DiGirolamo v. Apanayage
| Decision Date | 04 December 1973 |
| Citation | 454 Pa. 557,312 A.2d 382 |
| Parties | Lawrence DiGIROLAMO and Sarah DiGirolamo Apanavage, Appellants, v. Anthony R. APANAVAGE, Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
George A. Hahalis, Bethlehem, for appellants.
Jackson M. Sigmon, Bethlehem, for appellee.
Before JONES, C. J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
Sarah DiGirolamo was injured in an automobile accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle operated by Anthony R. Apanavage. At the time she was unmarried and a minor. Approximately one year later she married Anthony Apanavage. Subsequently, as Sarah DiGirolamo Apanavage (appellant), she instituted this action against her husband, Anthony R. Apanavage (appellee) seeking damages in excess of $10,000, alleging he had 'operated his motor vehicle in such a careless and negligent manner as to cause . . . extensive personal injuries to the body of the (appellant) . . ..' [1]
Appellee filed preliminary objections to the complaint, asserting appellant lacked the capacity to sue him because she was his wife. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the action of the trial court. DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 222 Pa.Super. 74, 293 A.2d 96 (1972). [2] We granted allocatur and now affirm.
The basic issue raised in this appeal is whether or not a wife may maintain an action against her husband for personal injuries caused by a tort committed prior to marriage.
By statute enacted in 1856, [3] the legislature of this Commonwealth prohibited a married woman from instituting a legal action against her husband, except in a few specified situations. One such instance was if the husband deserted or separated himself from his wife, she was given the right to institute an action against him to 'recover her separate earnings or property.' In 1893, the legislature repealed the Act of 1856, and in its stead enacted the Act of June 8, 1893, P.L. 344, 48 P.S. § 111. In Section 3, the Act of 1893 provided, in relevant part, that thereafter a married woman may sue and be sued civilly, in all respects as an unmarried person, but she could not sue her husband, except in a proceeding for divorce or in a proceeding 'to protect and recover her separate property.' The Act of 1893 was subsequently supplanted by the Act of March 27, 1913, P.L. 14, § 1, 48 P.S. § 111, but Section 3 of the Act of 1893 was incorporated therein without change. [4] Throughout the legislative history of interspousal immunity, the legislature has consistently adhered to the use of the term 'separate property.'
This Court in interpreting the 'separate property' language of the interspousal immunity statute has consistently adopted the view that unliquidated damages are not property within the meaning of the statute. In 1863, this Court in Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170 (1863), ruled an unliquidated tort claim was not 'property' as that term was used in the Act of 1856. The Court adopted the following language:
More recently, in Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962), this Court again had an opportunity to construe the meaning of the 'separate property' language in the statute and we stated: 'unliquidated claims of damage are not 'property' within the meaning of the Act.' The Meisel case is directly on point with the instant case. See also Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971). In light of the consistent position of this Court on the meaning of the term 'separate property,' and the fact that the legislature has failed to change the language of the statute, we must presume that the interpretation given to the pertinent language is consistent with the legislative design.
Moreover, the view that an unliquidated damage claim is not 'separate property', is not only consistent with the legislative design, but it is also valid for two other reasons. First, property may be defined in a number of ways, but one of the more workable definitions is: the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing. Cf. Willcox v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947). An unliquidated damage claim does not enjoy all the attributes of property, however, since it may not be assigned. See Sensenig v. Pennsylvania R.R., 229 Pa. 168, 78 A. 91 (1910); Manganiello v. Lewis, 122 Pa.Super. 435, 186 A. 218 (1936). Hence, an individual may not 'dispose' of an unliquidated damage claim in a manner in which he may normally dispose of other objects. Secondly, our legislature did not let the matter of interspousal immunity die with the enactment of the Married Women's Property Act, [5] which invested the wife with the legal power of owning 'every species and description of property, whether consisting of real, personal or mixed, which may be owned by or belong to any single woman. . . .' By itself, the effect of the language of this Act may have been to abolish the common law immunity between spouses; however, our legislature went further and preserved some of the common law by enacting the statute herein under discussion. If 'separate property' is read in the instant statute as having the same meaning as 'every species and description of property' in the Married Women's Property Act, the interspousal immunity statute would be meaningless, since every suit between spouses would be to protect or recover 'separate property.' It is therefore apparent 'separate property' as defined in the immunity statute has to be lesser in scope than an all encompassing definition of property.
We are urged to follow the reasoning of Falco v. Pados, supra, a case involving parental immunity, as well as the decisions of other jurisdictions dealing with interspousal immunity, [6] and do away with the present immunity doctrine. The difficulty, however, is the instant decision is controlled by a specific state statute. It is the function of this Court to interpret statutes, not rewrite them. If we were dealing with a rule promulgated in decisional law, we would be free to re-examine the reasoning underlying the rule, as well as the public policy considerations. However, we are here confronted with a statute enacted by the legislature, and we cannot and should not interpose our views on public policy for those of the legislature. The wisdom of a statutory provision is not for us to say.
Order affirmed.
The statute in this case which deprives a married woman of her right to file a legal claim is unconstitutional. The legislature Cannot grant immunity from suit to any person who has wronged another. There is no authority in the Pennsylvania Constitution which permits the legislature to deprive anyone of the opportunity to redress a wrong. In fact, the Declaration of Rights (Pa.Const. art. I, § 11, P.S.) specifically provides that '. . . every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law . . ..' See Brown v. Commonwealth, Pa., 305 A.2d 868 (1973) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
The above section of the Declaration of Rights, in the context of the entire Declaration, obviously uses the word Man as a reference to Human beings and not as a reference to the Male of the human species. The full protections of the Declaration of Rights are available to Females as well as Males. A legislative enactment which provides Any defendant with immunity from suit is unconstitutional.
The Court today, in the name of fidelity to legislative intent, permits perpetuation of a judicially created immunity. Not only is this Court alone responsible for the existence of spousal immunity in Pennsylvania, but claims to be bound by the pronounce-unfortunate rule is a classic example of blind adherence to precedent. The majority recognizes, as well it must, that social policies which may at one time have justified spousal immunity have ceased to exist, but claims to be found by the pronouncements of the Legislature. Although the Legislature has addressed the question of spousal immunity, its enactments, as well as current public policy, compel abolition, not retention, of this antiquated doctrine. I cannot join in a decision which refuses to correct this erroneous construction of legislative intent. This Court has acted to abolish other unjust, irrational immunities [1] and should not hesitate at this late date to permit married persons their full status before the law.
The majority's sole reason for denying appellant relief is its interpretation of the Married Womens Acts. To the contrary, Pennsylvania statutes affirmatively mandate that married women be permitted to sue their husbands for tortious conduct. The majority, however, prefers to follow outmoded and mistaken case law and holds that a married women's tort claim is not her 'separate property.'
The...
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