the property in question. The plaintiff owns one of the parcels of real estate affected, and for himself and on behalf of others similarly situated, he brought this action against the county clerk and the county treasurer, as ex officio county collector, to enjoin the extension and collection of taxes to the extent that they are based upon the increased valuations fixed by the supervisor of assessments. The defendants appeal from a decree which granted the relief sought.

No question is raised as to the propriety of injunctive relief or of a representative action under the circumstances here presented. The issues for determination are whether, under the due process clause of the constitution or under the provisions of the Revenue Act, notice to the taxpayer and an opportunity to be heard are required before the supervisor of assessments may increase the assessments upon real property which have been returned by the township assessor.

The statutory plan for the assessment of real estate for taxing purposes in counties under 150,000 population contemplates that the assessment shall, in the first instance, be made by the township assessor. To achieve uniformity of assessments, it is provided that 'The supervisor of assessments shall, on or before the first day of April in each year, assemble all assessors and their deputies for consultation and shall give such instructions to them as shall tend to a uniformity in the action of the assessors and their deputy assessors in his county.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 120, par. 483.) It is also provided that after the township assessor has returned his assessments 'The supervisor of assessments shall have the same authority as the township assessor to assess and to make changes or alterations in the assessment of property, and shall assess and make such changes or alterations in the assessment of property as though originally made. Such changes by the supervisor of assessments in valuations returned by the township assessor shall be noted in a column provided therefor, and no change shall be made in the original figures. All changes and alterations in the assessment of real property shall be subject to revision by the board of review in the same manner that original assessments are reviewed.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 120, par. 576.) Thereafter, the assessment list is required to be published in a newspaper. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 120, par. 584.) After the assessment has been published, the taxpayer has a right to appear before the board of review and be heard as to the propriety of the assessment placed upon his property. Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 120, par. 589(4).

The statute does not expressly require that the taxpayer be afforded a hearing before the supervisor of assessments revises the assessment returned by the township assessor. It does expressly require that the taxpayer be afforded a hearing before the board of review, and such a hearing is required whether the assessment is that fixed by the township assessor or that revised by the county supervisor of assessments.

Due process requires that the property owner be given notice and an opportunity to be heard upon the valuation of his property at some point in the taxing process before his liability to pay the tax becomes conclusively established. A failure in this regard renders the tax void and uncollectible. Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127, 28 S.Ct. 47, 52 L.Ed. 134. On the other hand, the taxpayer is not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard at each stage, or at any particular stage, of the assessment procedure. So it has been held that if the taxpayer may be heard upon the question of valuation in an action brought to collect the tax, Weyhauser v. State of Minnesota, 176 U.S. 550, 555, 20 S.Ct. 485, 44 L.Ed. 583, or in an action to restrain collection of the tax, Security Trust and Safety Vault Co. v. Lexington, 203 U.S. 323, 27 S.Ct. 87, 51 L.Ed. 204, due process requirements have been satisfied.

The requirements of due process are satisfied by a law which affords an opportunity to be heard with respect to assessments before the board of review. 'But a law prescribing a time when complaints will be heard before the board of review is all the notice that is required. (Citation.) If the law secured to the defendant a hearing after the assessment was in fact made, of which he had notice by the statute, that would be sufficient.' Carney v. People, 210 Ill. 434, 440, 71 N.E. 365, 367; cf. Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 4 S.Ct. 663, 28 L.Ed. 569; People v. International Salt Co., 233 Ill. 223, 84 N.E. 278; People v. Shirk, 252 Ill. 95, 96 N.E. 841. In the present case the opportunity of a property owner to be heard before the board of review with respect to the propriety of the assessment of his property is the same whether the assessment is that made by the township assessor, or the revised assessment made by the supervisor of assessments. It appears, therefore, that the requirements of due process have been satisfied, and the express provisions of the statute have been complied with.

It is argued, however, that this case is governed by a different rule which was announced by this court in People ex rel. Eisele v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Co., 268 Ill. 477, 109 N.E. 311, 313, decided under the Revenue Act of 1898. There the township assessor valued the taxpayer's land at $50,000 and the improvements, a bridge structure, at $600,001, and made a debased valuation for purposes of taxation of $216,667, or one third. Without notice to the taxpayer, the county supervisor of assessments raised the total assessed value from $216,667 to $500,000, without disturbing the valuations of the land or the improvements. The court held that the increased assessment, being made without notice, was void, saying, 'The statute contemplates changes and alternations of an assessment already made. The law is settled that notice to the property owner is jurisdictional, and must precede any change or reassessment of property after an assessment has once been made. (Citations.) The property owner may always learn from the township assessor the valuation of his property when made, and if the supervisor of assessments located at the county seat could increase the assessment without notice to the property owner, it would be necessary for him to keep the supervisor of assessments in sight until the monent of returning the books to the board of review, which would be most unjust and burdensome. To impose such a duty ought not to be attributed to the General Assembly if it can be avoided.'

It is true, as defendants point out, that the result in the St....