Diggs v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 March 1915
• Docket Number: 2405.,2404
• Citation: 220 F. 545
• Parties: DIGGS v. UNITED STATES. [1] CAMINETTI v. SAME.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

220 F. 545

DIGGS v. UNITED STATES. ^[1]

CAMINETTI v. SAME.

Nos. 2404, 2405.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

March 18, 1915

Concurring Opinion April 8, 1915. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Robert T. Devlin and Marshall B. Woodworth, both of San Francisco Cal. (S. Luke Howe, of Sacramento, Cal., and Nathan C Coghlan, of San Francisco, Cal., of counsel), for plaintiffs in error.

J. A. Cooper, of San Francisco, Cal. (Anthony Caminetti, Jr., of San Francisco, Cal., of counsel), for plaintiff in error Caminetti.

Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and WOLVERTON, District judge.

GILBERT Circuit Judge.

The two cases named above, although separately tried, arose out of a single transaction, in which each of the plaintiffs in error was involved. For the reason that the points presented to this court are similar in the two cases, they will be disposed of in a single opinion of this court.

The indictment against Diggs contained six counts. He was convicted on the first four counts, and there was no verdict on the last two. The first count charged him with transporting Marsha Warrington from Sacramento, Cal., to Reno, Nev., for the purpose of debauchery, and for an immoral purpose, to wit, that the aforesaid Marsha Warrington should be and become his concubine and mistress. The second count charged him with transporting Lola Norris from Sacramento to Reno, that she might become the mistress and concubine of Caminetti. The third count charged him with procuring a ticket for Marsha Warrington from Sacramento to Reno, with the intent that she should become his concubine and mistress. The fourth count charged him with buying a ticket for Lola Norris, with the intent that she should give herself up to debauchery, and for an immoral purpose, to wit, that she could be and become the concubine and mistress of Caminetti. The fifth and sixth counts charged him with persuading, inducing, and enticing Marsha Warrington and Lola Norris to go to Reno for the immoral purposes set forth in the other counts.

The indictment against Caminetti contained four counts. The indictment was similar to that against Diggs, excepting the two counts relating to the purchase of tickets were omitted from Caminetti's indictment. He was convicted on the first two counts and acquitted on the last two.

Error is assigned to the following instruction to the jury:

'After testifying to the relations between himself and Caminetti and these girls down to the Sunday night on which the evidence of the government tends to show the trip to Reno was taken, he stops short and has given none of the details or incidents of that trip, nor any direct statement of the intent or purpose with which that trip was taken, contenting himself by merely referring to it as having been taken, and by testifying to his state of mind for some days previous to the taking of that trip. Now this was the defendant's privilege, and, being a defendant, be could not be required to say more if he did not desire to do so; nor could he be cross-examined as to matters not covered by his direct testimony. But in passing upon the evidence in the case for the purpose of finding the facts you have a right to take this omission of the defendant into consideration. A defendant is not required under the law to take the witness stand. He cannot be compelled to testify at all, and if he fails to do so no inference unfavorable to him may be drawn from that fact, nor is the prosecution permitted in that case to comment unfavorably upon the defendant's silence; but where a defendant elects to go upon the witness stand and testify, he then subjects himself to the same rule as that applying to any other witness, and if he has failed to deny or explain acts of an incriminating nature that the evidence of the prosecution tends to establish against him, such failure may not only be commented upon, but may be considered by the jury with all the other circumstances in reaching their conclusion as to his guilt or innocence, since it is a legitimate inference that, could he have truthfully denied or explained the incriminating evidence against him, he would have done so.'

This assignment presents the question whether the waiver of the privilege of silence by a defendant in a criminal case in becoming a witness in his own behalf is a complete waiver, so as to place him in the position of any other witness in the case, or is only a partial waiver; that is to say, a waiver so far as the defendant sees fit to testify, leaving him, as to other matters, still under the protection of the fifth amendment. The statute of March 16, 1878 (U.S. Comp. Stats of 1913, Sec. 1465), provides that a person charged with an offense 'shall at his own request but not otherwise be a competent witness. And his failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption against him. ' Upon a careful and cautious consideration of the question we reach the conclusion that the statute should be held to mean that the waiver is complete, and that when it has been made the defendant is no longer under the protection of the amendment.

The only cause we have found for hesitation in reaching that conclusion is the fact that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, a court for which we entertain the highest respect, in a similar case (Balliet v. United States, 129 F. 689, 64 C.C.A. 201), held such an instruction reversible error. It is to be said, however, that while the opinion in that case contains no discussion of or reference to any adjudicated case of the state courts we think it is not improbable that the conclusion reached was influenced by the then settled rule of the Supreme Court of the state of Missouri. But in 1913 the Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Larkin, 250 Mo. 218, 157 S.W. 600, 46 L.R.A. (N.S. 13, overruled its prior decisions. In that case the court said:

'We have carefully examined the statutes and holdings upon this question of more than 30 states, and we find that it has been held universally that, if the defendant is not sworn as a witness in his own behalf, any comment by the prosecuting attorney on his failure so to testify constitutes reversible error, in the absence of a peremptory and proper rebuke by the trial court. But, on the other hand, except in our own state and in California, where the question has been sometimes doubted, the right of the prosecuting attorney to comment upon the failure of the defendant, when he takes the stand as a witness in his own behalf, to deny or explain incriminating facts and statements, has been uniformly held allowable.'

After citing numerous cases the court proceeded:

'The rule that no reference shall be made to the neglect, failure, or even refusal of a defendant to avail himself of his right to testify shall not be commented on, in the event he does not become a witness in his own behalf, is therefore, we find, universal; but, on the contrary, the rule that if he does go upon the witness stand he then stands in the precise attitude of of any other witness is, except in this state, and, as stated, in California. where the rule is subject to some doubt, also universal. Mr. Wharton, in his learned and able work on Criminal Evidence, lays down in the tenth edition thereof the rule that such comment is allowable.'

And the court referred to the earlier rule in Missouri as expressed in State v. Musick, 101 Mo. 271, 14 S.W. 214, in which it was said:

'These statements made by the state's witnesses were not denied by defendant, and therefore stand admitted, as much so as if the defendant had admitted them in terms.'

We think that the opinion in Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 15 Sup.Ct. 610, 39 L.Ed. 709, should be taken as affirming, in substance, what was said of the rule so expressed in State v. Larkin. In that case Mr. Justice Brewer, for the court, referring to the act of March 16, 1878, said:

'On the other hand, if he avail himself of this privilege, his credibility may be impeached, his testimony may be assailed, and is to be weighed as that of any other witness. Assuming the position of a witness, he is entitled to all its rights and protections, and is subject to all its criticisms and burdens. It is unnecessary to consider whether, when offering himself as a witness as to one matter, he may either, at the will of the government or under the discretion of the court, be called upon to testify as to other matters. That question is not involved in this case, and we notice it simply to exclude it from the scope of our observation. The privileges and limitations to which we refer are those which inhere in the witness as a witness, and which affect the testimony voluntarily given. As to that, he may be fully cross-examined. It may be assailed by contradictory testimony. His credibility may be impeached, and by the same methods as are pursued in the case of any other witness. The jury properly consider his manner of testifying, the inherent probabilities of his story, the amount and character of the contradictory testimony, the nature and extent of his interest in the result of the trial, and the impeaching evidence in determining how much of credence he is entitled to.'

In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597, 16 Sup.Ct. 644, 647 (40 L.Ed. 819) the court said: 'Thus, if the witness himself elects to waive his privilege, as he may doubtless do, since the privilege is for his protection and not for that of other parties, and discloses his criminal connections, he is not permitted to stop, but must go on and make a full disclosure.'

In Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 316, 20 Sup.Ct. 944, 949 (44 L.Ed. 1078) the court said:

'While the court would probably have no power of compelling an answer to any

...