Digennaro v. Malgrat
| Decision Date | 02 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:20-cv-10094-KMM |
| Citation | 522 F.Supp.3d 1189 |
| Parties | Bianca N. DIGENNARO, Plaintiff, v. Michael L. MALGRAT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Devon M. Jacob, Pro Hac Vice, Jacob Litigation Inc., Mechanicsburg, PA, Benjamin Lloyd Crump, Ben Crump Law, PLLC, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff.
Michael Thomas Burke, Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants Michael L. Malgrat, Kenneth JW Waite, Fred C. Sims, City of Key West, Florida.
Dirk Matthew Smits, Gaelan Jones Esq., Vernis & Bowling, Islamorada, FL, for Defendants Ashley N. Henriquez, Fran Herin, Monroe County School District, Kyle Sheer.
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants Ashley N. Henriquez ("Defendant Henriquez"), Kyle Sheer ("Defendant Sheer"), and Fran Herin's ("Defendant Herin") (collectively, the "School District Defendants") Motion to Dismiss. ("Mot.") (ECF No. 37). Plaintiff Bianca N. Digennaro ("Plaintiff"), as the legal guardian of HMM,1 filed a Response in Opposition. ("Resp.") (ECF No. 40). The School District Defendants filed a Reply. ("Reply") (ECF No. 41). The Motion is now ripe for review.
This case arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Am. Compl. At all relevant times, HMM was an eight (8) year old elementary school student at Gerald Adams Elementary School (the "Elementary School") in the Monroe County School District (the "School District"). Id. ¶¶ 12, 16, 34. The School District Defendants worked at the Elementary School—Defendant Henriquez as a teacher, Defendant Sheer as an assistant principal, and Defendant Herin as a principal. Id. ¶¶ 13–15. Defendants Kenneth JW Waite ("Defendant Waite"), Fred C. Sims ("Defendant Sims"), and Michael L. Malgrat ("Defendant Malgrat") (collectively, the "Police Officer Defendants") were police officers for the Key West Police Department. Id. ¶ 23. Defendant Malgrat was assigned to serve as a school resource officer at the Elementary School on December 14, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27.
The School District Defendants "knew that HMM had a Positive Behavioral Intervention Plan ("PBIP") and an Individual Education Plan ("IEP")." Id. ¶ 18. The IEP included HMM's diagnoses of Oppositional Defiance Disorder, Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Disturbance of Emotional Conduct, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and "noted the primary exceptionality as emotional or behavioral disability." Id. ¶¶ 17, 19–20. The PBIP "listed non-physical responses to be utilized with HMM to maintain a safe learning environment." Id. ¶ 30.
On or about December 14, 2018, Defendant Henriquez was assigned to supervise HMM, however HMM was not "well known" to Defendant Henriquez as she was not HMM's regular teacher. Id. ¶ 33. That same day, Defendant Henriquez reported to Defendant Herin, Defendant Sheer, and/or Defendant Malgrat that Defendant Henriquez directed HMM multiple times to either sit on a bench or to sit quietly next to her, but HMM refused. Id. ¶¶ 35–37. Defendant Henriquez "went hands-on in an attempt to physically move HMM" but HMM then told Defendant Henriquez "not to put her hands on him." Id. ¶ 38. Although Defendant Henriquez reported that HMM "punched" her, she understood that HMM merely made contact with Defendant Henriquez's body as HMM was attempting to pull his arm away from her grasp. Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
Plaintiff alleges that the School District Defendants and/or Defendant Malgrat "summoned [Defendant Waite and Defendant Sims] to the school for an unlawful purpose, i.e., for the purpose of teaching HMM a lesson and trying to scare HMM into ‘behaving’ in the future." Id. ¶ 48. Upon Defendant Waite and Defendant Sims's arrival at the Elementary School, HMM was sitting "quietly and calmly" on a bench in the hallway just outside of the school office and was "visibly upset and scared." Id. ¶¶ 50, 52. The Police Officer Defendants "intentionally led HMM to believe that he was going to jail." Id. ¶ 53. Specifically, one of the Police Officer Defendants told HMM he was going to jail and told him to stand up and put his hands behind his back. Id. ¶ 54. The Police Officer Defendants then "handcuffed and/or permitted HMM to be handcuffed." Id. ¶ 56. At some point, HMM's father was present in the school building. See id. ¶ 60.
After placing the handcuffs on HMM, the Police Officer Defendants determined that they were too large and could not be properly used on a child of HMM's size, so they removed the handcuffs and advised HMM to walk with his hands in front of him. Id. ¶¶ 57–58. HMM, "visibly upset and scared," asked for his father and was told he had left the school, even though his father was still in the building. Id. ¶¶ 59–60. The Police Officer Defendants told HMM that what happened was "very serious" and that it was time to "learn" and "grow" from his mistake. Id. ¶ 61. HMM was escorted out of the building to a marked patrol vehicle, where he was permitted to enter the rear seat without handcuffs and put on his seatbelt. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. The Police Officer Defendants "locked HMM in the back of the patrol vehicle" and Defendant Waite and/or Defendant Sims "then transported HMM to the adult jail for processing." Id. ¶¶ 64–65.
As a result of this incident, "HMM suffered a psychological injury that manifested itself physically, i.e., loss of breath, hives, stomach aches, headaches, insomnia, nightmares, and refusal to sleep alone." Id. ¶ 68.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint includes the following claims specific to the School District Defendants in their individual capacities: Fourteenth Amendment (State Created Danger) Pursuant to § 1983 (Count I); and Fourth Amendment (Duty to Intervene) Pursuant to § 1983 (Count III). Id. ¶¶ 69–76; 87–93. Now, the School District Defendants move the Court to dismiss Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Mot.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citation and alterations omitted). The court takes the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell , 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
A complaint must contain enough facts to plausibly allege the required elements. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ. , 495 F.3d 1289, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2007). A pleading that offers "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis , 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
The School District Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them because they are entitled to qualified immunity. See generally Mot. Specifically, the School District Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because (1) they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority; and (2) their actions did not violate a "clearly established" constitutional right. Mot. at 6–15. In response, Plaintiff argues that the School District Defendants’ request for immunity is premature and they are not entitled to immunity at this juncture. Resp. at 3, 9. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that "a sufficient custodial relationship existed between HMM and the School [District] Defendants"; the School District Defendants’ conduct, which "foreseeably led to an arrest and use of force solely to teach an 8 year old special needs boy a lesson" was conscience-shocking; the School District Defendants’ involvement of police violated clearly established law; and the School District Defendants’ duty to intervene required them to "stop each other from involving the police, from the start, for an unlawful purpose." Id. at 4–5, 7, 9.
"Qualified immunity provides complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities where their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Quinette v. Reed , 805 F. App'x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). A government official "is entitled to qualified immunity where his actions would be objectively reasonable to a reasonable [official] in the same situation." Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 638–41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ). To assert a qualified immunity defense, a government official must have been acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Id. (citation omitted). Once the government official establishes that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Carter v. Butts Cnty., Ga. , 821 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Courts employ a two-step inquiry to determine whether government officials are entitled to qualified immunity: (1) the facts alleged in the complaint show the official's conduct violated...
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