Dietz v. Dodge County

• Decision Date: 31 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. C9-91-73,C9-91-73
• Citation: 487 N.W.2d 237
• Parties: Charlotte E. DIETZ, Respondent, v. DODGE COUNTY, et al., Petitioners, Appellants.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 237

487 N.W.2d 237

Charlotte E. DIETZ, Respondent, v. DODGE COUNTY, et al., Petitioners, Appellants.

No. C9-91-73.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 31, 1992.

Syllabus by the Court

A timely petition for a writ of certiorari is the exclusive method by which an employee may secure judicial review of the county's employment termination decision. See Dokmo v. Independent School Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671 (Minn.1990); Minn.Stat. Sec. 606.01 (1990).

Thomas P. Kelly, Brown & Bins, Rochester, for appellants.

Charles F. Angel, O'Brien, Ehrick, Wolf, Deaner & Moss, Rochester, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

COYNE, Justice.

On petition of Dodge County and its board of commissioners, we consider only the question of whether, consistent with the policies announced in our decision in Dokmo v. Independent School District No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671 (Minn.1990), a petition for a writ of certiorari provides the exclusive means by which an employee can secure judicial review of the county's employment termination decision. The court of appeals held that the employee was not limited to the review afforded on certiorari, allowing thereby the maintenance by Charlotte Dietz of her action for wrongful termination. Dietz v. Dodge County, 472 N.W.2d 683 (Minn.App.1991). We reverse and reinstate the judgment of dismissal entered in the trial court.

The Fairview Nursing Home is owned and operated by the county and is overseen by two boards: the Dodge County Board of Commissioners and the Fairview Nursing Home Board. In 1982 layperson representation on the nursing home board was discontinued, leaving only active county commissioners to serve on the board. Dietz, a nursing home administrator licensed in Minnesota, interviewed with the nursing home board for the position of administrator. She claims that during the course of her second interview with the nursing home board in October 1979, a board member told her: (1) if she successfully completed the six-month probationary period, her job would be permanent; (2) "permanent" meant that she could not be dismissed without cause; and (3) the Fairview Nursing Home Personnel Policies applied to her. She cannot identify the person who made these remarks nor are they recorded in any form.

Upon completion of the interview process, Dietz was informed in writing that she had been selected as the nursing home administrator to commence work in January 1980 and was provided a copy of the home's personnel policies. In addition, there existed nursing home by-laws which purported to address specifically the terms of the administrator's employment as follows: "The Dodge County Fairview Nursing Home Board appoints the Administrator who serves an indefinite term. The Administrator may be terminated upon a 30 day written notice by either the Board of Directors or the Administrator." Dietz was aware of both documents early in her employment.

As demonstrated in summarized accounts of county board meetings, dissatisfaction with Dietz's performance began to surface in August 1983. On the occasion of the August 30, 1983 county board meeting, eight nursing home employees appeared and voiced dissatisfaction with Dietz. The following day two county commissioners presented Dietz with a letter, requesting that she tender her resignation within seven days and informing her that, failing that, the board would terminate her employment. The letter indicated that the board had identified managerial problems and low employee morale as the basis for its action. Thereafter, Dietz personally and by counsel, unsuccessfully requested information and an opportunity to respond. At a September 8, 1983 county board meeting, the board voted unanimously to terminate Dietz's employment effective September 30, 1983. No hearing was held.

On March 27, 1984 Dietz commenced an action for wrongful discharge against the county and each commissioner serving on the board during the fall of 1983. Because she did not seek review by certiorari within 60 days of notice of her termination, the county moved the district court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion was denied at that time. Dietz later amended her complaint, alleging unlawful discrimination and seeking compensatory damages, reinstatement, and damages for mental anguish. After Dietz deposed the chairperson of the county board, the district court granted the county's motion to limit discovery in accordance with the administrative nature of the dismissal action. ¹ On January 9, 1990 the district court denied the county's motion for summary judgment on the wrongful termination claim. It did, however, grant the county's motion for summary judgment on the unlawful discrimination claim; no appeal was taken from this judgment. Soon thereafter the county made three additional motions: (1) a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute; (2) a motion in limine to prevent Dietz from introducing certain evidence; and (3) a renewal of its earlier motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. At this time, the district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Dietz's failure to obtain review by writ of certiorari within 60 days of notice of her dismissal was fatal. It did not rule on the other pending motions, concluding that they were rendered moot by operation of the jurisdictional dismissal.

This court has long held that in the absence of an adequate method of review or legal remedy, judicial review of the quasi-judicial decisions of administrative bodies, if available, must be invoked by writ of certiorari. Review by certiorari is limited to an inspection of the record of the inferior tribunal in which the court

is necessarily confined to questions affecting the jurisdiction of the board, the regularity of its proceedings, and, as to merits of the controversy, whether the order or determination in a particular case was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory of law, or without any evidence to support it.

State ex rel. Ging v. Bd. of Education of Duluth, 213 Minn. 550, 571, 7 N.W.2d 544, 556 (1942) (overruled on other grounds). Moreover, the relator must cause the writ of certiorari to issue within 60 days of notice of the adverse determination. Minn.Stat. Sec. 606.01 (1990). Because it mandates nonintrusive and expedient judicial review, certiorari is compatible with the maintenance of fundamental separation of power principles, ² and thus is a particularly appropriate method of limiting and coordinating judicial review of the quasi-judicial decisions of executive bodies.

We reiterated these principles most recently in Dokmo v. Independent School Dist. No. 11, 459 N.W.2d 671 (Minn.1990). In Dokmo, a teacher sought a judicial declaration that her termination was improper and that she was entitled to reinstatement. We held that a declaratory judgment action to judicially review the school board's adverse determination was inappropriate because such potentially searching review would unconstitutionally invade the school board's decision-making processes and impermissibly upset efficiency concerns. Id. at 674-77. We concluded that judicial review, if available, had to be obtained by petition for a writ of certiorari. There was nothing particularly novel in this analysis and, historically, it has never inhered in school board cases alone. ³ Rather, the holding in Dokmo arose from a judicial recognition of separation of power concerns and a deference accorded a school board by virtue of the fact that such a body is a derivative of the executive branch of government. Thus, while the disposition of this matter is informed by and consistent with Dokmo, it does not depend on it.

For several reasons we conclude that writ of certiorari was the only mechanism by which Dietz could obtain judicial review of the county's decision to terminate her employment. First, Dietz was not entitled by statute to appeal the decision by traditional means. The county, not having statewide jurisdiction, is not subject to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, Minn.Stat. Sec. 14.02, subd. 2 (1990), and no statute specifically provides appeal to the courts from an administrative decision to terminate a county nursing home administrator. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. ch. 144A (1990); Minn.Stat. Sec. 376.55, et seq. (1990).

Second, because of the nature of the board's action upon which this dispute centers, the standard of review on certiorari is more appropriate to a review of the exercise of the board's discretion than would be the standard of review of an independent proceeding. Her request for reinstatement and damages for mental anguish highlights the fact that her claim is not an ordinary action for failure to perform on a contract for goods or services. The cause of action alleged in Dietz's complaint would require the rights and liabilities of the parties to be fixed not by the terms of the contract, but by the propriety of the county's exercise of discretion in terminating her. Compare Oikari v. Independent School Dist. No. 40, 170 Minn. 301, 212 N.W. 598 (1927); Backie v. Cromwell Consolidated School Distr. No. 13, 186 Minn. 38, 242 N.W. 389 (1932) (actions for salary in which the plaintiffs alleged their employment contracts were for a specified term). The issue which Dietz would have the court review demands scrutiny of the manner in which the county has discharged its administrative function; the very type of scrutiny that runs a grave risk of usurping the county's administrative prerogative. Thus, to the extent that she has characterized her contract as requiring cause to dismiss, she has raised a threshold issue which at least arguably renders the county's termination decision quasi-judicial in nature, warranting the issuance of writ of certiorari. See, e.g., State ex rel. Furlong v. McColl, 127 Minn. at 160, 149 N.W. 11; State ex rel....