Diggs v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 30 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2125-16-1 |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JAMES L. DIGGS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Humphreys, Malveaux and Senior Judge Frank
Argued at Newport News, Virginia
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Stephen K. Smith for appellant.
Aaron J. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
James L. Diggs ("appellant") appeals his conviction for attempted rape accomplished through the use of the victim's mental incapacity or physical helplessness, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-61(A)(ii) and -67.5.1 On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements because he made the statements during a custodial interrogation conducted without Miranda warnings, and his statements were not voluntary. Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike, because the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to prove that the complaining witness suffered mental incapacity at the time of the offense or that appellant possessed the specific intent to commit rape. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
"In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts [are] stated in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial." Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381, 789 S.E.2d 608, 608 (2016) (citation omitted). "We also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence." Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479, 619 S.E.2d 16, 31 (2005).
On March 15, 2015, both appellant and W.F. were patients at Riverside Behavioral Center in Hampton ("Riverside"). Appellant is hydrocephalic, suffers from emotional and psychiatric problems, and has a ninth grade education. He had been committed to Riverside by a magistrate after he attempted suicide, and at the time of the offense had been a patient for nearly two weeks.
W.F., a female, was twenty-five years old at the time of the offense. Her mother testified that W.F. suffers from tuberous sclerosis and other conditions that affect her physical and cognitive abilities and her emotional state. According to her mother, W.F.'s mental and emotional condition varies daily and "[s]ome days she . . . couldn't tell the difference [between] right [and] wrong." W.F. graduated from high school with a special education diploma, but lives at home and has never been able to work. W.F.'s mother testified that W.F. was at Riverside for "stabilization" due to her premenstrual dysphoric disorder.2 Because of that disorder, W.F. "would go off every time she would have a [menstrual] cycle, so she would go [to Riverside]."During these admissions, W.F. would remain at Riverside for anywhere from three to seven days.
Dr. Jeffrey Morse, a psychiatrist, had been treating W.F. for approximately seven years by March 2015. He testified that tuberous sclerosis is a congenital condition which has various effects, both mental or emotional and physical. One of its possible effects is "[m]ental retardation." Morse testified that W.F. also has a seizure disorder or epilepsy and that she experiences episodes of hallucinations and delusions, mood swings, and agitation and aggression. Morse stated that when W.F. experiences "an episode of psychosis or mood, her condition deteriorates . . . [s]he's not able to function." Morse opined that W.F. functions at about the age level of an eight to ten year old, with ten "the highest level" of function. He also opined that the time of the offense, W.F. was functioning at about the level of a ten year old and that her limited mental abilities would have affected her ability to make appropriate decisions. Morse did not examine W.F. on March 15, 2015 or treat her during that particular stay at Riverside, although he did have some of W.F.'s records from that admission.
Amanda Ketchen, a psychiatric technician at Riverside, testified that on March 15 she saw appellant and W.F. sitting side by side in a common room. Appellant had his arm around W.F. and was whispering in her ear. Ketchen entered the common room and told appellant to remove his arm from around W.F. because Riverside patients were not supposed to touch each other. Ketchen had to intervene with appellant in this fashion at least three times. W.F. "was sitting there . . . [without] saying anything," but on one occasion she "got a little bit loud and . . . disagreed" with Ketchen's attempt to separate her and appellant.
Later that day, Ketchen was making rounds when she saw that appellant and W.F. were no longer in the common room. She went to appellant's room to look for them. There, she found W.F. sitting on appellant's bed with her pants pulled down to her thighs. Appellant wasstanding near the door, and although he was clothed, his clothing appeared to be "in a little bit of disarray." Ketchen reprimanded appellant and W.F. for their conduct and told W.F. to accompany her out of appellant's room.
W.F.'s mother spoke with her by phone every day while W.F. was at Riverside. When she spoke with W.F. on March 15, she became alarmed by what W.F. said to her. W.F.'s mother called the nurse's station and asked them what had happened to W.F. She then proceeded to Riverside, where the police had already arrived.
Detective Michael Benjamin of the Hampton Police Division visited Riverside on March 15 to investigate an alleged sexual assault. Benjamin asked Riverside staff if they could contact appellant to see if he would be willing to be interviewed by police. Staff facilitated the meeting and directed Benjamin to a room where appellant was seated. Before asking appellant any questions, Benjamin, who took notes throughout the interview, advised appellant that Appellant was cooperative and indicated to Benjamin that he understood. He spoke with Benjamin for twenty to thirty minutes and at no time said that he did not want to speak any further or that he wanted an attorney present.
Appellant told Benjamin that he had met W.F. at breakfast that morning and "the chemistry was overwhelming." Appellant said W.F. asked him if he wanted to be her boyfriend, but he told Benjamin that he "didn't take it serious[ly] . . . [s]he's a mental patient" and that he "was just feeding into the role play." When they went to appellant's room, he and W.F. began kissing and undressing and W.F. removed her pants. Appellant told Benjamin that he tried to penetrate W.F.'s vagina with his penis, but was unsuccessful despite rubbing his penis against her in an effort to stimulate lubrication. He grew tired of the effort, and when someone knockedat the door, appellant and W.F. pulled their clothes back on. Appellant told Benjamin that W.F. "wanted that shit."
Anne Kennedy, a sexual assault nurse examiner in Riverside's emergency department, testified that she examined W.F. on March 15. She noted injuries to W.F.'s vagina, specifically an abrasion to the fossa area. She explained that such abrasions are common "mounting injuries," which may occur when the penis enters the vagina. The injury constituted a break in the skin, which could have been caused by penetration or "any kind of blunt [force] trauma." Kennedy also noted W.F.'s "mental slowness or disability" during the examination. W.F. "was able to answer questions but . . . didn't understand what [Kennedy] was asking, [and] she would answer inappropriately."
Appellant was indicted for attempted rape, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-61(A)(ii) and -67.5. Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress his statements to Detective Benjamin. He argued that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because Detective Benjamin failed to advise him of his Miranda rights before questioning him. Appellant maintained that since he was not free to leave Riverside—a "locked" facility—his interview with Benjamin was a custodial interrogation. Further, appellant argued, even if the interview was noncustodial in nature, the circumstances surrounding it—appellant's emotional and mental disabilities, his commitment to Riverside following a suicide attempt, and the fact that he was on medication—would call into question the voluntariness of his statements.
At the suppression hearing, appellant initially testified that Benjamin told him he was not under arrest and could leave. However, he also specifically stated that Benjamin did not tell him that he was not under arrest. Appellant further testified that although he told Benjamin he did not feel comfortable talking with him with no one else present, Benjamin "charmed" him and appellant "eventually talked to him after he used his expertises [sic] on me."
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. It found that although appellant had been committed to Riverside under a court order, that commitment was the consequence of action by "another governmental entity—he was not there by virtue of the police," which is "what's envisioned with . . . Miranda." Appellant, the trial court found, "could have left the [interview] room." With respect to the voluntariness of appellant's statements, the trial court concluded from appellant's testimony that he was both extremely intelligent and familiar with Miranda. Although appellant testified that he did not feel comfortable with the interview, the trial court found that Detective Benjamin told appellant he was not under arrest and noted that appellant testified that he was told he was free to leave. Thus, the trial court concluded that appellant knew that he did not have to say anything to police. Further, the trial court...
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