Dietz v. Dietz

• Decision Date: 01 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1560,1560
• Citation: 701 A.2d 1144,117 Md.App. 724
• Parties: Andrea Lynn DIETZ v. William Albert DIETZ, Jr. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 724

117 Md.App. 724

701 A.2d 1144

Andrea Lynn DIETZ v. William Albert DIETZ, Jr.

No. 1560, Sept. Term, 1996.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 2, 1997.

Reconsideration Denied Oct. 29, 1997.

Frances C. Gambo, Lutherville, for Appellant

Thomas L. Hennessey, Towson, for Appellee.

Argued before CATHELL and SONNER, JJ., and PATRICK L. WOODWARD, Judge, Specially Assigned.

PATRICK L. WOODWARD, Judge, Specially Assigned.

Andrea L. Dietz appeals from the Judgment of Absolute Divorce entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on April 1, 1996, which judgment provides, inter alia, that Ms. Dietz is granted a monetary award in the amount of $245,000, payable $20,000 within 5 days and the balance in monthly installments of $1,250.00 for 15 years. Ms. Dietz raises two questions for our consideration. First, she claims that the trial court erred in the application of the three-step procedure for determining whether to grant a monetary award by failing to determine whether Mr. Dietz's interest in certain real property was marital property and by failing to ascribe a value to that interest if found to be marital property. Secondly, Ms. Dietz asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the payment of the monetary award in monthly installments over a 15-year period. Unfortunately for Ms. Dietz, we do not reach these questions, because we have concluded that the appeal in this case must be dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Andrea L. Dietz and William A. Dietz were married on January 8, 1977. Two children were born of the marriage of the parties, namely, Kevin Michael Dietz, born September 21, 1980, and Jillian Nicole Dietz, born July 26, 1982. At the time of the marriage, William Dietz was working for his father, Fred E. Dietz, Sr., and with his brother, Fred, Jr., in the family farming and dairy operation. For the first two years of their marriage, the parties lived in a farmhouse on a 700 acre farm that was leased by the family farm operation.

In 1978, Fred Dietz, Sr. entered into a contract for the purchase of a 289 acre farm known as the Lang Valley Farm. At the time of settlement on February 1, 1979, the deed that was executed by the seller conveyed the Lang Valley Farm to Fred Dietz, Sr., Fred Dietz, Jr., and William Dietz, as joint tenants. Fred Dietz, Sr. paid a portion of the purchase price at settlement, and a mortgage for the balance was executed by Fred Dietz, Sr., Fred Dietz, Jr., and William Dietz. When the From 1979 to 1984, all payments on the mortgage were made by Fred Dietz, Sr. out of the proceeds of the family farm operation. In 1984, Fred Dietz, Sr. decided to retire and transferred all of the farm operation assets to his sons, Fred Dietz, Jr. and William Dietz. Fred Dietz, Jr. and William Dietz then formed a partnership known as "Dietz Brothers Partnership," each owning a one-half (1/2) interest therein. From and after 1984, the Dietz Brothers Partnership continued the family farm operation and paid off the balance of the Lang Valley Farm mortgage.

Lang Valley Farm was purchased, the parties and their children moved to this farm and resided there until 1990.

In December of 1990, Andrea Dietz, William Dietz, and their children moved from the Lang Valley Farm to a single family dwelling that the parties had purchased in Baldwin, Maryland. Except for several trial separations, the parties resided there until September 1, 1992, when Mr. Dietz finally moved out and returned to live on the Lang Valley Farm. Ms. Dietz remained in the house until shortly before it was sold on December 7, 1993. As of February 1995, Ms. Dietz was employed full time at Artography Labs, Inc. as a customer service representative with an income of $23,000 per year.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 27, 1992, Andrea Dietz instituted this action by filing a Complaint for Limited Divorce and Other Relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. In her Complaint, Ms. Dietz sought, inter alia, an award of temporary and permanent alimony, custody of both minor children, and child support. From October 27, 1992 to February 2, 1995, several hearings were held in the circuit court on the issues of alimony, support, visitation, custody, and expenses for experts. The results of these proceedings were that (1) temporary alimony was denied by the Domestic Relations Master and no exceptions were filed by Ms. Dietz, (2) the parties were awarded joint legal custody of the minor children, with the primary physical custody of Jillian granted to Ms. Dietz and When the case came to trial on February 28, 1995, before the Honorable Robert E. Cadigan, the only issues remaining for resolution were the determination of a monetary award, if appropriate, and Ms. Dietz's request for attorney's fees. Ms. Dietz advised the trial court that she was not requesting an award of alimony. The trial court took testimony and received evidence on 6 separate dates from February 1995 to February 1996, and issued an oral opinion on February 26, 1996.

the primary physical custody of Kevin granted to Mr. Dietz, (3) Mr. Dietz was required to pay child support to Ms. Dietz of $296.48 per month, (4) a visitation schedule was established, and (5) Ms. Dietz's request for expenses for experts was denied.

In his opinion, Judge Cadigan stated that the three-step procedure mandated by Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1996 Supp.), §§ 8-203 to 8-205 of the Family Law Article ("F.L."), was followed for the determination of what property was marital property, the valuation of that property, and whether a monetary award was appropriate. Regarding Mr. Dietz's interest in the Lang Valley Farm, the trial court found that there was no legally sufficient evidence to determine the value of any marital interest in the Lang Valley Farm even if such marital interest existed. Therefore, Mr. Dietz's interest in the Lang Valley Farm was not considered in determining a monetary award. On the other hand, Judge Cadigan held that Mr. Dietz's entire interest in the Dietz Brothers Partnership was marital property. After considering the testimony from experts called by both parties, the trial court valued the partnership at $1,204,759, and Mr. Dietz's fifty percent interest therein at $602,380. Finally, Judge Cadigan considered each of the factors set forth in F.L. § 8-205(b) and concluded that a fair and equitable monetary award to Ms. Dietz was 40.7% of the marital property, or $245,169, rounded to $245,000. Judge Cadigan declared that a judgment for $245,000 would be entered against Mr. Dietz, and he would be required to pay to By check dated April 23, 1996, Mr. Dietz tendered to Ms. Dietz the first installment of $20,000 on the monetary award. Ms. Dietz endorsed the check and deposited the same on or about April 26, 1996. When the first monthly installment of $1,250, due May 1, 1996, was not paid on time, Ms. Dietz filed a Petition for Contempt seeking to have Mr. Dietz held in contempt of court for failing to pay that installment. The circuit court issued a Show Cause Order and scheduled a hearing. About the time of the issuance of the Show Cause Order, however, Mr. Dietz paid the May installment, and the hearing was cancelled. Thereafter, Mr. Dietz paid each monthly installment until March of 1997. All of the monthly payments were accepted by Ms. Dietz.

Ms. Dietz $20,000 within 30 days of entry of judgment ¹ and $1,250 per month for 15 years beginning May 1, 1996. Ms. Dietz's request for attorney's fees was denied. The Judgment of Absolute Divorce was filed on April 1, 1996, and this appeal followed on May 1, 1996.

On March 24, 1997, Mr. Dietz filed in this Court, as a part of his brief, a Motion to Dismiss Ms. Dietz's appeal on the ground that, because Ms. Dietz, knowing the facts, voluntarily accepted benefits accruing to her under the Judgment of Absolute Divorce, she has waived any errors in that judgment and is estopped from maintaining her appeal.

DISCUSSION

It is a well established rule in Maryland that if a party, knowing the facts, voluntarily accepts the benefits accruing to him or her under a judgment, order, or decree, such acceptance operates as a waiver of any errors in the judgment, order, or decree and estops that party from maintaining an appeal therefrom. Dubin v. Mobile Land Corp., 250 Md. 349, 353, 243 A.2d 585 (1968). This principle of law (hereinafter referred to as the "general waiver rule") has been applied by In Dubin, the Court of Appeals held that when a decree enjoined a mortgagee from instituting any foreclosure proceedings for any default allegedly occurring prior to a certain date, but allowed the mortgagee such expenses as may have been incurred in instituting foreclosure proceedings, the acceptance by the mortgagee of the payment of such expenses in accordance with the trial court's decree precluded the mortgagee from challenging the decree on appeal. According to the Court, "[t]he knowledgeable acceptance ... of the benefit of any portion of the decree waived any alleged error in the entire decree and estopped the accepting party from challenging the decree on appeal." Id. at 353, 243 A.2d 585; see Suburban Development Corp. v. Perryman, 281 Md. 168, 377 A.2d 1164 (1977) (purchaser at tax foreclosure sale forfeited his right to appellate review of the trial court's decree authorizing redemption of the subject properties when the purchaser accepted the payment of the costs and expenses awarded to him under that decree).

this Court and the Court of Appeals in a variety of factual and legal settings.

When a plaintiff agreed to the trial court's reduction of a jury's compensatory damage award, accepted full payment of the judgment entered on the reduced award, and had the judgment marked "Paid, Settled and Satisfied," the plaintiff forfeited his right to appellate review of the trial court's decision granting a judgment n.o.v. on the jury's punitive damage award. Kneas v. Hecht Co., 257 Md. 121, 262 A.2d 518 (1970)...