Dietz v. Avco Corp.
| Docket Number | 645 EDA 2021 |
| Decision Date | 26 May 2022 |
| Citation | 279 A.3d 1288 (Table) |
| Parties | James DIETZ, Administrator of the Estates of John Kenneth Lallo, Sr., Deceased and Diana Christine Ceo Lallo, Deceased, John K. Lallo, Jr., Melissa Lallo-Johnson, Erica Hoar and Samantha Lallo v. AVCO CORPORATION, Lycoming Engines, AVCO Lycoming-Textron Williamsport, Continental Motors, Inc., Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc., Bendix Corporation, Unison Industries, LLC, Unison Industries, Inc., Allied-Signal, Inc., Honeywell International, Inc., Interface Performance Materials, Inc., Interface Solutions, Inc., New ISI, Inc. and Quality Aircraft Accessories, Inc. Appeal of: Continental Motors, Inc. (Incorrectly Also Named as Teledyne Continental Motor, Inc., in this Action) |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Appellant, Continental Motors, Inc. ("Continental"), appeals from the January 14, 2021 entry of judgment in this products liability action brought by the representative of the estates of John Kenneth Lallo, Sr. ("Mr. Lallo") and Diana Christine Ceo Lallo ("Mrs. Lallo") (collectively "the Lallos"), and their surviving children, Melissa Lallo-Johnson, Erica Hoar, and Samantha Lallo (collectively "Appellees"). After careful review, we affirm the jury's verdict and damages award. Having concluded, however, that the trial court erroneously awarded delay damages for Appellees’ survival claims, we vacate the judgment in favor of Appellees’, and remand for the trial court to reduce the judgment by the amount of delay damages it awarded for Appellees’ survival claims.
On August 18, 2013, Mr. Lallo, a licensed pilot, and Mrs. Lallo arrived at an airport in Kansas City, Missouri, for a return flight to their home in Ohio. Mr. Lallo fueled his aircraft and conducted routine pre-flight inspections. After receiving clearance from air traffic control, the Lallos’ aircraft proceeded down the runway and began its ascent before its engine suddenly lost power. The aircraft momentarily stopped climbing and started to descend, prompting Mr. Lallo to declare an emergency situation.
Mr. Lallo was then able to restore power to the engine, and the aircraft began a second ascent. About 12 seconds later, Mr. Lallo reported that he was "okay." Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lallo again reported an emergency and an air traffic controller cleared him to land. Mr. Lallo was, however, unable to land the aircraft safely; it crashed in a field not far from the airport, killing the Lallos upon impact.
Appellees commenced this design defects products liability action against numerous defendants, including Continental as successor in interest to the manufacturer of the engine on the Lallos’ aircraft.1 Relevantly, Appellees asserted claims for strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Primarily at issue was the cause of the loss of power to the aircraft's engine.2
Prior to trial, Continental filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the trial court apply the substantive products liability law of Ohio to this action, and, in particular, Ohio's ten-year statute of repose, which, if applied, would bar Appellees’ products liability claims. The trial court denied the motion, concluding instead that Alabama products liability law applied.3
The jury trial commenced on July 8, 2019,4 and concluded more than one month later on August 16, 2019. At the close of evidence, the court submitted to the jury eighteen special interrogatories on the verdict sheet. Following their deliberation, the jury found in favor of Appellees. The jury concluded that: (1) the engine's single drive dual magneto, a component of the engine's ignition system,5 was defectively designed and that this defect was the factual cause of the crash that killed the Lallos; (2) Continental's negligence was a factual cause leading to the Lallos’ deaths; (3) the magneto was changed or modified by non-party Quality Aircraft Accessories ("QAA") after it left Continental's place of manufacture but before the Lallos’ crash, and that this change or modification contributed to the accident; and (4) Mr. Lallo's negligence was a contributing factor to the crash. The jury did not find that Continental's conduct under a failure to warn theory was a factual cause of the crash. The jury determined that Continental was 70% at fault and that Top Gun Aviation, QAA, and Mr. Lallo were each 10% responsible, and awarded $2,000,000 to each estate for wrongful death and $2,500,000 to each estate for survival damages.6
Appellant filed a timely Post-Trial Motion, which the trial court denied in part and granted in part to mold the verdict to reflect the jury's finding that Mr. Lallo negligence contributed to the accident.7 Appellees then filed a Motion for Delay Damages.
While Appellees’ Motion for Delay Damages was pending, Continental appealed from the jury's verdict. On July 27, 2020, the trial court denied Appellees’ motion for delay damages without prejudice in light of the pendency of Continental's appeal.
Appellees then filed an application to quash Continental's appeal as interlocutory, which this Court granted on October 28, 2020. See Dietz v. AVCO , No. 1411 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 28, 2020).
Following remand, on October 30, 2020, Appellees re-filed their Motion for Delay Damages. The court held argument on the motion, and, on January 14, 2021, the trial court awarded Appellees damages for delay in the amount of $1,390,077.44 and entered judgment in the total amount of $9,940,077.44.
This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following six issues on appeal:
Continental's issues challenge the trial court's denial of Continental's post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict ("JNOV"). We review the denial of a request for JNOV for an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case or an abuse of discretion. Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co. , 876 A.2d 978, 984 (Pa. Super. 2005). In this context, an "[a]buse of discretion occurs if the trial court renders a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias or [ill will]." Id.
When reviewing the denial of a request for JNOV, the appellate court examines the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Wapner , 903 A.2d 565, 569 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Thus, "the grant of [JNOV] should only be entered in a clear case[.]" Id. (citation omitted).
There are two bases upon which a movant is entitled to JNOV: "one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and/or two, the evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant." Rohm and Haas Co. v. Continental Cas. Co. , 781 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). When an appellant challenges a jury's verdict on this latter basis, we will grant relief only "when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 69th St. Retail Mall, L.P. , 126 A.3d 959, 967 (Pa. Super. 2015).
In its first issue, Continental alleges that the trial court erred in applying Alabama and not Ohio product liability law to Appellees’ claims. Continental's Brief at 24-31.
To determine whether Ohio or Alabama law applies to the current dispute, we apply Pennsylvania choice of law principles, which use a combination of the "government interest" analysis and the "significant relationship" approach of Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 203 A.2d 796, 805-06 (Pa. 1964). By using this hybrid test, courts can analyze "the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court." Id. at 805.
Section 145(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts sets forth the factors the court should consider in conducting the analysis required under Griffith . The factors include: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1983).
Under Pennsylvania choice of law rules, we first look to see if a true conflict exists between the states’ laws. Stange v. Janssen Pharm., Inc. 179 A.3d 45, 65 (Pa. Super. 2018). Id. (citing Marks v. Redner's Warehouse Markets , 136 A.3d 984, 988 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal citations omitted)).
Choice of law analysis is limited...
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