Diggs v. Hood
| Decision Date | 04 October 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-4809,84-4809 |
| Citation | 772 F.2d 190 |
| Parties | Clarence L. DIGGS, Plaintiff, v. Billie C. HOOD, et al., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Third Party Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Richard C. Meaux, Lafayette, La., for defendants-third party plaintiffs-appellants.
McGlinchey, Stafford, Mintz, Celline & Lang, C.C. Norwood, Ernest P. Gieger, Jr., New Orleans, La., for defendants-third party defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
Before RUBIN and REAVLEY, Circuit Judges, and SEAR *, District Judge.
The issue before us is whether, under Louisiana law, one of two joint tortfeasors who compromises the claim against him and receives a release in which the injured plaintiff reserves his rights against the nonsettling tortfeasor has a cause of action against that joint tortfeasor on the basis of contribution, indemnity, subrogation, or unjust enrichment. We conclude that, under Louisiana's code articles relative to comparative negligence, a judgment against the unreleased tortfeasor would be reduced in proportion to the fault attributed to the released tortfeasor and, to that extent, the unreleased tortfeasor benefits by the settlement. Because, however, the amount of the reduction would be the dollar amount represented by the released tortfeasor's percentage of fault, the unreleased tortfeasor would realize no reduction in the amount of its net liability. In effect, the released tortfeasor has paid none of the joint obligor's debt, and hence has no claim for contribution. Holding that in this situation the released tortfeasor also has no claim for indemnity, subrogation, or unjust enrichment, we affirm the district court judgment dismissing the released tortfeasor's claims.
A Ford Mercury, driven by Clarence Diggs, was struck from the rear by an eighteen-wheel combination truck trailer driven by Billie Hood. Diggs was thrown from the Ford and sustained serious injuries including paralysis from the waist down. Diggs sued Hood, the owner of Hood's truck, and their insurers. The Hood interests filed a third party action against Ford Motor Company, seeking contribution and indemnity. Diggs then amended his complaint to add Ford as a defendant, contending that his injuries were aggravated by a defect in the seat and other parts of the vehicle. Thereafter, the Hood interests paid Diggs $1 million to compromise his claims against them. The parties to the compromise signed a release in which each of them reserved "any and all claims" they might have against Ford. Thereafter, the district court granted Ford's motion for summary judgment dismissing the third party claims against it. The summary judgment was made final and appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1982).
Under Louisiana law, joint tortfeasors are liable in solido to a person whom they injure, and their victim may, therefore, recover the entire amount of his injury from any one of them. 1 If the separate acts of two persons cause consecutive injuries to another and the harm caused by each cannot be determined, the two are considered joint tortfeasors and each is liable for the entire harm. 2 A joint tortfeasor may enforce contribution or indemnity from another joint debtor by making him a third party defendant in the suit. 3
Indemnity is due when fairness requires that one person bear the total responsibility for an injury. The basis for indemnity in the civil law, as in the common law, is restitution, the indemnitor having been unjustly enriched when the person seeking indemnity has discharged liability that was his responsibility. A solidary debtor who pays a debt that "concern[s] only" a co-debtor is, therefore, entitled to indemnity from the debtor in whose behalf the debt arose. 4 Thus a person who is held liable vicariously or passively for the tort of another is due indemnity from the culpable tortfeasor. 5 One who is himself at fault, however, is not due indemnity because liability for indemnity exists only when the party seeking indemnity, the indemnitee, is free of fault and has discharged a debt that should be paid wholly by the indemnitor. The Louisiana Supreme Court has summed up the principle this way: indemnity shifts the entire loss from a tortfeasor only technically or constructively at fault to the person primarily responsible, while contribution apportions the loss among those jointly responsible. 6
The Hood interests are, therefore, not entitled to indemnity from Ford, for neither Diggs nor they contend that Ford is responsible for the collision, which certainly caused at least some of Diggs' injuries. Ford could not, therefore, be solely liable to Diggs. If Ford's liability is established, Ford owes damages only because the defects in the vehicle it manufactured aggravated the injuries Diggs would otherwise have suffered.
Louisiana courts have also recognized an action for unjustified enrichment based on quasi-contractual principles through the "procedural vehicle evolved by French jurisprudence, the action de in rem verso." 7 To successfully invoke the doctrine, five prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the defendant must receive an "enrichment"; (2) the plaintiff must sustain an "impoverishment"; (3) the enrichment and impoverishment must be connected; (4) no legal cause must justify the enrichment; and (5) the plaintiff must have no other legal remedy practically available and the impoverishment must not have been able to be reasonably avoided. 8 These are not satisfied here, because, for the reasons set forth in Part V of this opinion, Ford has not sustained any enrichment as a result of the settlement by the Hood interests. 9 Insofar as the summary judgment dismissed the claim for indemnity, therefore, it is correct whatever theory the claim is based on.
The subrogation claim fares no better. Louisiana recognizes both conventional 10 and legal subrogation. The Hood interests have not been subrogated conventionally to all or any part of Diggs' claim against Ford; indeed Diggs has expressly reserved that claim. Civil Code article 2161 limits legal subrogation to specific circumstances, only one of which is arguably applicable here: "For the benefit of him who, being bound with others, or for others, for the payment of the debt, had an interest in discharging it." 11 Although Louisiana may recognize partial legal subrogation, 12 partial subrogation cannot be obtained here for the reasons set forth in Part V of this opinion.
The Hood interests may claim contribution from Ford only if their payment to Diggs may in some way discharge part of Ford's potential liability. This turns on whether and to what extent Diggs' recovery from Ford may be affected by the fact and the amount of the settlement with the Hood group. Contribution may be demanded only by one who has paid the "part or portion" of an obligation for which another is liable. 13
It would be a needless digression to discuss the principles that would have been applicable when Louisiana's negligence law included the rule of contributory negligence, for profound changes were made when Louisiana adopted comparative negligence in 1979. 14 Louisiana has removed the bar to the recovery of damages by a plaintiff found to be contributorily negligent, and instead reduces his recovery in proportion to the degree of negligence attributable to him. 15 While each of several joint tortfeasors remains liable for the entire amount due the injured party, 16 comparative negligence applies not only to the relative fault of the injured person and the defendant, but extends also to the assessment of relative fault among tortfeasors. Under the earlier rule, joint tortfeasors were each liable for their virile, that is per capita, share of the debt, but Civil Code article 2103 now provides, "[i]f the obligation arises from an offense or quasi-offense [a tort] it shall be divided in proportion to each debtor's fault." 17
To provide a means to apportion fault among all of the responsible parties, the Comparative Negligence Act 18 also amended the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. The amended article requires the court to submit to the jury special written questions inquiring, inter alia, not only whether the party from whom damages are claimed was at fault and the degree of his fault, but also, "whether another involved person, other than the person suffering injury, death or loss, was at fault, and, if so: (a) whether such fault was a proximate cause of the damages, and, if so: (b) the degree of such negligence, expressed in percentage." 19 In nonjury cases, the court must, upon request, give specific answers to the same questions. 20
The codal provisions do not address the effect of the settlement of a claim against one joint tortfeasor on the liability of an unreleased joint debtor. When an injured party compromises his claim against and releases one of the joint tortfeasors, two potential claims for contribution remain: (1) the nonsettling tortfeasor later cast in judgment may seek contribution from the settling tortfeasor; and (2) the settling tortfeasor may seek contribution for the settlement amount in excess of his share of liability from the nonsettling tortfeasor.
The Louisiana courts have upheld the settlement's preclusive effect on a nonsettling tortfeasor's claim for contribution from a released tortfeasor. The nonsettling tortfeasor may not demand contribution from the released tortfeasor as reimbursement for part of the amount the nonsettling tortfeasor is required to pay. 21 The settlement is "final, not only between the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor; it also [operates] to preclude the nonsettling tortfeasor(s) from subsequently claiming contribution from the released persons." 22 As a corollary, the plaintiff is entitled to recover only a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Alumax Mill Products, Inc. v. Congress Financial Corp.
...tortfeasor pays only its proportionate share of liability, and no more, there can be no liability for contribution. See Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190, 195-97 (5th Cir.1985); Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246, 1249-51 (5th Cir.1979); Bordelon v. Consolidated Georex Geophysics......
-
Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc.
...(5th Cir.1985); see also In re Incident Aboard D/B Ocean King, 813 F.2d 679, 689 (5th Cir.1987), and otherwise, e.g., Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190, 196 (5th Cir.1985) (relying on Leger ). On the other hand, in our recent decision in Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan, 841 F.2d 582, 591 (5th Cir.1988), ......
-
Brister v. Gulf Cent. Pipeline Co., Civ. A. No. 82-1069 to 82-1089
...105 & n. 3 (emphasis added). The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized Louisiana law of tort indemnity in Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1985) as Indemnity is due when fairness requires that one person bear the total responsibility for an injury. The basis for indemn......
-
Boyett v. Keene Corp.
...no less, than its own share of the judgment. It remains liable for the full amount of damages its own negligence caused. Diggs v. Hood, 772 F.2d 190, 196 (5th Cir.1985). There has been no showing that the amounts recovered in settlement from the Shipowners represented compensation for damag......
-
Loss shifting: upstream common law indemnity in products liability.
...1977); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Green v. TACA Int'l Airlines, 304 So.2d 357 (La. 1974); Diggs v. Hood 772 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1985); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 107 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. 1952); Vertecs Corp. v. Reichold Chemicals Inc., 6......