Dill v. Ron's Golf Car Rental, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:12-cv-00137 (JBA) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | THOMAS DILL, THOMAS R. DILL, and NICHOLAS MELLO, Plaintiffs, v. RON'S GOLF CAR RENTAL, INC., Defendant. |
Plaintiff Thomas Dill's diversity suit against Defendant Ron's Golf Car Rental, Inc. claims wrongful termination under Connecticut state law. (Compl. [Doc. # 1] ¶ 2.) On April 2, 2012, Thomas R. Dill and Nicholas Mello were added as plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs' motion for prejudgment remedy [Doc. # 21] was referred for hearing to Magistrate Judge Margolis (see Order of Ref. [Doc. # 22]), who ruled that Plaintiffs were collectively entitled to a prejudgment remedy totaling $59,292. (Jan. 24, 2013 Ruling [Doc. # 34] at 22-23.) Defendant now moves [Doc. # 45] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the prejudgment remedy amount demonstrates that Plaintiffs cannot establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs Thomas Dill, Thomas R. Dill, and Nicholas Mello, residents of Chicopee, Massachusetts, were employed by Defendant Ron's Golf Car Rental, Inc., acompany incorporated in Connecticut with its principal place of business in Connecticut. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3-6.)
In 2005, Plaintiff Thomas Dill was hired by Defendant as a truck driver. (id. ¶ 6.) He developed a close relationship with Ronnie Joppru, the owner of Ron's Golf Car Rental, Inc., and as a result, Plaintiff's son Thomas R. Dill and his nephew Nicholas Mello were hired the next year. (Id. ¶ 8.) In August 2011, Ronnie Joppru was hospitalized for a mental condition and his wife and father-in-law Kathleen Joppru and Nick Carlo began overseeing the daily operations of the company. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) Shortly thereafter, Thomas Dill's wages were reduced and, though he was unhappy, he continued to work for Defendant. (Id. ¶ 12.) On August 25, 2011, he noticed that an above-ground gas tank had been installed at work. (Id. ¶ 15.) To Thomas Dill's inquiry of Nick Carlo whether the Defendant had proper permits for the installation of the gas tank (id. ¶ 18), Carlo replied that he had not requested permits for the tank. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff Thomas Dill then telephoned the Vernon Police Department. (Id.) A police officer arrived and spoke with Kathleen Joppru by telephone. (Id. ¶ 23.) After this conversation, the police officer informed Thomas Dill that he and the other Plaintiffs were not terminated, but that Kathleen Joppru had requested they be removed from the property. (Id. ¶¶ 24-25.) Thomas Dill left the property, called the Environmental Protection Agency, and filed a complaint against Defendant for the "improper[] installation of a gas tank next to an open watercourse." (Id. ¶ 27.) Later that evening, Kathleen Joppru told Plaintiff ThomasDill by telephone that "he and his family were not welcome to return to work," thereby terminating their employment. (Id. ¶¶ 28-31.)
Plaintiffs allege that they were wrongfully terminated in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q as a result of Thomas Dill's complaints concerning the installation of the above-ground gas tank on Defendant's premises. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 36.) In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to damages in excess of $75,000 for back pay, the value of lost employment benefits, pay for the years Plaintiffs would have worked absent their wrongful termination, compensation for physical and emotional pain and suffering, punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs. (Id. at 13.)
Defendant moves to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to allege damages meeting the requisite jurisdictional amount in controversy. Further, Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff Thomas Dill'sdamages exceed $75,000, the Court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Thomas R. Dill's and Nicholas Mello's claims because they are not part of the same case or controversy.
Defendant argues that Magistrate Judge Margolis's prejudgment damage award fell short of the $75,000 jurisdictional amount, and that this analysis should "trump plaintiffs' self-serving speculation" in the Amended Complaint that the amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied. (Reply [Doc. # 50] at 2-3.)
District courts have diversity jurisdiction in "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different states." 28 U.S.C. § 1332. "A party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of proving that it appears to a 'reasonable probability' that the claim is in excess of the statutory jurisdictional amount." Tongkook Am. v. Shipton Sportswear Co., 14 F.3d 781, 784 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moore v. Betit, 511 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1975)). "This burden is hardly onerous, however, for [the Second Circuit] recognize[s] a rebuttable presumption that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of the actual amount in controversy." Wolde-Meskel v. Vocational Instruction Project Cmty. Servs., Inc., 166 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To overcome the face-of-the-complaint presumption, the party opposing jurisdiction must show 'to a legal certainty' that the amount recoverabledoes not meet the jurisdictional threshold." Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 347 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938)). "[E]ven where the allegations leave grave doubt about the likelihood of a recovery of the requisite amount, dismissal is not warranted." Brown v. New York State Supreme Court for Second Judicial Dist., 680 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Insufficient amount in controversy may be found if "a specific rule of substantive law or measure of damages limits the money recoverable . . . [or if] independent facts show that the amount of damages was claimed by the plaintiff merely to obtain federal court jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 3702). Because the Amended Complaint provides only a bare assertion that the amount in controversy has been met, the Court will look beyond the pleadings to information otherwise available in the record. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. Centermark Properties Meriden Square, 30 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1994) ().
In support of their motion for prejudgment remedy, Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit by Plaintiff Thomas Dill, claiming approximately $150,000 in net lost wages andother damages as of October 5, 2012. (Thomas Dill Aff. [Doc. # 21] at 8, ¶ 20.) In his testimony before Magistrate Judge Margolis, he claimed past and future lost wages and future lost wages totalling $190,250. (Jan. 24, 2013 Ruling at 15.) Of the $190,250 total lost wage claims, Magistrate Judge Margolis found probable cause for attachment only in the amount of $34,475. (Id. at 22.)
Defendant argues that the Court should rely on the prejudgment remedy attachment amount awarded to determine the amount in controversy. (Reply at 3.) However, because Magistrate Judge Margolis's ruling is based on a probable cause standard, not a legal certainty standard, and assesses only the extent to which Plaintiffs have shown in that hearing that they are entitled to prejudgment attachment (see Jan. 24, 2013 Ruling at 17), the prejudgment remedy award should not be dispositive of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Wolde-Meskel, 166 F.3d at 63 . Although Magistrate Judge Margolis rejected Plaintiff Thomas Dill's claimed $1500 weekly salary as not credible, his lost salary damage claim is central in the dispute between him and his employer and it does not appear to be claimed solely for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction. See Brown, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (). Because the prejudgment remedy ruling does not conclude to a legal certainty that Plaintiffs cannot prove a higher salary claim and/or non-economic damages that would meet the jurisdictional threshold, the prejudgment remedy ruling alone is insufficient to foreclose jurisdiction, although it may be useful in fleshing out the amount in controversy encompassed by the allegations of the Amended Complaint. See Hough v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 283, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (). Here, the prejudgment remedy ruling clarifies that Plaintiff Thomas Dill claims that he suffered damages for lost wages, lost benefits, and future lost wages (Am. Compl. at 13), of approximately $190,000. (See Jan. 24, 2013 Ruling at 15.) That he did not secure a prejudgment remedy in that amount points to the quality of evidence offered at that stage, but not to any legal certainty that a greater damages sum...
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