Dietz v. Lee County School Bd., 93-03971

• Decision Date: 24 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-03971,93-03971
• Citation: 647 So.2d 217
• Parties: 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1814 Carl B. DIETZ, Appellant, v. LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 217

647 So.2d 217

19 Fla. L. Weekly D1814

Carl B. DIETZ, Appellant, v. LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Appellee.

No. 93-03971.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Second District.

Aug. 24, 1994.

Appeal from the Lee County School Board.

Robert J. Coleman, Fort Myers, for appellant.

Marianne Kantor, Fort Myers, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.

BLUE, J., concurs specially.

BLUE, Judge, specially concurring.

I concur in affirming the final agency action of the Lee County School Board which resulted in the termination of the professional service contract of Carl B. Dietz. I agree section 231.36, Florida Statutes (1991), provides no objective standard by which school boards are required to judge the conduct of instructional staff, resulting in school boards exercising a nearly pure subjective analysis when deciding to terminate a teacher during the term of a professional service contract. I write because I am not sure the legislature intended to endow school boards with this absolute discretion. If not, section 231.36 should be amended to clarify the conduct that would warrant the dismissal of teachers holding a professional service contract.

Section 231.36 appears to provide for three status categories for instructional staff: continuing contract, professional service contract, and probationary status. Each category carries a separate standard for dismissal. Probationary status provides no rights to continuing employment and is required for three years preceding either a continuing contract or a professional service contract.

A continuing contract applies only to instructional staff attaining their contract status before July 1984. Persons holding continuing contracts are subject to dismissal for conduct constituting one of the so-called "seven deadly sins:" immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, drunkenness, or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Sec. 231.36(4)(c).

By statute, all contracts except continuing must contain provisions allowing dismissal during the term only for just cause. Sec. 231.36(1)(a). The statute then defines "just cause" as including but not limited to: misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Just cause therefore includes but is not limited to five of the seven deadly sins. We assume that drunkenness and immorality, which are not included in the non-exclusive list of sins constituting just cause, would also be grounds for dismissal.

Although the statutory language requiring just cause for dismissal has been in effect for more...