Dill v. Save-A-Lot, Ltd., No. 1:99CV207-D-D (N.D. Miss. 8/29/2000)
| Decision Date | 29 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:99CV207-D-D.,1:99CV207-D-D. |
| Parties | TERRY LYNN DILL, PLAINTIFF, v. SAVE-A-LOT, LTD., DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the court is the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted.
The Plaintiff, Terry Dill, was employed by the Defendant, Save-A-Lot, beginning in September of 1997, when he was hired as a grocery store co-manager. After brief stints at Save-A-Lot's Tupelo and Houston locations, Dill was permanently assigned to Save-A-Lot's Amory store in February of 1998 and was promoted to store manager about a month later.
On March 20, 1998, Dill fell out of a truck while at work and injured his knee. In May of 1999, Dill sought treatment for his knee injury; he underwent knee surgery on May 24, 1999 and, as a result of the surgery, was expected to be away from work for four weeks. Then, on June 4, 1999, Save-A-Lot terminated Dill's employment for, inter alia, "scheduling elective surgery and planning to leave store for extended period of time without notifying district or division manager to ensure management coverage of the store."
On July 9, 1999, Dill filed this suit, asserting the following federal claim and two state law claims:
violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 —
2654 (FMLA), because he was fired, in part, because he took necessary medical leave;
discharge in violation of public policy; and
breach of various provisions contained in Save-A-Lot's employee handbook.
On June 8, 2000, Save-A-Lot moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
While all legitimate factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Under the provisions of the FMLA, an eligible employee is entitled to a total of twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve month period "[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). It is unlawful for any employer to deny the exercise of any right provided for under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
Before a plaintiff may state a cause of action under the FMLA, however, two prerequisites must be met. First, the defendant employer must meet the statutory definition of "employer"under 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A). This requirement states that an employer must be engaged in interstate commerce and have a total of at least fifty employees. Save-A-Lot admits that it is a qualifying employer under the FMLA. Second, the plaintiff must be an "eligible employee" under 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2). The term "eligible employee," however, does not include:
any employee of an employer who is employed at a worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees employed by the employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50.
29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). It is this exclusion that renders Dill's FMLA claim meritless; he does not qualify as an eligible employee under the FMLA and cannot state a claim under the FMLA.
Dill was employed at Save-A-Lot's Amory, Mississippi, worksite. Only two other Save-A-Lot worksites, located at Tupelo and Houston, are located within seventy-five miles of Amory. Combining all three stores together, it is undisputed that Save-A-Lot, as of May 22, 1999, employed less than fifty employees within seventy-five miles of the Amory store. See Gazda v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc., 10 F. Supp.2d 656, 674 (S.D.Tex. 1997) (...
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